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ABSTRACT
This dissertation explores how individual members of Congress pursue policy goals by
engaging with the bureaucracy. This behavior, which I call “backchannel policymaking”, is a
new way of thinking about policymaking and representational behavior, distinct from previously
studied channels of the lawmaking process like roll call votes or bill introductions. I develop and
test a theory to explain why members of Congress choose to engage with the bureaucracy. I
consider whether backchannel policymaking serves as an alternative path for policy influence,
which members of Congress use to circumvent the legislative process. My analyses, which focus
on senators’ policy contact with the bureaucracy during the 110th and the 111th Congresses and
draw on original bureaucratic records from the U.S. Departments of Labor and Homeland
Security, reveal that a senator’s institutional position, constraints, and behavior within the
legislative process predict her engagement in backchannel policymaking. These findings
illustrate how members of Congress try to influence policy outside of the formal lawmaking
process.
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1CHAPTER 1
The Bureaucracy: Congress’ Backchannel of Policy Influence
In the summer of 2005, Senators Elizabeth Dole and Richard Burr, both first term
Republican senators representing North Carolina, encountered a dilemma. The U.S.-Central
America Free Trade Agreement (CAFTA)1 was about to come up for a vote. Republicans in both
the House and the Senate faced pressure and intense lobbying from the Bush administration and
leadership of the GOP-controlled Congress to vote the party line and pass CAFTA (Andrews
2005; Edsall 2005; Mowbray 2005). However, Senators Dole and Burr struggled with the vote
and the potential harm to North Carolina’s textile industry.
Adding to the contention, the decline of the state’s manufacturing industry in previous
years had been blamed largely on the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) (Funk
2005), 2 which became a heated issue during Dole’s 2002 campaign (Morrill 2002). Burr’s 2004
campaign opponent also used the issue to attack the then-House member (Morrill and Johnson
2004). Senators Dole and Burr, along with many of their Republican colleagues, faced the
conflict of partisan pressure versus state interests. This conflict was particularly sharp for
senators in swing states like North Carolina, where large segments of the constituency did not
share their partisan affiliation.
Moreover, Burr and Dole faced several constraints which exacerbated their predicament.
They made statements claiming that they would not vote for CAFTA unless they could make
1 The U.S.-Central America Free Trade Agreement (CAFTA or CAFTA-DR) is a trade pact with Costa
Rica, the Dominican Republic, El Salvador, Guatemala, Honduras, and Nicaragua (congress.gov).
2 North Carolina had already experienced a loss of 90,000 textile and apparel manufacturing jobs since
1994 and 131 plant closings since 1997 (Fletcher 2005).
2changes protecting North Carolina’s textile industry, but making such changes through the
legislative process proved impossible (Johnson 2004). Neither senator was a member of the
Senate Finance Committee, which had jurisdiction over CAFTA, and the fast-track rules on trade
pacts (PL 107-210) do not allow for amendments (Norton 2005). These constraints limited the
senators’ capability to influence the bill before having to commit to an up-or-down vote. In the
end, Senators Dole and Burr toed the party line and voted for CAFTA along with most of their
Republican colleagues, despite the potential damage to the state’s textile industry.
However, their attention to CAFTA did not end with the vote in 2005.3 Two years later,
the senators wrote a joint letter to the Department of Labor requesting that the sock industry,
important to their home state, receive protection from CAFTA via an increase of the duty on
socks imported from Honduras. 4 About three months after the senators sent the letter, the
administration announced it would be increasing the duty on Honduras’ socks (International
Trade Administration 2008).5
3 The Senate voted on CAFTA (S. 1307) on June 30, 2005 and passed the final version (H.R. 3045) on
July 28, 2005. CAFTA become public law on August 2, 2005 (Thomas.gov).
4 The letter was received on October 4, 2007. While it is not entirely clear why the senators waited two
years before contacting the Department of Labor about the issue, some news coverage (Mowbray 2005)
suggests that the Bush administration, in order to ensure the senators’ votes, informally agreed to provide
protections for domestic sock producers if damage to the industry became evident.
5 The Department of Labor is represented on the U.S. Committee for the Implementation of Textile
Agreements (CITA), an interagency committee responsible for textile trade policy, including the
implementation of textile trade agreements and textile and apparel safeguards. The Departments of State,
3The senators’ persistence in pursuing their policy goal by reaching out to the bureaucracy
is not unique. In fact, their behavior is an example of a widespread but largely unrecognized
means of policymaking and representation. I argue that legislators regularly pursue policy goals
by engaging with the numerous departments and agencies within the executive branch in an
effort to influence policy and represent the interests of their districts and states. I term this
behavior backchannel policymaking. Participation in Congress does not end with a vote. Nor is a
legislator’s influence restricted to committees and the chamber floor. Instead, legislators also
pursue their goals and the interests of their states and districts outside of the legislative process
by communicating directly with the departments and agencies that decide how and to what extent
policies will be put into effect.
To give just a few examples of this behavior, in 2007, Senator Barbara Boxer sent a letter
to the Secretary of the Navy requesting that he cease all sonar training exercises in the waters off
of Southern California until measures are taken to protect marine life. Earlier that year, Senator
Jeff Bingaman wrote to the Department of Commerce to request an expansion of the Foreign
Trade Zone in Doña Ana County in order to facilitate international trade and boost the local
economy. In 2011, Senator Richard Lugar wrote to the Department of Energy requesting the
department’s views on identifying and overcoming the primary obstacles to domestic oil
production. That same year, Senator Robert Casey wrote to Energy Secretary Steven Chu
requesting that the department implement protections for public safety from oil and gas drilling.
These examples illustrate that members of Congress directly communicate with the
bureaucracy about their policy goals. They contact agency officials to follow up on enacted
Treasury, and the United States Trade Representative are also members of CITA. The announcement was
made on January 8, 2008 (International Trade Administration 2008).
4legislation, to seek information and guidance on policy formation, to influence policy decisions,
and even to try to attain policy goals they were unable to achieve within the formal lawmaking
process. Yet very little is known about this strategy of policy influence. Why do legislators
engage in this behavior? What are the characteristics of the members of Congress most likely to
undertake it? Does it pay off for them, electorally and in terms of policy?
I argue that, while legislators have various policymaking tools at their disposal, they also
face several constraints within the lawmaking process. Backchannel policymaking provides a
way for legislators to circumvent the formal legislative process, especially when constraints
preclude them from influencing the final outcomes, and allows them an alternative means of
pursuing their goals and representing their constituents. The central purpose of this dissertation is
to investigate how members of Congress use the strategy of backchannel policymaking, explain
why they use it, how it differs from other types of policymaking activities legislators can choose,
and the implications for policy.
It is important to understand this behavior because, while congressional scholars have
primarily considered how legislators influence policy within the chambers of Congress, public
policy is increasingly produced and managed through bureaucratic governance rather than
through direct statutory enactment. This is largely because, over time, the bureaucracy has grown
and gained considerable influence over policy (Dodd and Schott 1979, Ferejohn and Shipan
1990, Eskridge and Ferejohn 1992). The bureaucracy’s influence over policy is partly due to the
discretion granted to it by Congress, and while Congress has benefited from this discretion
(Bawn 1995; Epstein and O'Halloran 1999; Huber and Shipan 2002), it has also made it difficult
for Congress, as an institution, to control the bureaucracy (Hill and Brazier 1991; Hamilton and
Schroeder 1994; Hamilton 1996; Balla 1998; Spence 1999). However, savvy individual members
5of Congress strategically use the bureaucracy’s discretion to pursue their own policy goals
outside of the lawmaking process and the public eye.
The Congressional-Bureaucratic Relationship: Keystone of the Washington Establishment
Of course, the idea that legislators attempt to influence the bureaucracy is not new.
Fiorina’s classic work, Congress: Keystone of the Washington Establishment (1977), continues
to serve as the foremost authority on the relationship between individual members of Congress
and the bureaucracy. Seeking to explain incumbency advantage, Fiorina argued that the growing
federal bureaucracy allows legislators to win over constituents, first, by providing programs and
services and, second, by helping them with personal problems (i.e., “casework”), such as benefit
denials and delays in Social Security checks, that result from the bureaucracy’s complexity.
Thus, in Fiorina’s view, members of Congress interact with the bureaucracy mostly to build their
“personal vote”. His theory described an exploitative system involving members of Congress
trading influence on policy for casework and pork, a more electorally valuable currency. He
viewed this system as a disservice to citizens and identified it as the culprit behind “vanishing”
electorally competitive districts. Driven by electoral goals, the “incentives of incumbent
congressmen lead them to protect and encourage the structure and operation of a centralized
bureaucratic state almost irrespective of the kind of public policy that constrains our present and
shapes our future” (75). In short, Fiorina argued that the relationship between members of
Congress and the bureaucracy is focused on electorally valuable casework and pork, not policy.
Arnold’s (1979) work on interactions between Congress and the bureaucracy reaches
much the same conclusions. However, he approaches the question from the point of view of the
bureaucrats, highlighting the benefits that accrue to them from the system. His study of
congressional influence over the geographic allocation of federal expenditures finds that
6bureaucrats strategically consider the preferences of legislators when distributing grants in order
to build coalitions of support in Congress. Arnold examines three types of federal expenditures:
the distribution of military bases, an urban development grant program, and water and sewer
grants, in the 1950s-70s. He concludes that bureaucrats focus benefits on members of
committees with jurisdiction over department programs, coalition leaders, and strategically
situated legislators.
In contrast to Fiorina, Arnold leaves open the possibility that a legislator’s influence over
the bureaucracy extends beyond casework and grants, but leaves the research task to “another
time, another place, and perhaps another writer” (216). However, while subsequent scholarship
has advanced Fiorina and Arnold’s focus on casework (Cain, Ferejohn, and Fiorina 1987;
Johannes 1984; Parker 1980) and expenditures (Bertelli and Grose 2009; Stein and Bickers
1995), it has not picked up the question of whether the interactions between individual members
of Congress and the bureaucracy are also policy-based.
Previous Work on Congressional-Bureaucratic Policy Influence
Individual level interactions of the type studied by Fiorina and Arnold are certainly not
the only way Congress might influence the bureaucracy. There is a tremendous body of research
at the aggregate level that focuses on the policy influence of Congress over the bureaucracy (and
vice versa). Scholars have considered congressional control of the bureaucracy through
legislation and agency design (e.g., Balla and Wright 2001; Baum 1995; Epstein and O’Halloran
1999; Ferejohn and Shipan 1990; Huber and Shipan 2002; Lewis 2003; McCubbins, Noll, and
Weingast 1987, 1989; Weingast and Moran 1983; Wood and Bohte 2004), committees (e.g.,
Clinton, Lewis, Selin 2014; Shipan 2004), and other forms of oversight (e.g., Aberbach 1990;
McCubbins and Schwartz 1984).
7Although the legislature can try to control the bureaucracy through appointees and
oversight, federal departments and agencies’ specialization, expertise, and discretion offer a great
deal of autonomy (Carpenter 2001a, 2001b, 2000; Clarkson and Muris 1981; Katzmann 1980a,
1980b).6 This gives the bureaucracy extensive power to influence and make policy (Dodd and
Schott 1979; Ferejohn and Shipan 1990; Hamilton and Schroeder 1994; Wilson 1989).7
After bills are passed into law, they are handed down to bureaucrats who write the rules
for how the law will be implemented. This process gives considerable discretion to agencies, and
can even lead to policy unintended by the law’s original author. For example, when
implementing policy involving food marketing and labeling, bureaucrats at the U.S. Department
of Agriculture (USDA) decide what rules to write and who to prosecute for violations (and when
to look the other way), affecting not only the information available to consumers but also
companies within various industries and regions.
However, although the bureaucracy often has a great deal of discretion, individual
legislators are not powerless within the policy implementation process. A legislator can contact
the head of a department or agency and request that a policy be changed, and the bureaucracy has
an incentive to respond favorably to the legislator’s request. The departments and agencies have
6 Empirical studies (Hill and Brazier 1991; Hamilton and Schroeder 1994; Hamilton 1996; Balla 1998;
Spence 1999) find that, at an institutional level, Congress fails at its attempts to control bureaucratic
procedures and outcomes. Bureaucratic agencies evade congressional process (Hamilton and Schroeder
1994; Hamilton 1996) and their actions do not reflect dominant legislative interests (Balla 1998; Spence
1999).
7 Also see, Lipsky (1980) and Pressman and Wildavsky (1984). See Scholz, Twombly, and Headrick
(1991) for a review of “street-level” bureaucratic policymaking.
8preferences and goals, most of which require funding or other forms of congressional support. 8
Consequently, they work to form coalitions of legislators who will support them during
consideration of their budget and promote their goals (Arnold 1979; Carpenter 2001a; Fiorina
1977b). This provides an opening for strategic legislators looking to advance their own policy
interests.
One instance of legislator involvement in policy implementation that captured the
public’s attention involves a controversy over neglected prosecution for the mislabeling of extra
virgin olive oil. Store shelves are lined with many products sold as extra virgin olive oil which
actually contain less desirable oil (Corn 2010; Garner 2011; Mueller 2011a, 2011b; Wilson
2013). Interest groups have pressured the USDA to enforce stricter regulations (Agricultural
Marketing Service 2010; Flagg 2012). However, concerned with the impact on regional olive oil
producers in New York State, Senator Chuck Schumer has written to the USDA requesting that
the Secretary hold back on imposing regulations, arguing that the proposed change9 “would
dramatically raise testing costs for U.S. olive oil bottlers like New York's Sovena USA, as well
as increase prices for consumers” and “would deviate from the internationally-recognized
standard, mandate expensive new testing regimes, and require labeling changes.” Senator
Schumer concluded that the proposed change “seems unnecessary at best and economically
8 In his book, The Forging of Bureaucratic Autonomy, Daniel Carpenter (2001a) describes the rise of an
autonomous bureaucracy with its own preferences and means of achieving goals. Focusing on the Post
Office and the Department of Agriculture during the turn of the twentieth century, he explains how the
departments’ pursued their goals using bureaucratic expertise as well as other more entrepreneurial tactics
such as initiating grass roots campaigns and coalition building.
9 Specifically, the interest groups proposed a marketing order (Cord 2012, Schumer 2012).
9harmful at worst,” (Schumer 2012). The senator’s advocacy on behalf of the olive oil bottlers
occurred, not through the legislative process, but via the bureaucracy.
The Goals of Backchannel Policymaking
This is where the concept of backchannel policymaking comes in. In short, I contend that
individual legislators interact with bureaucratic agencies in attempts to achieve their policy and
electoral goals. These fundamental goals drive both backchannel policymaking as well as
previously studied policymaking activities and have been a major focus of the literature.
Indeed, scholars of Congress have long characterized members of Congress as goal-oriented.
Fenno (1973) famously identified the three primary goals of all legislators: reelection, influence
within Congress, and good public policy. Legislators’ motivations for participation in Congress
likely emerge from a mix of these goals, and they often go hand-in-hand. For example,
legislators reap electoral benefits for showing records of expertise on policy issues (Fenno 1973;
Sellers 1998), and legislative entrepreneurship is rewarded with prestigious leadership positions,
in turn providing a platform for influence over policy and electoral benefits (Wawro 2000).
What avenues do members of Congress have for pursuing these goals? Congressional
scholars have studied a variety of avenues for legislators to accomplish their objectives through
policymaking activities including legislative or lawmaking activities such as voting (e.g.,
Kingdon 1973; Miller and Stokes 1963; Poole and Rosenthal 1991), bill introductions and
cosponsorships (e.g., Koger 2003; Wilson and Young 1997; Woon 2008), and committee work
(e.g., Hall 1996). However, individual members of Congress also have the opportunity to
influence policy outside of the formal lawmaking process by going directly to the bureaucracy.
Like lawmaking within Congress, backchannel policymaking can serve the three goals of
reelection, influence within Congress, and good public policy. For example, members of
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Congress can publicize their policy advocacy to interest groups in order to gain support for their
campaigns. A legislator in pursuit of institutional advancement can point to her work with the
bureaucracy to demonstrate expertise within an issue area as justification for attaining a
leadership position. Perhaps most importantly, legislators can engage with the bureaucracy to
pursue policy changes they failed to achieve within the legislative process due to the constraints
of lawmaking. Yet, this alternative strategy for influencing public policy has been largely
unrecognized by congressional scholars.
There are a number of reasons for this lack of attention to legislators’ policy engagement
with the bureaucracy. The first is data availability issues. While roll call voting records, bill
sponsorship and cosponsorship, and floor speeches are easily available in the public record,
finding data on legislators’ interactions with the bureaucracy is more of a challenge. Obtaining
the records for this dissertation required several Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) requests to
federal departments, which often took several months to respond.
Second, when considering legislators’ policymaking behavior, scholars have focused on
the lawmaking process within Congress. For many years, attention was almost entirely on roll
call voting. Eventually congressional scholars pushed into territory beyond up-or-down votes,
considering bill introductions, cosponsorships, floor speeches, and committee participation (Hall
1996; Koger 2003; Maltzman and Sigelman 1996; Schiller 1995; Sulkin 2005, 2011). However,
the policymaking activities of individual members of Congress outside of the legislative process
has generally been a black box. Examining policymaking behavior beyond the halls of Congress
is a natural next step.
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Plan of the Dissertation
In this dissertation, I explore how members of Congress use the bureaucracy to pursue
their policy goals. Chapter 2 will define and explain backchannel policymaking and discuss how
this concept fits into the congressional literature and its importance for the study of Congress. I
then build on my theory and offer hypotheses regarding why and how legislators use the
bureaucracy to pursue policy goals, what types of legislators are more likely to take advantage of
it, how it differs from legislators’ other options for influencing policy, and the impact of
backchannel policymaking. I will describe legislators’ motivations for using the bureaucracy,
who benefits from it, and how it affects the policymaking process. In particular, I focus on the
strategic considerations of the legislators who use backchannel policymaking as well as the
bureaucratic departments and agencies which must then decide how to respond.
Chapters 3, 4, and 5 serve as the empirical chapters of my dissertation. The third chapter
describes my original data and process for collection and coding. I explain why these data are
appropriate for my research and important for future work on Congress. I present my process of
content analysis, reliability statistics, and tests of the validity of my measure. I describe the
different types of communication between members of Congress and the bureaucracy (i.e., non-
policy communication, grant requests, and policy contact) and explain the various categories of
policy contact (e.g., requests for assistance and support for pending legislation, influencing
policy post enactment). Additionally, I describe the measures for my other variables. Finally, I
consider how broadly policy contact with the bureaucracy occurs across Congress and how
frequently legislators engage in it.
Chapters 4 and 5 consider why legislators engage in backchannel policymaking and how
it is used to pursue policy goals. Chapter 4 addresses the question: What are the characteristics of
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members of Congress who engage with the bureaucracy on policy issues? In this chapter I
examine variation in policy contact with the bureaucracy across legislators. I discuss variations
in constraints and capabilities across legislator characteristics and circumstances. I test the
various hypotheses described in Chapter 2 and identify the primary factors predicting variation.
Finally, I consider what my results suggest about the distribution of power in Congress and the
potential consequences of backchannel policymaking on the legislative process.
In Chapter 5, I consider legislators’ incentives for engaging in backchannel policymaking
and how they strategically use it to influence policy. Specifically, I compare backchannel
policymaking to another type of policymaking activity, bill introductions. I test my predictions
about the circumstances under which legislators are more likely to choose the bureaucratic
policymaking venue over the legislative one.
Finally, Chapter 6 summarizes the results, and I consider the scholarly and normative
implications. I discuss what my findings and backchannel policymaking offer for our current
understanding of longstanding questions regarding policymaking in Congress, the influence of
individual legislators, the nature of executive-legislative interactions, and the quality of
representation. I conclude by taking stock of the policy, representational, and real-world
implications of this backchannel, interbranch relationship. I discuss the remaining questions
raised by my findings and my plans for further study of how Congress and the bureaucracy
interact to affect policy.
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CHAPTER 2
A Theory of Backchannel Policymaking
What motivates backchannel policymaking? Given their limited time and resources, why
would members of Congress choose to reach out to the bureaucracy with their policy concerns
when they have other means of influencing policy, including introducing bills or working
through their committees? What, if any, strategic advantage does the backchannel offer over the
legislative venue? In this chapter I establish my theory for why members of Congress engage
with the bureaucracy as a strategy for influencing policy.  My objective is to explain what
motivates this behavior, what facilitates it, and how it affects the policymaking process. To test
my theory, I develop hypotheses about variation in legislators’ policy contact with the
bureaucracy and the differences between legislators who choose the backchannel over other
avenues of policy influence.
In short, I argue that members of Congress try to pursue their policy goals by reaching
out to the bureaucracy rather than by solely relying on previously considered policymaking
activities within the legislative process. Members of Congress strategically use the bureaucratic
venue because they are unable to accomplish their goals through the legislative process due to
several constraints. Some of these constraints are ones that all members of Congress face (e.g.,
gridlock, opposition from other legislators), while others are more problematic for some than
others due to the legislator’s status in Congress and the cross-pressures from party and
constituency. I argue that members of Congress can try to circumvent these constraints by
bypassing the legislative process and reaching out to the bureaucracy with their policy concerns.
Of course, members of Congress attempting to achieve their policy goals by engaging with the
bureaucracy are not always successful. In fact, a legislator’s likelihood of successfully
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influencing policy through this backchannel of the bureaucracy is likely tied to her ability to
reciprocate the federal agency’s favorable response through her behavior in the legislative arena
(e.g., support for an agency’s budget and programs). I argue that agencies are complicit in
backchannel policymaking and are more likely to try to fulfil the policy requests of legislators
who are in a position to pay them back. In other words, legislators who have power within
Congress are also more likely to have influence using the backchannel of the bureaucracy.
My theory and findings have implications for the distribution of power over lawmaking
in Congress and about the policies that are produced. First, my findings indicate that members of
Congress do not limit themselves to the legislative process but, instead, their policymaking
behavior extends to the bureaucratic venue. This observation is particularly important because, as
I will explain, individual legislators are limited in their ability to influence policy in the
legislative process.
However, if legislators who are in positions of power within Congress are the most likely
to be able to take advantage of backchannel policymaking, it suggests that the bureaucracy
serves as a second pathway for already powerful legislators, even offering them a way of
circumventing the will of the majority in Congress. This could mean that policymaking power is
largely in the hands of a small group of congressional leaders and complicit bureaucrats who
stand to gain from doing the leaders’ bidding.
Third, I argue that legislators strategically use policymaking activities to deal with
conflicts between partisanship and constituency interests. For instance, a legislator can vote with
her party but then represent constituency interests that diverge from her partisan stance through
communication with the bureaucracy. In this way, savvy legislators can strategically choose
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venues and conjoin policymaking activities to construct strategies allowing them to dodge
conflicts and satisfy competing principals.
Finally, this behavior provides broad insights into the ability of individual legislators to
influence policy both within Congress and through the backchannel of the bureaucracy. My
theory suggests that even in the face of gridlock, partisanship, and polarization in Congress, an
individual legislator can try to use this alternative venue of the bureaucracy to pursue policy
goals and represent his constituency. However, if, as I argue, members of Congress strategically
choose venues and build strategies by integrating policymaking activities, we cannot evaluate the
quality of representation unless we consider their behavior in the various venues of policymaking
in tandem.
From a normative standpoint, my theory sheds light on the state of representation,
transparency, the separation of powers and the interactions across branches of government. My
research contributes to a substantial line of work suggesting that the realities of the policymaking
process are quite different from the textbook version established in the minds of citizens.
Conventional Wisdom about Policymaking in Congress
While the prevailing view among the public portrays policymaking as existing within the
formal lawmaking process, in reality, policy is primarily made through federal agency
regulations rather than through the legislative process (e.g., Eskridge and Ferejohn 1992).
Agencies have a great deal of influence over policy due to the growth in society, the expansion
of the federal government, and to the discretion granted to them by Congress. While Congress
benefits from this discretion and the policy expertise of agencies (Bawn 1995; Epstein and
O'Halloran 1999; Huber and Shipan 2002), a substantial line of research has considered
Congress’ struggle to maintain control over the bureaucracy through mechanisms of oversight
such as committee hearings (Dodd and Schott 1979, Hall and Miler 2008, McGrath 2013),
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administrative procedures (Balla 1998), and federal advisory committees (Balla and Wright
2001). Scholars have found the legislature to be limited in its ability to control bureaucratic
policymaking through procedural and structural arrangements (e.g., Ball 1998; Hamilton and
Schroeder 1994).
While the bureaucracy seems to subvert Congress’ means of institutional oversight, savvy
individual members of Congress can take advantage of the bureaucracy’s discretion to pursue
policy goals of their own. This individual-level behavior differs from previous work on the
policy-based interactions between Congress and the bureaucracy because the literature has
focused on the concept of oversight, which assumes the existence of an intent of Congress as an
institution or of the majority (or winning coalition) in Congress, and that legislative control of
the bureaucracy entails of the preservation of that intent using the mechanisms of oversight cited
in the previous paragraph. In other words, Congress passes a bill, the president signs the bill, and
Congress works to ensure that the bureaucracy implements that law as intended (or via ex ante
controls). My work departs from this previous literature because I show, as demonstrated by the
opening example of Senators Dole and Burr voting for CAFTA only to pursue their own interests
with the bureaucracy, that legislators can use the bureaucracy’s influence over policy to pursue
individualistic policy goals apart from the intent of Congress and party.
That is not to say that legislators’ policy requests to the bureaucracy are always in
conflict with what we might assume to be the intent of Congress. In fact, I find that legislators
often contact agencies to ensure they are implementing laws properly and efficiently. However,
while a legislator may write a request to ensure that an agency is implementing her bill as she
intended, she may ask that the agency not implement sections of her colleague’s bill, which has
had negative consequences for her constituency. In other words, when a legislator contacts the
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bureaucracy to ensure a law is being implemented, it seems not to be motivated by a general
concern for congressional oversight over the bureaucracy, but by a desire to see his bill, which he
wrote, cosponsored, and worked on in his committee, implemented. As Hall described the
motivation of legislators’ participation, “Individuals act to pursue their interests, not promote the
functioning of the group,” (1996, p. 56).
In fact, I argue that this behavior is motivated by the same general goals that guide other
types of participation such as committee work, voting, and introducing and cosponsoring bills.
For example, legislators’ governing histories with demonstrated policy interests should guide
their interactions with the bureaucracy. However, backchannel policymaking differs from
previously studied channels of policy influence in important ways which predict how frequently
and under what circumstances members of Congress choose to use the strategy as a venue for
pursuing a policy goal.
Why do Members of Congress Engage with the Bureaucracy about Policy Issues?
My general argument underlying why members of Congress use the bureaucracy to
pursue their policy interests is that they are constrained from accomplishing their policy goals
within the formal lawmaking process. If members of Congress were able to accomplish their
policy goals via the formal legislative process, we would not expect backchannel policymaking
to occur broadly or frequently across individual legislators. Although all legislators face
constraints in Congress, the hurdles can vary based on the legislator’s status in Congress, his
policy preferences, and his constituency. Opportunities for influencing policy through the
executive branch may be particularly important for legislators who are the most constrained from
influencing policy and representing their constituencies within the lawmaking process.
18
In order to understand the motivation behind backchannel policymaking, it is important
that we first recognize the extent of legislators’ influence within the legislative process. While
members of Congress have several legislative tools they can choose from to participate in
policymaking, the formal lawmaking process is wrought with constraints which can prevent
them from voicing their policy preferences and representing their constituencies. Of course,
legislators participate in the legislative process by voting (e.g., Kingdon 1973; Miller and Stokes
1963; Poole and Rosenthal 1991), introducing and cosponsoring bills (e.g., Koger 2003; Sulkin
2005, 2011), and working within their committees (e.g., Hall 1996). Yet, despite all of these
unique outlets for participation, individual legislators have limited influence within the
lawmaking process.
A Theory of Legislative Constraints
It was 1978 when Fenno identified the campaign strategy of “running against Congress”
and yet the promise of going to Washington to make changes is still a staple of election
challengers (although, ironically, also of some incumbents) (Fenno 1975, 1978). But what ability
does a legislator have to actually make changes in Congress? Considering the great concern
among the media, the public, and academics over gridlock and polarization, how capable is the
legislator of influencing policy within the legislative body?
One likely answer is, not very. A great deal of research suggests that members of
Congress are constrained in their ability to influence policy. For example, a legislator can
introduce a bill, but with less than a 5% percent chance of it becoming law (Volden and
Wiseman 2015). As Mayhew points out, to the question, “‘But what bills has he passed?’ There
is no unembarrassing answer,” (1974, p. 60).
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Legislators can try to voice their preferences in their committees, but Fenno’s
observations suggests there are serious limits for committee members. For example, when
focusing on the Foreign Affairs Committee, he concludes that, “…in proportion to members’
desires and expectations, their opportunities to contribute to the making of foreign policy are
small. The resulting disappointment and frustration tend to drive down the rates of internal
participation,” and that Foreign Affairs members “function largely as consumers of the executive
branch information” (1973, p. 188). Even membership on Appropriations does not seem to offer
power over policy, as suggested by a member of the powerful committee, who told Fenno,
“‘Appropriations is a dog’s life. You don’t have any influence over policy’” (p. 144).
In his study of post-reform House committees, Hall (1996) offers a less dire account,
concluding that legislators who do participate in their committees and subcommittees have
influence, but his empirical findings show low levels of participation overall. He finds that
committee participation tends to be low both in terms of attendance and committee and
subcommittee voting (p. 34-5). Likewise, informal, behind the scenes participation is not
widespread, with most legislators playing a negligible role (p. 43).
What is the reason for the low rates of bill passage and participation in committees? What
is stopping legislators from playing a role in policymaking? There has been a tremendous
concentration on constraints preventing Congress, as a whole, from making public policy.
Scholars and the media alike have focused on questions about increased divided government,
polarization, and partisanship, and how these factors might decrease Congress’ productivity.
Mayhew’s (1991) landmark book overturned conventional wisdom by concluding that divided
government had little effect on legislative productivity and led to a flood of research debating the
impact of divided party control (e.g., Binder 1999, 2003; Heitshusen and Young 2006; Howell et
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al. 2000; Shipan 2006) and polarization (e.g., Binder 1999, Jones 2001, Lapinski 2008) on
gridlock. However, the public’s blame of partisan conflict firmly persists, sustained by events
such as the fiscal cliff crisis in January of 2013. Indeed, news stories about polarization in
Congress have increased (Levendusky 2009), and the media have paid a great deal of attention to
the negative outcomes of partisan conflict. In 2012, Thomas Friedman wrote in his New York
Times column that, due to polarization, America has “gone from a democracy to a ‘vetocracy’—
from a system designed to prevent anyone in government from amassing too much power to a
system in which no one can aggregate enough power to make any important decisions at all.”
But while the media and general public have propagated the notion of a temporary
gridlock due to divided government, partisanship, polarization, and a lack of compromise;
congressional scholars have pointed out that there are a myriad of more elusive, persistent
constraints stymieing members of Congress from participating and influencing policy as well.
For example, earlier work considered whether norms of deference limit participation in
Congress. Members of Congress defer to committee and subcommittee members and do not
encroach on committee work when they are not members. As one of Fenno’s respondents
explained, “It’s frowned upon if you offer an amendment in the full committee when you aren’t a
member of the subcommittee,” (Fenno 1973, p. 95). While there are organizational advantages to
such norms (i.e., specialization), this deference keeps legislators from registering their policy
preferences within the committee system.
As Matthews observed, norms of apprenticeship, too, limit legislators’ participation in
policymaking and are “very real and confining,” (1960, p. 94-5). A freshman senator “is
expected to keep his mouth shut, not to take the lead in floor fights, to listen and learn,” (1960, p.
94-5). While more recent work indicates that freshmen legislators’ influence has increased in the
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decades since Matthew and Fenno conducted their studies (e.g., Sinclair 1986, 1989), it is hard to
imagine a new legislator accomplishing any policy goals given other limiting factors, as Hall
points out.
Of course, the limitations on a new legislator have also been attributed to information and
transaction costs (Hall 1996). Participation in policymaking requires information, policy
expertise, and “political intelligence” as well as other resources including staff (Hall 1996 p. 91).
Legislators must have the background knowledge, the political savvy, and the staff to pursue
their policy goals. Hall points to these constraints as the cause behind the inactivity of freshmen
and new committee members. For some members of Congress, these requirements prohibit their
involvement in committee and other legislative action.
There is also several restrictions that result from leadership’s control over the agenda and
procedure. Congressional leaders can prevent legislators from offering amendments, stifling the
rank-and-file’s ability to propose modifications to the legislation on the chamber floor.10
Moreover, while the leadership cannot prevent legislators from introducing and cosponsoring
bills, it can constrain their bills from coming to the chamber floor for a vote. When members of
Congress decide how to vote, they are limited to dichotomous choices structured by leadership,
at times along extreme partisan lines. Leadership is also known to attach entire bills onto other
omnibus legislation, leading legislators to vote for policies they would not have favored as a
stand-alone bill.
10 Even in the Senate, where there are fewer restrictions on amendments, non-germane amendments are
not permitted on appropriations bills, budget measures, and other instances. Furthermore, restrictions are
not enforced uniformly (Davis 2013).
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Moreover, conflicting interests within a constituency can exacerbate the problem for
legislators who are already limited. Cross-pressured legislators are conflicted by competing
signals from party leaders and diverging interests within their constituencies. As illustrated in the
opening example of Chapter 1, Senators Dole and Burr were torn between voting with their party
and representing the textile industry of North Carolina. If a legislator represents a heterogeneous
district or state, his or her ability to represent the constituency with an up-or-down vote might be
more difficult. Moreover, most lawmaking activities are public; legislators have little control
over dissemination of their voting record and bill sponsorships. In the legislative domain, a
member of Congress cannot satisfy one group or region of his constituency without the rest of
his electorate knowing about it.
This conflict is particularly problematic for roll call voting decisions because legislators
are forced to take a position without room for ambiguity and without control over issue selection.
Scholars note that while numbers of moderate and cross-pressured legislators has decreased, the
“remaining non-conformists experience additional pressure as party leaders use their powers
more aggressively to pursue a party agenda preferred by the more homogenous party caucus,”
and that this “additional pressure produces some conversion as moderate and cross-pressured
members become more supportive of the preferences of their party mainstream,” (Bond,
Fleisher, and Wood 2003, p. 430).
This demand for party discipline makes voting challenging for cross-pressured
legislators. There is substantial evidence suggesting that legislators are extremely concerned with
the electoral consequences of voting (Mayhew 1974; Fiorina 1974; Jacobson 1987; Kingdon
1989; Arnold 1990). Legislators try to avoid “wrong votes” (Kingdon 1973; Arnold 1990) or
votes which conflict with their “home style” (Fenno 1978). The consequences of this conflict are
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real; voters punish legislators who vote with their party (Ansolabehere, Snyder, and Stewart
2001; Canes-Wrone, Brady, and Cogan 2002), particularly on divisive issues (Carson, Koger,
Lebo, and Young 2010). Other scholars (e.g., Aldrich 1995; Cox and McCubbins 1993; Rohde
1991; Snyder and Groseclose 2000; Wawro 2002) argue that voting with one’s party can offer
benefits in the long-run. Thus, legislators are presented with a trade-off when making voting
decisions.
The conflict between party affiliation and constituency interest is further complicated by
subgroups within a constituency. Fenno (1977, 1978) points out that the constituency is not
homogenous and that legislators do not perceive it as a uniform entity. Instead, legislators view
their constituency as a series of concentric circles consisting of personal, primary, reelection, and
geographic constituencies. Subgroups of constituencies can influence a legislator’s decisions
depending on the issue in question (Arnold 1990, Fiorina 1974, Kingdon 1973, Bishin 2000) or
the party affiliation of the legislator and subconstituency (Clinton 2006). Constituencies contain
numerous, often diverging, interests. Even when a legislator votes the preference of the majority
of his constituents, there are subgroups that are not represented by his vote. Conflicting
subgroups within a constituency may lead legislators to act strategically by representing various
parts of the constituency in different ways.
This point identifies the limit of roll call votes. Voting is one way of representing a
constituency, and it is often not ideal for legislators who seek to represent diverging interests
within their districts and states. Legislators must make a dichotomous decision, and the choices
have been limited, at times along extreme partisan lines.
Douglas Arnold argues that the dyadic nature of roll call votes is of great advantage to
congressional scholars. He states,  “Each roll call has only two sides – yea or nay – so a
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representative cannot be all things to all people,” which is important because a “vote requires all
representatives to make decisions on the same proposal, thus creating a standardized way for
comparing representatives’ decisions,” (2004, 92). Roll call voting is useful because it simplifies
the policymaking process in a way that allows congressional scholars to compare legislators’
positions and to draw broad conclusions about how legislators represent their constituencies.
However, this advantage of roll call voting records comes with costs. Several scholars
(e.g., Hall 1996, Sulkin 2005, Sulkin 2011, Sellers 2010) have pointed out the limitations of roll
call voting records for understanding the policymaking process. Roll call votes do not measure
the intensity of a legislator’s preference (Hall 1996) or how active a legislator is on an issue
(Sulkin 2005). Additionally, congressional leadership’s control over which bills come to the
floor for a vote further limits how much roll call voting can really tell us about the preferences of
the rank-and-file.
In this way, backchannel policymaking plays an important role in supplementing the
scholarly contributions of roll call voting. In consideration the opening example, if we were to
look solely at the CAFTA voting records, we might assume Senators Dole and Burr were staunch
advocates of free trade blind to the interests within their state. However, with a glance at the
senators’ interactions with the Department of Labor, we know that is not the case. Records of
legislators’ interactions with the bureaucracy are important because they offer a very different
story than roll call votes alone.
Constraints of Leadership
It is important to point out that, while congressional leadership is a source of constraints
faced by individual legislators, there are additional and unique challenges faced by the most
powerful members of Congress. Scholars have pointed out that leaders have two primary goals:
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First, leaders work to maintain party discipline, particularly on votes, and, second, they want
their members to win reelection in order to attain or keep the majority of seats in Congress.
These dual goals create a trade-off for party leaders since coercing cross-pressured legislators to
vote with the party could lead them to loose reelection. One way leaders have dealt with this
conflict is by avoiding votes that could lead to majority party rolls (i.e., the majority of the party
voting against bills that pass) (Cox and McCubbins 2005, 2002). However, there are
circumstances when parties cannot avoid necessary legislation that causes conflict for cross-
pressured members (Harbridge 2015).
Yet, party leaders are not without options. Leaders use various tactics to get the rank-and-
file to vote with the party. For example, they can withhold information or the legislation itself
until immediately before a vote, forcing legislators to making voting decisions “in the dark”
(Curry 2015) or persuade legislators by inserting pork or pet legislation into an omnibus bill
(Evans 2004). Of course, leaders can also deal with the trade-off of cross-pressuring legislation
directly. Leaders send out talking points for cross-pressured members to use to explain (and sell)
their partisan votes to dissatisfied constituencies (Sellers 2009).
Adding to the scholarship on how leaders manage this trade-off, I argue that party leaders
benefit from backchannel policymaking. If members of Congress vote with their party but turn to
the bureaucracy to advocate for constituency groups that were dissatisfied with the partisan vote,
it not only allows the member to satisfy competing principals of party and constituency, but also
satisfies leadership’s dual goals of demonstrating party discipline and maintaining seats in
Congress. Thus, it is in the interest of party leadership to allow its members to pursue their
policy interests with the bureaucracy. Going one step further, not only is it in the interest of party
leaders to allow backchannel policymaking to occur, they may even be motivated to assist with it
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by intervening on behalf of their cross-pressured members. This intervention by powerful party
leaders is important because, while backchannel policymaking is motivated by the constraints of
the legislative process, not all members of Congress have what it takes to be able to take
advantage of the backchannel.
Backchannel Policymaking: What does it take?
While in the previous section I argued that legislative constraints motivate members of
Congress to reach out to the bureaucracy with their policy concerns, not all legislators have the
capacity to take advantage of this alternative way of influencing policy. This second
consideration in my theory of backchannel policymaking distinguishes between what motivates
backchannel policymaking from what facilitates it. Are some legislators more capable of getting
what they want from the bureaucracy? I break this question down into two different stages. Not
all legislators are successful at achieving favorable responses to their policy requests. However,
some legislators do not try to use backchannel policymaking to the same extent as others,
meaning they do not make requests to agencies. These two stages are intertwined. Legislators
cannot successfully influence policy through the bureaucracy if they do not first contact an
agency. As such, it is important to consider what factors facilitate both stages of backchannel
policymaking. Before we consider which legislators are most successful at influencing policy via
the bureaucracy, we must know which legislators actually reach out to the bureaucracy with their
policy requests. Thus, I focus primarily on the question of who contacts the bureaucracy while
reserving an empirical examination of policy influence for my subsequent research agenda.
However, knowing which legislators try to use backchannel policymaking can also lend insight
into which ones are successful at it.
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Like participation within Congress, backchannel policymaking is facilitated by
information and policy expertise, political intelligence, and resources. These factors can affect
both a legislator’s ability to communicate with the bureaucracy about a policy request as well as
the likelihood that the agency will respond favorably to her request. For example, a member of
Congress must have some knowledge about the policy area in order to make a credible request.
Moreover, while introducing or cosponsoring a bill is an obvious way to pursue a policy goal,
some legislators might not even recognize communicating with the bureaucracy is an option or
know which agency to contact. A learning process also likely plays a role; legislators
increasingly employ the backchannel as they learn that it is an option. Of course, any
policymaking activity requires time and resources, and a large staff that can collect information,
recognize instances in which backchannel policymaking could be a strategic option, and actually
contact and keep up with an agency would clearly facilitate participation.
Another factor that could facilitate backchannel policymaking is the potential for
reciprocity. An agency is more likely to respond favorably to a legislator’s request if the
legislator has the potential to be able to pay the agency back in the form of support for the
agency’s budget, programs, and other policies in the legislative arena. Since some members of
Congress are more effective in the legislative arena than others (Volden and Wiseman 2015), a
legislator’s capacity to reciprocate could be tied to his status and position in the legislative
process. A legislator who has limited influence within the legislative process is unlikely to be
able to reciprocate compared to a powerful member of Congress.
A Framework of Backchannel Policymaking
Thus, it is important that we consider what motivates backchannel policymaking in
conjunction with what facilitates it. While constraints in the legislative process motivate
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members of Congress to turn to the bureaucracy, the legislators who are the most constrained
from influencing policy in the legislative process may be the least capable of taking advantage of
this alternative venue. My theory produces two different hypotheses. First, if my theory is
correct, we might expect that members of Congress who are the most constrained in the
legislative process and most in need of an alternative way to influence policy and represent their
constituents to try to use backchannel policymaking most often. I will refer to this hypothesis as
the legislative constraint hypothesis.
For example, rank-and-file junior legislators, frustrated by norms biased towards
seniority and disabled by a lack of knowledge and experience, might see the backchannel as an
alternative way of representing their constituencies. Realizing their lack of status and ability
within committees and the chambers, these legislators may try to pursue policy goals via the
bureaucracy. The bureaucracy could offer rank-and-file junior legislators, who are largely shut
out of the formal lawmaking process, a way to influence policy and represent their
constituencies.
Similarly, a legislator may also be limited in her ability to influence policy issues that are
outside of her committee’s jurisdiction. This constraint could be particularly critical if the issue
is a priority for the member of Congress or salient among the legislator’s constituency. Under
these circumstances, a legislator may choose to communicate her policy interest to the agency
that handles the issue, since she does not have a seat on the committee with jurisdiction.
While the previous examples focus on a legislator’s status, members of Congress can also
be constrained from pursuing their policy goals due to partisanship in Congress and cross-
pressures from their party and constituency interests. Some members of Congress who are
particularly limited due to partisanship and polarization may use the bureaucracy to modify
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policies or to explain away partisan votes. For example, when votes are structured along party
lines, moderate legislators may be constrained from registering their preferences on the
legislation. However, moderate legislators can communicate their true preferences to the
bureaucracy even after the bill has passed. Similarly, legislators facing cross-pressures from their
party and competing interests within their constituency are constrained by the limited choices of
up-or-down votes and may use this backchannel in order to advocate for those interests. These
cross-pressured members of Congress also come under strain due to the public nature of the
legislative arena, and may use the backchannel to satisfy competing interests in their
constituency in a way that is less visible. Legislators can claim credit for their work with the
bureaucracy only to the particular interests group that benefited from it, allowing legislators to
please diverging groups and subconstituencies.
On the other hand, all members of Congress face constraints, even members of
leadership, but not all legislators are equally capable of taking advantage of backchannel
policymaking. While legislators facing legislative constraints might have the most need for an
alternative way to influence policy, they may not have the resources to reach out to agencies or
the power to influence them. The same limitations which constrain them in the lawmaking
process might also prevent them from engaging with the bureaucracy. Instead, legislators who
already have power within Congress may be the most capable of using the backchannel. I term
this prediction the “capacity hypothesis,” predicting that a legislator’s policy contact with the
bureaucracy is positively related to her status in Congress and her ability to influence policy
within the legislative process.
For example, while, as I previously mentioned, junior members of Congress may have
the most need for an alternative way to influence policy, they may be ill-equipped to actually
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take advantage of the backchannel. Seniority offers benefits which can increase legislative
effectiveness (Matthews 1960; Frantzich 1979; Hall 1996; Volden and Wiseman 2015) which
could also lead to a greater capacity to engage with the bureaucracy about policy. With seniority
comes experience and expertise with the policymaking process, relationships with bureaucratic
departments, and status within committees and Congress more generally. Senior legislators have
presumably worked on a specialized set of policy issues within their committees and become
familiar with long-standing issues and with the agencies that oversee them. Senior legislators
have also had more years to represent their states and districts and become familiar with the
particular policy concerns of their constituencies. Junior legislators may not be as aware of how a
particular policy could negatively impact the areas they represent. Additionally, the status that
comes with seniority offers, at the very least, the perception that a legislator has power within
Congress, which could have implications for the legislator’s influence over a department’s
budget and other policy preferences. Senior legislators are more likely to recognize intervention
with the bureaucracy as an option for influencing policy and to believe they will be successful
because of their status. These benefits of seniority could lead senior legislators to engage in
backchannel policymaking more often than their junior counterparts.
In the same way, members of congressional leadership already have an arsenal of tools to
carry out their policy goals within the legislative process and may have less of a need for an
alternative channel. However, leaders also are in the best position to engage in backchannel
policymaking. Members of leadership carry more experience and expertise within the public
policymaking process and have the skills and knowledge to intervene with the bureaucracy. The
leadership may carry more weight with the departments, assuming the departments perceive
leadership as having greater influence over the budget process.
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Committee membership can also increase a legislator’s ability to engage with the
bureaucracy on issues under his committee’s jurisdiction. Participating in committee mark-ups
and sitting across from bureaucrats and experts during committee hearings offer committee
members an in-depth knowledge of the nuances of policy and the problems with its
implementation. Committee members are more likely to have established relationships with
bureaucratic officials, and the expectation of future interactions. A legislator carries more weight
with the agencies under his committee’s jurisdiction as committee membership may signal a
greater capacity for reciprocation in terms of support for an agency’s budget and goals (and
perhaps leniency in terms of formal oversight).
While at first glance these may seem like competing hypotheses, I theorize that both
constraints and capacity are both at work. In Chapter 4, I will test the hypotheses using some of
the same variables. This could lead to one mechanism “washing out” the other. For example,
while constraints motivate backchannel policymaking, it may be capacity that predicts how
frequently legislators take advantage of it. However, I attempt to tease out these two interrelated
processes using some variables that measure constraint but not capacity.
While a legislator’s seniority (i.e., the number of years he has served in Congress),
committee membership, and leadership status capture aspects of both constraint and capacity,
measures of cross-pressured legislators should only capture particular constraints legislators face,
but not capacity. I have no reason to expect cross-pressured legislators would have any
additional ability to engage in backchannel policymaking.
Distinguishing between these hypotheses is important because variation across legislators
can tell us about the distribution of policymaking power in Congress. Evidence in support of the
legislative constraint hypothesis could suggest that individual rank-and-file, junior legislators are
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not as powerless within the lawmaking process as previously assumed, but that these low-
ranking members of Congress have an alternative way to try to influence policy and to represent
their constituencies. On the other hand, findings consistent with the capacity hypothesis could
suggest an important implication that the bureaucracy acts as a second pathway for already
powerful members of Congress to influence policy, which could further exacerbate the power
difference between the “haves” and “have nots” in Congress. Moreover, such findings could also
suggest that the backchannel offers legislators real value if, for example, senior legislators, who
have accumulated the most knowledge, experience, and expertise about the policymaking
process still devote limited time and resources to using the backchannel.
Strategies of Policy Influence
Another way to address the question of why legislators use the backchannel is to compare
it to their other policymaking options in the legislative venue. How does this strategy compare to
previously studied means of policymaking? Do members of Congress utilize them differently? I
contend that members of Congress choose venues for policy influence based on the constraints I
previously described and the characteristics of the channels available to them. Legislators engage
in backchannel policymaking strategically based on the venue’s distinctive qualities and their
needs.
Notably, unlike previously considered policymaking activities such as roll call voting,
bill introductions, and cosponsorship, backchannel policymaking is not readily public. Members
of Congress may choose to publicize their backchannel policy efforts, but they have much more
control over its dissemination. They have the option of submitting press releases about their
activity to all the media outlets on their distribution list, making an announcement on social
media, or they may limit credit claiming for a favorable bureaucratic decision to a speech
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presented in front of a local organization. Legislators even may decide to remain silent about
their activity altogether. In comparison to previously studied lawmaking activities, this discretion
is particular to backchannel policymaking.  Accessing the information for this research required
that I submit FOIA requests, which took many months for the departments to fulfil, and then
examine thousands of pages of documents. Voting and bill sponsorship records, on the other
hand, are easily accessible on the internet and some information is even regularly published in
local newspapers and other media outlets.
While other legislative activities force members of Congress to go on the record,
legislators have more control over when and if backchannel policymaking becomes public and
whether it is made known only to the beneficiaries. Legislators are constrained by a loss of
control over dissemination in the lawmaking process, but backchannel policymaking allows
members of Congress to escape this cost commonly associated with legislative activities. The
implications of this control over dissemination are important because it allows legislators to
satisfy divergent portions of the constituency.
For example, I have argued that legislators who are constrained by the cross-pressures of
partisanship and diverging constituency interests will turn to backchannel policymaking. For
these legislators, having control over dissemination of their behavior could make the policy
backchannel more appealing than introducing a bill, which tends to be much more visible to the
media, electoral challengers, and the constituency. Indeed, some work (Primo and Snyder 2010,
Wichowsky 2012) has shown that legislators representing complex districts tend to be more
concerned with electorally valuable pork than with position-taking activities like bill
sponsorship. My argument aligns with this previous work in the sense that I expect legislators
who are constrained by partisanship in Congress are less motivated to pursue legislative position-
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taking. However, I depart from the literature in that I expect that these legislators represent their
constituencies, not just with pork, but with policy. However, unlike highly visible position-
taking, these legislators should be more inclined to advocate for moderate or divergent policy
interests by using the backchannel, which allows them to strategically credit claim for the policy
work only to its beneficiaries.
However, backchannel policymaking can also be a useful supplement, rather than a
replacement, for other legislative activities, allowing members of Congress to strategically
maneuver between competing principals within the constituency as well as the sometimes
divergent pressures of constituency and party leadership. When party and regional interests
clash, legislators can vote with their party but then represent the preferences of an interest group
with backchannel policymaking. The opening example illustrated this tactic. Senators Dole and
Burr voted for CAFTA but requested protections for textiles from the bureaucracy. If a legislator
is forced into a decision requiring her to vote for two policies, one she favors and one she is
against, in the same piece of legislation, she can pursue her true policy preferences by engaging
with the bureaucracy regardless of her vote.
Considering how members of Congress strategically choose venues of policy influence
has a number of important implications. It suggests that legislators represent their policy
preferences and the interests of their constituencies in different ways and by using different
options. First, a legislator’s decision about whether and how to participate in a policymaking
activity, like whether or not to introduce a bill, is not made in a vacuum. Instead, members of
Congress construct comprehensive blueprints that strategically incorporate different means and
even venues of policymaking.
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Second, previous literature has largely assumed a consistent direction of preference
across legislative activity. Certainly, this assumption is intuitive. Members of Congress use
legislative activities to build their agendas and establish a reputation of expertise with other
legislators as well as the public. Thus, they have motivation to focus their attention on particular
issue positions and priorities. A legislator who introduces and cosponsors bills that are pro-labor
should also have a voting record of support for unions and fair trade. Members of Congress who
introduce bills supporting civil liberties should also vote in favor of protecting individual
liberties. We would not expect legislators with a pro-labor voting record to sponsor bills
suppressing unions and worker rights. Likewise, we would not expect a legislator with a strong
voting record supporting civil liberties to introduce or cosponsor the PATRIOT Act. However,
my research asserts that some legislators strategically use the bureaucracy to modify policies and
to advocate for interests they were not able to represent through a party-line, up-or-down vote
and to satisfy competing interests.
Third, my work suggests that even when Congress is polarized, moderate and minority
interests can still be represented through the bureaucracy. This implication is particularly
important if we consider that the unintended consequences of policies for particular groups and
regions are often not immediately recognized when legislation is proposed and passed. The
backchannel allows legislators to try to bring these consequences to the attention of the agencies,
who may be in a better position to “fix” or tailor policies (e.g., allowing for exceptions to
policies) in order to minimize the negative impact, than if the legislator were to try to go through
the formal legislative process. However, these implications are likely to depend on how agencies
respond and if legislators actually succeed in influencing policy using the backchannel.
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How do Agencies Respond to Legislator’s Policy Requests?
Under what circumstances is backchannel policymaking an effective way of influencing
policy? While, as I will explain, backchannel policymaking could have important implications
even if a legislator is not able to achieve policy change in response to his request, it is important
to consider whether agencies are more likely to favor some legislators over others and under
what conditions legislators are likely to get what they want from the bureaucracy. While I will
not present an empirical analysis of agency response to legislators’ policy requests in this
dissertation, I plan to test the hypotheses described below in subsequent work, and thus outline
my theory here and offer some qualitative evidence of how agencies respond in Chapter 6.
Moreover, my analysis in Chapter 4, which examines which senators contact agencies most
often, can, in fact, lend insight to the question of who is most effective an influencing policy
through the backchannel. Members of Congress are unlikely to continue to spend limited time
and resources contacting the bureaucracy if they are not benefiting from it, and frequent contact
between a senator and an agency could signal a relationship of reciprocity.
As I previously described, agencies have incentives for responding favorably to
legislators’ policy contact. Agencies respond favorably to legislators because they want to build
coalitions of support in Congress in order to maintain (or increase) funding for their programs
and to promote their own goals (Arnold 1979; Carpenter 2001a; Fiorina 1977a, 1977b). Agencies
also have an incentive to maintain their discretion and autonomy by avoiding new statute. In
other words, an agency would prefer to respond to a legislator’s request voluntarily rather than to
face new legislation requiring the policy change.
However, it is very unlikely that agencies fulfill all policy requests, especially in cases
when legislators’ demands conflict. Thus, I expect that agencies favor the requests of legislators
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who have the greatest potential to reciprocate in the form of support for the agency’s budget and
programs and lenient oversight of the agency. For example, the chair of the committee
overseeing an agency will be much more likely to get preferential treatment from an agency than
a junior legislator who is not on the committee. However, agencies have two masters, and they
must also consider whether the request will conflict with the White House’s preferences. This
task becomes easier when the legislator shares the party affiliation of the President. Thus, I
expect agencies are more likely to fulfill legislators’ policy requests when the legislator shares
the party affiliation of the administration.
Of course, agencies may be less willing to fulfil the requests of legislators if the policy
area they manage is critical for public safety (e.g., regarding national security or defense) or
requires a high level of expertise (for example, an agency like NASA would require a high level
of expertise). These policy areas are more vulnerable to the possible negative consequences of
fulfilling policy requests for political reasons. Thus, agencies managing critical policy areas
requiring extensive expertise are less likely to accommodate legislators’ requests.
Finally, I expect that politicized agencies, those with a high percentage of political
appointees, are more likely to respond favorably to elected officials. This expectation might
seem counterintuitive since politicization is thought to be a means for a president to increase his
control over the bureaucracy (Moe 1982, 1985a, 1985b; Randall 1979; Stewart and Cromartie
1982; Wood 1990; Wood and Anderson 1993; Wood and Waterman 1991, 1994). Given
scholars’ focus on the president and Congress as competing principals, vying for control over the
bureaucracy (see Epstein and O’Halloran 1999; Ferejohn and Shipan 1990; McCubbins, Noll,
and Weingast 1987, 1989; McCubbins and Schwartz 1984; Moe 1985a, 1990; Snyder and
Weingast 2000; Weingast and Moran 1983), we might assume that individual legislators would
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have more of an advantage with less politicized agencies. However, more recent work (Lewis
2009) points out that higher numbers of appointees do not necessarily lead to greater control by
the administration (consider the performance of Federal Emergency Management Agency, or
FEMA, during Hurricane Katrina and that it has a large number of appointees) and that
presidential appointments are also motivated by patronage (Hollibaugh et al. 2014). Agencies
with a high number of patronage appointments are more difficult for the administration to
manage. These agencies have preferences of their own (e.g., preferred policies, increased budget,
less oversight) and so the agencies may take opportunities to build for support for their programs
by doing favors for and making deals with legislators.
However, even agencies with a high number of policy (not patronage) motivated
appointments may be more likely to fulfill legislators’ requests if the administration stands to
benefit. There is evidence (Lewis 2008, 2009) that presidents use policy motivated appointments
to increase their control over agencies, particularly those with diverging ideologies (e.g.,
President Bush had more such appointees at liberal agencies including the Labor Department and
Environmental Protection Agency). This politicization could create opportunities within the
backchannel for deals between the administration and legislators who are critical for passing the
president’s preferred legislation. In fact, I argue that the bureaucracy provides a backchannel for
interbranch cooperation within a party, particularly when the party controls both branches of
government, as I explain below.
Interbranch Party Cooperation
As I previously explained, backchannel policymaking can benefit cross-pressured
legislators, allowing them to satisfy both party and diverging constituency interests. This serves
the goals of party leadership as well by maintaining party discipline on votes and the majority of
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seats. However, cross-pressured legislators and congressional leadership are not the only actors
that stand to gain from this backchannel transaction. Administrations can benefit from it, too.
I argue that backchannel policymaking works best during unified government; when the
administration and congressional leadership share an interest in using the bureaucracy to pursue
the party agenda. This is due to two considerations. First, the backchannel is most effective when
opposition is unlikely to put up a fight. During divided government, congressional leadership
may be less likely to use the backchannel (or successfully use it), if there is likely to be push
back from the administration (and its appointees within the agency). Second, the president has
policy goals of its own that require legislation to pass Congress. When Congress and the
administration share party affiliation, leadership can work on behalf of the president’s agenda by
pushing legislation and building support by offering cross-pressured legislators backchannel
incentives to sell their partisan votes back home. In other words, when one party controls both
branches of government, the party has a great incentive to use the backchannel to accomplish
goals that would otherwise face procedural, political, and public hurdles (e.g., minority party
obstruction, committee inaction, outcry over compromises) in the formal lawmaking process.
What I am describing is a triangle of interbranch cooperation, with party control as the
connection between the president, Congress, and agency.
While, as I mentioned, I will not be directly testing agency response to legislators’
requests in this dissertation (but will do so in subsequent work), in the sixth chapter, I discuss
agencies’ responsiveness and offer illustrations of the circumstances under which they are more
likely to fulfill policy requests from members of Congress. I then consider the implications of the
patterns of agency responsiveness for policy outcomes and representation. What are the
implications of backchannel policymaking for the political system and policy output? Who
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benefits most from it, and how does it affect interbranch relationships? In fact, I argue that
backchannel policymaking serves as a strategic device for interbranch cooperation.
Implications for Representation and Accountability
There are several normative questions that arise from my theory. The most obvious
question, is whether this problematic or perhaps beneficial for representation? On one hand, it
may be beneficial for representation if legislators can tailor overly broad national policies
intended to apply to the diverse regions of the country. However, it could be normatively
problematic if legislators can shape policy by circumventing the collective decision-making body
of Congress and the formal lawmaking process established in the Constitution. As I have noted,
legislators do have other means available to express their policy preferences. Rather than using
the backchannel to influence policy, perhaps legislators should only be voicing their
constituents’ interests within the chambers of Congress by introducing bills and making speeches
on the House or Senate floor.
There are implications even if a legislator’s attempt to influence policy via the
backchannel is not successful. Legislators may benefit electorally from advocating for state
interests using the backchannel even if they do not succeed at actually changing policy, similar to
how legislators credit claim for introducing a bill that is very unlikely to actually become law. So
even without a favorable response from the bureaucracy, this option allows legislators to “have it
both ways” by voting with their party and then advocating for state interests via the bureaucracy.
Interestingly, this could suggest that the backchannel allows legislators to vote with their
party more often; they know they can always try to excuse their vote by explaining that they
advocated for their state’s interests via the bureaucracy. In this way, these types of strategies that
allow legislators to satisfy competing party and state interests may actually contribute to
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polarization in Congress. If legislators did not have this option, they might have to represent state
interests more forcefully within the formal legislative process, since they would be less capable
of compensating for voting against state interests by reaching out to the bureaucracy.
Conclusion
In order to consider the effects of backchannel policymaking, we first must establish the
basic patterns of this behavior. The implications described above are unlikely to matter if we
observe that members of Congress rarely engage with the bureaucracy on policy issues. In fact,
such an observation would suggest that the backchannel is of little real value to legislators.
Chapter 3 considers how often members of Congress engage in this behavior and whether it is
widespread across legislators. I also examine how it compares to aggregate levels of previously
considered policymaking activities. Chapter 3 begins with a description of my original data,
collection and coding process, and tests to validate my measure.
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CHAPTER 3
The Nature of Backchannel Policymaking
My theory of backchannel policymaking predicts that senators contact federal agencies
about policy issues. This communication provides the foundation for the policy linkage between
legislator and agency, and it allows me to examine several aspects of backchannel policymaking.
First, it indicates the extent to which a legislator engages with an agency on policy issues.
Second, as I will show, it is a measure of a legislator’s expressed policy preferences, and, third,
evidence of the agency’s knowledge of those preferences. Thus, this communication provides the
means for exploring several questions about backchannel policymaking. Why do legislators
reach out to the bureaucracy with their policy concerns? What are the circumstances under which
legislators choose to take advantage of backchannel policymaking, and how does it line up with
their behavior within the legislative process? How does the bureaucracy respond to legislators’
policy requests? What are the implications for policymaking process and for outcomes?
The first question that needs to be addressed is whether such communication occurs to
any significant degree. How often do legislators contact the bureaucracy about policy issues?
This question is important since previous work (Fiorina 1977b) has considered the direct
communication between individual members of Congress and the bureaucracy to be largely
focused on casework, not policy.
As I mentioned in the previous chapter, if legislators use the bureaucracy because they
are constrained from pursuing policy goals in Congress, I should observe that they reach out to
the bureaucracy about policy matters regularly and that this engagement occurs broadly across
legislators. Such an observation would also suggest that this behavior has value for members of
Congress, if they devote their limited time and resources to it at levels rivaling other means of
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policy influence. In this chapter, I describe my original data and lay the groundwork for my
examination of my theory by using senators’ communication about policy issues to federal
agencies. First, I will show that senators contact the bureaucracy about policy issues and that this
activity is widespread across the U.S. Senate. Second, I demonstrate that senators engage in this
behavior at rates similar to other types of policymaking activities, suggesting that it deserves
greater attention from congressional scholars. Third, I offer evidence that senators’ policy
contact with the bureaucracy is a valid measure of their policy preferences. These findings allow
me to establish the foundation for my primary analyses in Chapter 4.
Assessing Policy Contact
Senators’ correspondence with federal agencies regarding policy issues, which I will refer
to as “policy contact,” is an appropriate measure for considering how and to what extent
senators’ try to pursue their policy goals through the bureaucracy. I define policy contact as
direct forms of communication, such as letters, emails, and face-to-face meetings, between a
senator and an agency. If a senator wants to use the bureaucracy to influence policy, she would
presumably need to make her preferences known to the agency that oversees the policy area she
wants to influence. While it is reasonable to argue that the bureaucracy can assume a legislator’s
preferences about receiving a grant for his district or state (Arnold 1979), legislators’ policy
preferences, and, in particular, the intensity of preferences, are less clear.
Of course, there are other ways beyond direct contact that members of Congress can
communicate their policy preferences to agencies. For example, scholars have considered how
legislators try to influence the bureaucracy through formal means of oversight like administrative
procedures (Balla 1998) or in the more public forum of a committee hearing (Hall and Miler
2008). Additionally, a legislator can make a statement to the press regarding an agency’s
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handling of a policy matter. This last more indirect form of communication, while not a feature
of this dissertation, will be a focus of my future work, as I will describe in more detail in Chapter
6.
Policy contact differs from the other forms of communication mentioned above for a few
important reasons. First, policy contact is not a formal procedural means of oversight and
political control and, therefore, allows legislators who might not have access to these formal
means of oversight (because they are not on the committee overseeing the agency, for example)
to make their preferences known. Second, this feature also allows policymaking to occur under
the radar, off the congressional record, and outside of the public eye.
Some scholars (Hamilton and Schroeder 1994, Hamilton 1996, Balla 1998) have pointed
out that bureaucrats, too, use informal means to pursue policy influence. For example, Steven
Balla (1998) describes how the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) used such channels to
evade the formal oversight of Congress:
“Regulators promulgated certain RCRA [the Resource Conservation and
Recovery Act] rules through informal channels, such as interagency memoranda
and guidance manuals, thereby circumventing formal procedural requirements.
Furthermore, regulators’ decisions to pursue informal rulemaking were strategic;
the penalties associated with informal rules were higher than those associated
with rules promulgated under the notice and comment process, an indication that
EPA officials used informality to impose sanctions more stringent than those
preferred by members of Congress and the interests likely to participate in formal
proceedings.” (Balla, 1998, p. 664)
While Balla suggests that the EPA’s actions would not be preferred by members of Congress,
surely some legislators are staunch environmental advocates would likely favor the EPA’s
actions, and perhaps even urged the EPA to act in the way it did. In fact, policy contact could
complement the bureaucracy’s informal means of changing policy as a strategy that occurs under
the radar.
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Data and Methodology
In order to consider patterns of policy contact, I use original data involving senators’
correspondence with the Departments of Labor and Homeland Security during the 110th and
111th Congresses (2007-2010).11 I measure senators’ policy contact with the bureaucracy using
records of official correspondence (including letters, faxes, phone calls, and meetings) between
senate offices and the federal departments. I use logs detailing the correspondence from senators
to the Departments of Labor and Homeland Security in order to measure the amount and type of
contact each senator makes with the department.12 I chose these departments in order to take into
account differences between agencies which could affect legislator interactions. Specifically, I
considered assessments of departments’ policy preferences (Clinton and Lewis 2008) suggesting
that the Labor Department leans liberal and the Department of Homeland Security leans
conservative. The department logs include correspondence details including dates, summaries of
the correspondence, and participants.
The Freedom of Information Act
11 The time period covers the last two years of the second term of President George W. Bush’s presidency
and the first two years of President Barack Obama’s first term. There was divided government under the
second two years of President Bush’s second term (2007-2008, 110th Congress). The Obama presidency
experienced unified government in the first two years of his first term (2009-2010, 111th Congress).
During the entire time period, Democrats controlled both chambers of Congress.
12 I measure levels of policy contact using a count of correspondence from a legislator to a department.
When a legislator contacts a department multiple times about the same issue, I count each contact as a
separate correspondence.
46
How did I attain these records? Fortunately, the Freedom of Information Act, enacted on
July 4, 1966, allows individuals to request any record from a federal agency. Beginning in May
of 2012, I submitted Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) requests to the Departments of Labor
and Homeland Security in order to obtain the records of correspondence with members of
Congress. I received the last of the documents I had requested from the Department of Homeland
Security on September 24, 2013 and from the Labor Department on October 2, 2013.
However, there are some limitations under FOIA. The Freedom of Information Act allows
individuals to request records unless the record is covered by 9 exemptions.13 Information
covered by one of the exemptions can be redacted. For example, the 6th exemption protects
personal information affecting an individual's privacy, which for my purposes, means the names
of citizens are redacted. However, I still received a record of the particular correspondence with
all the other information (except the citizen’s name) (for an example, see the image of the
redacted records of the congressional correspondence log in Appendix C).  Fortunately, the
names of citizens are not necessary for my purposes, and any other exemptions were minimal
and did not result in the redaction of information required for my analyses.
13 The exemptions include: (1) Protects information that is properly classified in the interest of national
defense or foreign policy; (2)  Internal personnel rules and practices; (3) Information specifically
exempted by other statutes; (4) Trade secrets, commercial or financial information; (5) Privileged
interagency or intra-agency memoranda or letters; (6) Personal information affecting an individual's
privacy; (7) Investigatory records compiled for law enforcement purposes; (8) Reports of financial
institutions; (9) Geographical and geophysical information concerning wells. The Department of Labor is
the source of this list of exemptions. (http://www.dol.gov/sol/foia/exempt.htm, last accessed April 3,
2015).
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Coding Policy Contact
Legislators contact the bureaucracy for a variety of reasons. I used content analysis to
identify policy contact, which required that I read and code agency summaries of over 13,000
contacts (includes contacts with both departments from 2007 through 2010). I classified
correspondence as policy contact if it concerns the formation or broad implementation of policies
(e.g., the department’s rulemaking process, regulations, enforcement, etc.). More specifically, I
identify policy contact by the following criteria: The legislator or his or her staff corresponds
(e.g., letter, fax, email, meeting, phone call) with the department about a law, agency program or
policy, or a national policy issue (i.e., not a grant request, earmark, or casework) on behalf of the
state or district as a whole or a portion of the state or district (not an individual constituent). To
be clear, while casework (or constituency service) concerns personal matters of individual
constituents, policy relates to government action on public issues and social problems.
All other correspondence is coded as either non-policy or grant-related. I categorized
correspondence as involving non-policy activities if it concerns casework, an event invitation, or
similarly ceremonial correspondence (such as thank you notes and birthday greetings). I
operationalize casework as involving (1) a matter particular to just one constituent or a family or
(2) routine14 assistance customarily carried out by a congressional office’s caseworker (e.g.,
VISA renewal, delayed social security checks, etc.). Most correspondence labeled as non-policy
satisfies both criteria. However, some of this correspondence only applies to the first or the
second criterion (such as a request for expedited processing of a local business’ VISA-related
14 By “routine” I am referring to the services regularly carried out by congressional caseworkers which
are often advertised on a member of Congress’ website under “casework” or “constituency service.”
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application). I labeled correspondence as grant requests if it involves a request for funds for a
particular project or organization within the state.
In order to assess the reliability of my measure and coding scheme, I generated the
intercoder reliability scores displayed in Figure 3.1. I coded all of the correspondence entries and
received the assistance of an undergraduate research assistant who blindly double-coded 10% of
the correspondence entries (randomly selected) using a codebook (see Appendix C for the
codebook and examples from the Department of Homeland Security’s correspondence records) I
developed. I calculated the percentage agreement (or agreement rate) between coders, which was
86% for the correspondence from the Labor Department and 92% for the Department of
Homeland Security. However, the agreement rate, while intuitive, can overestimate intercoder
reliability because it does not take into account the frequency with which coders’ agreement is
due to chance alone. In order to achieve greater confidence in the reliability of my measure, I
generated Cohen’s kappa scores (Cohen 1960), which take into account intercoder agreement
based on random chance. The kappa scores for coding agreement of the Labor Department
correspondence is 0.72, which Landis and Koch (1977) interpret to be “substantial” agreement,
and, for the Department of Homeland Securing, the kappa score is 0.83, considered to be “almost
perfect” agreement.15 Overall, the intercoder reliability scores, displayed in Figure 3.1, indicate a
high level of agreement between coders.
15 Landis and Koch (1977, 165) established a set of standards for interpreting kappa, as follows: <0.00 =
Poor, 0.00-0.20 = Slight, 0.21-0.40 = Fair, 0.41-0.60 = Moderate, 0.61-0.80 = Substantial, and 0.81-1.00
= Almost Perfect.
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Types of Congressional Correspondence: A Breakdown
Table 3.1 presents descriptive data on correspondence initiated by senators to the
Departments of Labor and Homeland Security during the 110th and the 111th Congresses. The
table shows the raw numbers of correspondence as well as the percentage of each type of contact
during each Congress. The rows distinguish between three different types of correspondence;
policy contact, grant requests, and non-policy (casework, event invitations, etc.); for each
department.  As Table 3.1 shows, the amount of contact the departments receive from senators is
fairly consistent across the Congresses and departments. Non-policy and casework-related
correspondence comprises the majority of all contact for both departments during the time
period, with grant requests making up the smallest percentage of overall contact. Figure 3.2
collapses the two Congresses to illustrate the different percentages of correspondence by
department, and the raw numbers of each type are presented above the bars.
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TABLE 3.1 Senator Contact with Departments of Labor & Homeland Security
Correspondence Type
By Department
110th 111th
Number of
Contacts
Percentage of
Total
Number of
Contacts
Percentage of
Total
Policy Contact
Labor
Homeland Security
752
778
24%
21%
847
589
28%
17%
Grant Requests
Labor
Homeland Security
271
414
9%
11%
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476
9%
14%
Non-Policy
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Homeland Security
2055
2557
67%
68%
1943
2338
64%
69%
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Assessing Measurement Validity of Policy Contact
Is policy contact a valid measure of senators’ policy preferences? It is possible, for
instance, that senators are merely forwarding along the letters of individual constituents in order
to gain their favor, and that policy contact is “cheap talk” rather than a meaningful reflection of a
senator’s policy interests. In order to assess the validity of my measure, I consider whether there
is a relationship between previously studied measures of a senator’s policy preferences within
the legislative arena and my measure of policy contact. If a senators’ policy contact is a valid
indication of their policy preferences, we should observe a significant relationship between their
contact with the bureaucracy and their policymaking behavior within the legislative process.
I use two measures of legislative behavior as indicators of senators’ policy preferences,
voting and bill introductions. Since my data is constrained to policy contact that is issue-specific
(related to the policies of the Departments of Labor and Homeland Security), I use interest group
voting scores as an indication of senators’ issue-specific voting behavior and the number of bills
a senator introduces within an issue area as a measure of preference intensity.16 To assess policy
16 The data for labor bill introductions comes from the Policy Agendas Project, originally collected by
Frank R. Baumgartner and Bryan D. Jones, with the support of National Science Foundation grant
numbers SBR 9320922 and 0111611, and distributed through the Department of Government at the
University of Texas at Austin. Neither NSF nor the original collectors of the data bear any responsibility
for the analysis reported here. I included labor bill introductions within my measure when coded with the
major topic category, “Labor, Employment, and Immigration,” as well as bills which were coded with the
major topic category, “Macroeconomics,” and the subtopic category, “Unemployment Rate”. I included
homeland security bill introductions when coded with the subtopic category, “Civil Defense & Homeland
Security,” “Immigration and Refugee Issues,” “Domestic Disaster Relief,” and “Terrorism, Hijacking.”
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contact to the Labor Department, I examine the relationships between the frequency of a
senator’s policy contact and the voting score she received from the AFL-CIO17 and with the
number of bills related to labor issues she introduced during the same time period (2007-2010).
Likewise, I compare the frequency of a senator’s policy contact with the Department of
Homeland Security to the voting score she received from the American Security Council
Foundation18 and to the number of bills related to homeland security issues that she introduced.
If policy contact is a valid measure of policy preferences and preference intensities, I
would expect it to be significantly correlated with voting scores and bill introductions. My
expectations for the relationship between policy contact and bill introductions is straightforward.
Members of Congress should contact the bureaucracy more frequently on issues that are on their
legislative agendas, and so we should observe a significant, positive correlation between
frequency of policy contact and the number of bill introductions.
A significant relationship between policy contact and voting scores would also offer
additional support for the validity of my measure, but the relationship is less clear. Policy contact
indicates a senator’s preference intensity, while voting scores measure the direction of her policy
17 I obtained the AFL-CIO voting scores from the Almanac of American Politics.
18 The American Security Council Foundation (ASCF), formally known as the Institute for American
Strategy, was created in 1958 and is concerned with the development of national security, global
economic, and foreign policy. The stated mission of ASCF is to “promote the necessity of maintaining
military, economic and diplomatic strength,” (https://www.ascfusa.org/content_pages/view/about). A
senator’s score is based on whether her vote is in line with the ASCF’s stated position on votes that are of
concern to the interest group. I obtained the scores from ASCF’s Voter Index Archive (see
http://www.ascfusa.org.php5-4.dfw1-1.websitetestlink.com/content_pages/view/voter-index-archive).
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preferences, so there is less likely to be a strong relationship between these two measures.
Additionally, the expected direction of the relationship is less certain. We might expect a senator
with a strong voting record in support of labor (i.e., with a higher AFL-CIO voting score) to
engage with the Labor Department often, but a senator who always votes against the interests of
labor might also contact the department to hinder the implementation of pro-labor laws or to
encourage the department act to promote free trade policies. Yet, other senators contact the
bureaucracy to modify or “explain away” their votes. As we observed in the opening example of
this dissertation, Senators Dole and Burr voted for CAFTA, a vote in favor of free trade, only to
request protectionist action from the Labor Department later on. Clearly, senators use their
interactions the bureaucracy in different ways, which could mask or weaken any relationships
between policy contact and voting scores.
In addition to examining the relationship between policy contact and legislative behavior,
I also look at the association between contact that is not policy-related (e.g., casework, event
invitations) and my measures of legislative behavior for comparison. There is some reason to
expect a weak correlation between non-policy contact and legislative behavior.  For example, the
non-policy contact category includes birthday cards, event invitations, and other personal notes,
which could indicate a relationship between a senator and the Secretary, potentially endogenous
to legislative behavior. Also, senators may receive more casework (which they then pass on to
the relevant agency) on issues that are salient within their constituency, and thus also a part of
their legislative agendas. However, if policy contact is a valid measure of a senator’s policy
preferences and the intensity of those preferences, I would expect it to have a stronger
relationship to the senator’s policy agenda within the legislative process.
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My results offer support for my expectations and the validity of my measure. As
expected, frequency of a senator’s policy contact with the Labor Department is significantly and
positively correlated with the number of labor-related bills he introduces (correlation of 0.380, p
= 0.000) and policy contact with the Department of Homeland Security is significantly and
positively correlated with bill introductions related to national security (correlation of 0.368, p =
0.000). Also as predicted, non-policy contact with the Department of Homeland Security is not
significantly correlated with national security bill introductions (correlation of 0.081, p = 0.242)
and non-policy contact with the Labor Department is positively and significantly related to labor
bill introductions, but the correlation is weaker than indicated by the coefficient for policy
contact (correlation of 0.157, p = 0.024). Additionally, the correlation between policy contact
with the Labor Department and AFL-CIO voting scores is positive and approaching significance
(correlation of 0.129, p = 0.064). Policy contact with the Department of Homeland Security is
positively but not significantly correlated with ASCF’s voting score. However, as I noted, my
expectation for the relationship between my measure and the voting scores was weaker since the
relationship between preference direction and intensity is less clear. As expected, non-policy
contact is not significantly correlated with the AFL-CIO (correlation of 0.084, p = 0.229) or
ASCF (correlation of 0.023, p = 0.743) voting scores.
These findings offer evidence of the validity of my measure and provide a foundation for
further analysis. Senators’ policy contact with the bureaucracy is significantly related to their
legislative behavior. While the relationship to the direction of policy preferences is less certain
and, perhaps, conditional, policy contact clearly reflects senators’ legislative agendas and, thus,
the intensity of a senator’s policy preferences.
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The Content of Policy Contacts
When legislators reach out to the bureaucracy about a policy issue, what are they
contacting them about? In most of the work (e.g., McCubbins, Noll, Weingast 1989) on the
interactions between Congress and the bureaucracy, there has been a tremendous focus on
oversight, or how Congress tries to reign in a bureaucracy that has drifted from the intent of the
legislative majority or winning coalition and monitors violations or a lack of compliance.
Certainly, individual members of Congress engage with the bureaucracy to ensure that laws are
being implemented and that agencies are performing their tasks efficiently and without
corruption or scandal.
However, when individual legislators engage with the bureaucracy about policy, their
interactions differ from the concept of oversight commonly considered in the literature. First,
legislators’ policy requests tend to be focused on individualistic goals rather than on the
collective intent of Congress. For example, while a senator might contact an agency to ensure the
implementation of a bill he authored, he may request the agency not implement his colleague’s
bill.
To illustrate, consider a letter from Senator Jon Tester sent to the U.S. Food and Drug
Administration (FDA) on January 12, 2015. Senator Tester was concerned that the FDA was not
properly implementing his successful amendment to the Food and Safety Modernization Act
regarding food safety regulations on small farmers and food processing operations. In his letter,
Senator Tester says he is “deeply troubled that the FDA did not adequately address the same ‘all
food’ versus ‘covered produce’ issue in relation to the ‘Tester-Hagan’ amendment. Failure to do
so undermines the intent of my successful amendment and would subject small farms to
unnecessary and burdensome regulations. This stands in stark contrast to Congress’ intent when
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FSMA was signed into law and would have a negative impact on rural economies.”19 Clearly,
Senator Tester is concerned with overseeing the implementation of his amendment.
However, on December 3, 2009, Senator Tester joined his colleague from Montana,
Senator Max Baucus, on a letter to the Secretary of Department of Homeland Security, Janet
Napolitano, urging her not to pass the REAL ID Act of 2005, a law which (if implemented)
would prevent citizens from states are that are not compliant with the law from being able to
board commercial airlines with a driver’s license. The senators argued that “this legislation is
fundamentally unworkable” and that it “creates an unacceptable unfunded mandate on states,”
and conclude by saying, “we urge you to take the steps necessary to prevent the imposition of
additional screening requirements.” While Senator Tester reached out to the bureaucracy to try to
ensure the implementation of his legislation, he seems wholly in favor of DHS not implementing
his colleague, Representative James Sensenbrenner’s, bill, the REAL ID Act.20 In other words,
the senator is interested in the oversight of his policy, but not of laws with which he disagrees.
19 Senator Tester published his letter and mentioned it in a press release which can be found on his
website (http://www.tester.senate.gov/?p=press_release&id=3829, last accessed: April 3, 2015).
20 However, Representative Sensenbrenner (along with Reps. Lamar Smith and Peter King) expressed his
concern to the Secretary of Homeland Security about the department’s failure to implement the REAL ID
Act, and sent her a letter arguing, “Rather than usurping Congress’s authority in writing policy, DHS
should commit to the law and fully support implementation.” Senator Tester and Representative
Sensenbrenner’s conflicting instructions to the department illustrate how battles over policy can move
from the legislative to the bureaucratic arena.
(http://judiciary.house.gov/index.cfm/2011/2/smithkingandsensenbrennerfurtherrealidextensionthreatensn
ationalsecurity, last accessed: April 3, 2015).
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Legislators seem not to be motivated by a collective concern for oversight than by their own
policy goals.
Second, as I alluded to in my first point, legislators are not always ensuring the
implementation of laws in their correspondence with the bureaucracy. Often they are requesting
the agency not implement a law or delay its implementation, requesting a loophole or that a
regulation not be enforced, or influence a policy in a way that may not have passed the
legislative majority. This distinction marks an important departure from previous work on the
policy-based interactions between Congress and the bureaucracy. The perspective I offer focuses
not on how these individual-level interactions are motivated by a principal-agent problem
(although the principal-agent problem establishes the context and opportunity for these
interactions), but on how the bureaucracy’s discretion serves as yet another tool for rational
legislators to pursue their policy goals.
I breakdown policy contact into three categories based on the legislator’s request. The
first category is oversight, although, as I previously mentioned, it differs from the common
conception of oversight as defined in the literature. The primary difference is that I do not
assume the legislator is concerned with the intent of the legislative majority. I characterize policy
contact as oversight if the legislator says he is trying to ensure that a law is being implemented21,
that the agency is performing its task efficiently, or if he is expressing concern about corruption
or scandal within the agency. For example, on September 22, 2010, Senator Grassley sent a letter
to the Secretary of the Department of Homeland Security expressing his concern that the
department was not executing the nation’s immigration laws but, instead, allowing for what he
21 Certainly, this could simply be a matter of how the legislator is framing his request. Framing a policy
request in terms of oversight could offer it more credibility.
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referred to as “backdoor amnesty”. This example also illustrates how, while Senator Grassley, a
Republican with a conservative stance on immigration issues, frames his request in terms of
oversight and ensuring implementation of the law, it also serves a political goal.
The second classification includes contacts in which a legislator requests the agency take
a particular course of action on a policy issue beyond matters of oversight and government
performance. The case of Senators Dole and Burr requesting the Labor Department raise tariffs
on socks imported from Honduras would fall into this category. Other examples include
instances of several senators contacting the Secretary of Homeland Security to request that the
department not implement the REAL ID Act of 2005. Often legislators will urge the department
to take an action based on a public problem faced by their constituency without mention of
current law. The actions available to the agency can include stricter enforcement, making
exceptions for particular industries, or extending a program, although legislators do not always
indicate how, specifically, they want the agency to fulfill their requests and, instead, leave it up
to the agency to determine how to proceed. One bureaucrat I spoke with said that when members
of Congress contact his agency, he and his colleagues consider whether they actually need to
propose a rule in order to fulfil the request, and often need to communicate with the agency’s
attorneys to consider how far they can “stretch the law” in order to do so.22
The third category includes cases in which legislators request information for the
formation of policy or the support of the agency for pending legislation. Agencies’ expertise can
make them valuable assets to legislators who are pursuing policy initiatives in Congress. Support
from an agency can give a legislator’s bill credibility and help win over his colleagues. However,
22 This information and quote are from an interview conducted on November 28, 2015 with a Division
Chief within the agency’s Washington, DC office.
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agency opposition to a bill could make legislators reluctant to vote in favor of it. In some cases,
legislators contact the agency to try to persuade it. For example, on December 8, 2008, Senator
Dianne Feinstein (D-CA) contacted the department to expresses her disagreement with the
department’s arguments against the Emergency Agriculture Relief Act, a bipartisan bill, saying
that “the bill is necessary and broadly supported solution to the labor crisis facing the agriculture
industry.”
Table 3.2 presents an overview of the content of the policy contacts with each department
in terms of the action described in the communication as well as the specific issue area (e.g.,
worker protection, immigration, etc.). I coded the policy contacts based on whether they are
characterized by one of the three action categories: a senator engaging in oversight of the agency,
requesting an agency action, or request for information or ex ante support for pending legislation
(labeled in the table as “content actions”). Additionally, occasionally members of Congress write
to agencies about classified matters of national security, in which case the content of the contact
is not available. While there were no classified contacts with the Labor Department, there were a
few (5 contacts comprising less than 0.5% of all policy contacts) with the Department of
Homeland Security.
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TABLE 3.2 Content of Senators’ Policy Contact with the Departments of Labor &
Homeland Security, 110th-111th
Content of Policy Contact Labor Dept. Dept. of Homeland
Security
Contact Topic Raw Percentage Raw Percentage
Job Corps 41 3%
Unemployment 19 1%
Worker Protection 1273 80%
Immigration 54 3%
Other 212 13%
FEMA 150 10%
Terrorism/National Security 416 30%
Immigration 433 32%
Border Issues 235 17%
Other 123 9%
Total 1599 100% 1367 100%
Contact Action
Oversight 217 14% 452 33%
Request Agency Action 1273 80% 889 65%
Request for Information/Ex Ante Support 109 7% 22 2%
Classified 0 0% 4 < 0.5%
Total 1599 100% 1367 100%
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Participation in Policy Contact
Thus far this chapter has described characteristics of contacts. Now, I will consider
participation in policy communication by focusing on the individual senator as my unit of
analysis. How often do senators contact agencies about policy? Are policy contacts initiated by
most senators or is it a small group of senators who are primarily responsible for the majority of
the interactions with agencies? In other words, is this strategy for influencing policy used by
most senators or is it concentrated among a few?
These questions tap into the key findings of this chapter and provide the foundation for
the forthcoming analyses of Chapters 4 and 5. As I explained at the beginning of this chapter,
backchannel policymaking is dependent on policy contact occurring broadly and regularly across
senators. If senators are not engaging with agencies about policy, the backchannel is not a
significant means of influence. Moreover, the prevalence of policy contact could shed light on
some misconceptions about the relationship between individual legislators and the bureaucracy
and about how legislators try to influence policy outside of the legislative process. Finally,
understanding the rate of participation could offer some normative implications about the
distribution of policymaking power among legislators. If it is primarily a small group of
legislators who are engaging with an agency, it could suggest that backchannel policymaking is
largely in the hands of highly-motivated, preference outliers.
Before plunging into the rates of participation in policy contact, I will discuss my sample
of senators. Table 3.3 offers descriptive information about the sample I will use throughout the
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dissertation. My sample consists of 124 unique senators, 23 85 of whom served for both the 110th
and 111th Congresses and including 16 who only served part of one of the Congresses (due to
retirement, appointment, special election, etc.). While generally representative in terms of key
variables including seniority (mean = 12 years in office) and vote share in the previous election
(mean = 63%), Democrats held the majority of seats in the Senate during all four years. The
sample includes 27 senators who held leadership positions (or 17 unique senators who were on
leadership during one or both of the Congresses). There are 41 members of the Senate Health,
Education, Labor and Pensions (HELP) Committee (26 unique senators), which is relevant to my
analyses because it is the committee that primarily oversees many of the policies and programs
carried out by the Labor Department, and 29 members of the Senate Committee on Homeland
Security and Governmental Affairs (21 unique senators), which oversees the Department of
Homeland Security. These variables will be important for the analyses in the forthcoming
chapters.
23 Due to his party switch in 2009 (the 111th Congress), Senator Arlen Specter is treated as two different
senators (each with a unique ICPSR), one Republican and one Democratic. His policy contacts are
divided based on the date of his official transition to the Democratic Party and the date of the contact.
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24 This summary of party affiliation is based on whether the senator caucused with the Democratic Party.
Senators Joseph Lieberman and Bernard Sanders are coded as Democrats in my sample.
TABLE 3.3 Sample Characteristics
Variable Senate, 110th-111th
# of Senators 124
# of Senators who served both in Congresses 85
Mean Seniority (Years in Office) 11.86
Mean Vote Share (%) 63.08
# of Senators who did not serve for the entire Congress 16
# of Leadership Members 27
# of Labor Committee Members 41
# of Homeland Security Committee Members 29
# of Republicans 95
# of Democrats24 114
Sample N 209
Sources: All data were collected from the Almanac of American Politics (2008, 2010, and
2012 editions).
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Table 3.4 presents descriptive data on how often individual senators correspond with the
departments during a Congress. The table shows the number of contacts for each individual
senator, (in several cases, multiple senators initiate contact as a group, but it is recorded here as
distinct initiations of contact from each senator in the group). For example, the maximum of
policy-related contacts with the Labor Department (56 contacts) reflects Senator Edward
Kennedy’s activity only during the 110th Congress. The first column presents the percentage of
senators who contacted the departments. From 2007 through 2010, 95% of senators contacted the
two departments regarding policy issues during a Congress. This column indicates that most
senators are involved in policy-related correspondence with the bureaucracy.
In terms of frequency of contact, senators contacted the Departments of Labor and
Homeland Security about a policy issue an average of 8.6 and 8.3 times, respectively, during a
single Congress. Of course, this analysis is limited to two of 15 departments. Senators may
contact other departments more or less frequently. This summary indicates that policy contact is
not limited to a few senators. Most senators contact the bureaucracy about policy, and, if we
assume the Departments of Labor and Homeland Security are representative of the other 13
departments, do so fairly regularly.
However, there is variability in the volume of policy contact across senators. While some
legislators never contact the departments regarding policy, the maximum number of contacts by
a senator is 56 for the Labor Department and 51 for Homeland Security. This summary indicates
that policy engagement with an agency varies across senators. I consider the explanation for this
variation in Chapter 4.
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How does Backchannel Policymaking Compare to Legislative Activities?
I have shown that nearly all senators contact agencies about policy and many do so fairly
regularly, but how does policy contact compare to other types of policymaking activities that
take place within the legislative process? Considering senators have limited time and resources,
if levels of policy contact rival other types of policymaking activities, it would suggest that this
behavior carries real value for members of Congress.
However, it is important to note the differences between activities. For example, I would
expect the costs of introducing a bill to be higher than for contacting an agency. While both
activities take time, effort, and some policy expertise, these costs should be greater for writing a
bill than for writing a letter, calling, or meeting with an agency head. Additionally, bill
introductions are on the congressional record and visible to other legislators, the public, and
electoral challengers, and so a senator should consider the possible negative ramifications for
such a public action, especially if there might be differences of opinion about the legislation
among her constituency. In contrast, contacting an agency about a policy issue is less likely to
Table 3.4 Descriptive Statistics for Policy Contact by Senator, 110th – 111th Congress
Policy Contact % who
contacted
Minimum
contacts
per
Congress
Maximum
contacts
per
Congress
Mean
contacts
per
Congress
Median
contacts
Std. Dev.
Labor
Homeland Security
95%
95%
0
0
56
51
8.6
8.3
7
6
8.4
8.0
Note: The columns represent correspondence by individual senators during a particular Congress. For
example, maximum of policy-related contacts (56) reflects Senator Edward Kennedy’s activity only during
the 110th Congress.
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become as public unless the senator chooses to publicize it (or a FOIA request is made for the
contact), and so policy contact carries less of risk since senators have control over when and how
their policy contacts are publicized (i.e., not publicized at all or only to the beneficiaries of the
policy contact). Due to the greater costs and risk associated with introducing bills, I would
expect the number of policy contacts to exceed the number of bills introduced. However, despite
the difference in costs, if policy contact offered no real value to senators, we would not expect
legislators to divert time and resources (time and resources that could be spent on introducing
bills, working on committee, etc.) to policy contact.
In order to test this expectation, I look at the number of bills introduced having to do with
labor issues in comparison to the number of policy contacts with the Labor Department and
homeland security-related bills in relation to policy contacts with the Department of Homeland
Security. This comparison is particularly useful because I can also examine the prevalence of
cosponsored bills in relation to collaboration on policy contact. As I previously mentioned,
legislators will sometimes contact an agency together (for example, by signing onto a letter in
pairs or groups). This is similar to how legislators cosponsor bills.
Figures 3.3 and 3.4 display levels of bills and policy contacts on labor and homeland
security issues, respectively, during the 110th through the 111th Congresses. As expected, there
are more policy contacts than bills, with just over 325 bills introduced in both issue areas
compared to 1,599 policy contacts with the Labor Department and 1,367 contacts with the
Department of Homeland Security. In terms of collaboration on either activity, while the raw
numbers are relatively close, the percentage of cosponsored bills is 60% of all labor related bills
and 73% of the total number of homeland security bills while collaboration comprises only about
12% of policy contact in either issue area. One possible reason for the much higher numbers of
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policy contacts and low percentages of collaboration could be that senators are more likely to
cosponsor a colleague’s bill than to introduce their own if they planned on sponsoring a similar
bill. However, since policy contact is less visible, different senators may be independently
initiating contact about the same issue without realizing it. While senators sometimes request
their colleagues to collaborate on policy contact, they may also communicate with agencies
discretely and independently. Looking at just the raw counts, though, collaborative policy
contact occurs nearly as often as collaborative legislation.
328
1599
199 190
0
500
1000
1500
2000
Sponsored Bills Policy Contacts
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These totals suggest that policy contact with the bureaucracy is not an infrequent
occurrence, particularly in relation to bill introductions, but how does individual-level
participation in these behaviors compare? Table 3.5 presents the number of senators who
introduce at least one bill with the number of senators who initiate at least one policy contact and
compares the average number of bills senators introduce to the average number of policy
contacts. The table indicates that about 70 additional senators participate in policy contact with
either department than introduce bills about labor or homeland security issues, and the average
number of policy contacts significantly exceeds the average number of bills senators introduce
for both policy areas.
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Overall, these comparisons suggest that legislators communicating with the bureaucracy
about policy is not rare or unusual. Assuming these departments are fairly representative of the
bureaucracy, policy contact occurs frequently, particularly in relation to bill introductions. Yet,
unlike the introduction of legislation, policy contact takes place off of the congressional record.
Summary of Findings regarding the Relationship between Legislator and Agency
The patterns of policy contact I have shown thus far offer a number of findings regarding
the relationship between individual members of Congress and the bureaucracy.
The interactions between individual members of Congress and the bureaucracy are not confined
to casework, grants, and oversight. Legislators reach out to the bureaucracy about policy issues,
often apart from simply ensuring the intent of Congress.
TABLE 3.5 Participation in Bill Introductions vs. Policy Contact,
110th-111th
Policy Area/
Department
Bill
Introductions
Policy Contacts Difference?
Labor 1.56 8.60 t = -12.96***
# of Participating
Senators 120 190
Homeland Security 1.56 8.29 t = -13.02***
# of Participating
Senators 123 190
Note: The cells preset the average number of bills introduced or policy contacts
initiated by the sample of senators and the number of senators who participated
in either activity (i.e., introduced at least one bill or initiated as least one policy
contact). Differences between the means are calculated using paired t-tests. *** =
p < 0.001, ** = p < 0.01, * = p < 0.05.
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Individual members of Congress regularly communicate with the bureaucracy about policy
issues. Nearly all senators contact the bureaucracy about policy, and many seem to do so fairly
often. In fact, the number of times senators contact the bureaucracy about policy well exceeds
the number of bills introduced in the Senate.
A legislator’s participation in policymaking is not constrained to the legislative process.
Senators try to influence policy beyond the conventional avenues of policy influence (e.g.,
voting, bill introductions, cosponsorship, committee work) long considered by congressional
scholars.
These findings are important for our understanding of the policy linkage between legislator and
agency as well as for laying the empirical groundwork for my forthcoming analyses.
Conclusion
Beyond shedding light on the relationship between legislators and the bureaucracy, this
chapter should raise some normative red flags. If members of Congress are trying to influence
policy by going off the congressional record and through this backchannel of the bureaucracy,
what might this mean for public policy? In order to answer this question, we need to address who
is trying to use the backchannel to influence policy, why they use it, and under what
circumstances it is effective. Chapter 4 will pick up with the first of these considerations.
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CHAPTER 4
Who uses the Backchannel?
Some members of Congress are more powerful than others. The unequal distribution of
power in Congress can be explained largely by the resources, skills, and advantages accrued
from a legislator’s institutional position and how many years he has spent walking the halls of
the Capitol Building.  In this chapter, I begin to consider whether the bureaucracy’s discretion
offers an opportunity for low-ranking legislators to balance the scales, or if it serves as second
pathway for already powerful members of Congress. The answer to this question is important for
determining whether backchannel policymaking mitigates or exacerbates the unequal distribution
of power in Congress.
As the foundation of my theoretical framework described in Chapter 2, I argued that
legislators contact the bureaucracy about policy because they are constrained from achieving
their goals in the legislative process. While all legislators face constraints in Congress, some are
more limited than others. In particular, when it comes to achieving policy goals, senior
legislators, majority party members, majority party leaders, and committee chairs tend to be
more successful at getting their bills through the legislative process (Volden and Wiseman 2015,
p. 44). It is generally the case that a low-ranking, junior senator is likely to have a harder time
pursuing his goals than a powerful, senior member of leadership. If we assume that these
constrained legislators are the most motivated to pursue alternative venues for influencing
policy, we might expect to see members of Congress who are the least capable of influencing
policy in the legislative process turn to the bureaucracy the most. In Chapter 2, I introduced this
expectation as the legislative need hypothesis.
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Yet, even the most powerful members of Congress are not unlimited in their ability to
accomplish their goals within the legislative process. For example, in addition to the general
constraints faced by all legislators (e.g., bicameralism, 534 other members of Congress), leaders
face the additional task of pursuing the party agenda while maintaining the majority of seats.
Moreover, some constraints are situational. A chair of one committee may have a harder time
pursuing policy interests under the jurisdiction of another committee, or a senior member of
leadership may face cross pressures from her constituency. When all is considered, powerful
legislators may be just as motivated to reach out to the bureaucracy as their limited colleagues if
doing so allows them to circumvent legislative hurdles.
We also must take into account that, while the constraints of the legislative process
motivate members of Congress to reach out to the bureaucracy, power, influence, and resources
within Congress could facilitate legislators’ capacity to use backchannel policymaking. For
example, a senior committee chair has experience, policy expertise, and prior relationships with
bureaucratic heads which could facilitate further communication with an agency. Senior
legislators, leaders, and committees possess additional resources and staff for backchannel
activities. Perhaps more importantly, legislators who have power and influence within the
legislative process are in a better position to reciprocate or pay back the agency by supporting its
programs, budgets, and even leniency of oversight of the agency. Previous work has shown that
agencies strategically distribute grants to legislators who are in a position to benefit the agency
(Arnold 1979), so it seems likely that agencies consider the potential for reciprocity when
responding to policy requests as well. Recognizing this advantage, powerful legislators may be
more likely to contact the bureaucracy if they expect the agency will respond favorably. As a
result, members of Congress who are in the most need of an alternative way to influence policy
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may be the least capable of taking advantage of it. If this is the case, we should expect to observe
that legislators in positions of power and influence in Congress exploit their advantages with the
bureaucracy. In Chapter 2, I referred to this competing expectation as the capacity hypothesis.
Distinguishing between these hypotheses is important for understanding how
backchannel policymaking is used and who benefits from it. As a first step, I consider which
types of senators reach out to the bureaucracy with their policy concerns most often. While the
analyses in this chapter only address which legislators try to use backchannel policymaking, not
whether they are actually successful at influencing an agency, it is an important and necessary
first step for a few reasons. First, as I have mentioned, some legislators may lack the resources
required to communicate with the bureaucracy. In order to use backchannel policymaking,
legislators must recognize that it is an option and have some expectation of benefiting from it, in
addition to the policy expertise, political intelligence, staff, and other resources required in order
to participate in any policymaking activity. Second, a legislator cannot successfully influence
policy using the backchannel if he does not first contact an agency. Finally, a member of
Congress can benefit electorally from her policy contact with the bureaucracy even if she is
unable to successfully influence an agency’s actions. Yet, these electorally valuable, although
unsuccessful, attempts at using backchannel policymaking can still have real implications for the
policymaking process, as I will explain in Chapter 6.
Furthermore, who tries to use backchannel policymaking can shed light on which
legislators use it most successfully. If the bureaucracy is useless as a policymaking tool, we
would not expect senior legislators, who have accumulated years and political know-how, to
continue to try to use the bureaucracy if it has proven to be a failure in the past. If policy contact
increases with seniority, it could suggest legislators learn how to take advantage of the
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backchannel over time. Additionally, frequent policy contact between particular legislators and
an agency might point to a relationship of reciprocity. I would not expect a legislator to spend
time and effort regularly contacting a particular agency if she was not getting anything out of the
relationship.
Finally, knowing the characteristics of legislators who contact the bureaucracy can
inform us about the constraints of the legislative process and the advantages and limits of
backchannel policymaking. Who chooses this strategy as a way of pursuing policy goals? Does
backchannel policymaking offer advantages over legislative activities for some members of
Congress? Are their instances when it is less useful? While I begin to answer the first of these
questions here, I will pick up with them again in Chapter 5.
Who Participates in Congress?
Before I describe and test my expectations for how policy contact with the bureaucracy
varies across individual senators, it is important to take a step back to consider previous findings
on legislators’ participation in policymaking activities. If members of Congress use their
communication with the bureaucracy to pursue policy goals, we might expect to observe some
similar patterns across participation in both the legislative and bureaucratic venues. Thus,
previous findings, while constrained to the legislative arena, can help guide my own expectations
or alternative hypotheses. Previous work can also provide a standard by which to consider my
results.
Scholars (Hall 1996, Schiller 1995, Wawro 2000, Woon 2009) studying participation in
Congress have consistently relied on a rational-choice framework. This theoretical approach
generally purports that members of Congress make decisions about participation based on
activities and issues that offer the highest net benefits when institutional and strategic constraints
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are taken into account. Scholars argue that patterns of participation reflect the benefits that
legislators accrue from pursuing their policy interests, building reputations of expertise, and
responding to constituency demands, but under the constraints they face due to their institutional
position, limited resources, and political concerns. Untangling these interactive factors has
proven to be a challenge.
Indeed, the motivation to pursue policy interests and the capacity offered from
institutional positions are closely intertwined. For instance, we know that committee membership
predicts bill sponsorship (Schiller 1995) and issue attention (Woon 2009). Committee members
sponsor more bills related to issues under their committee’s jurisdiction than do non-committee
members (Woon 2009). This finding could suggest the importance of the committee system,
even in the decentralized Senate which prioritizes individualism over historic norms of policy
specialization (Sinclair 1989). However, it could also point to a general interest committee
members have in the issue area. Members of Congress request committee assignments based on
their policy interests and constituency demands or develop interest in the issue after assigned.
Alternatively, committee membership, and even more so, committee leadership positions, can
offer an edge to legislators pursuing issue-specific policy goals through legislative means such as
bill sponsorship and cosponsorship (Wilson and Young 1997) by lowering costs for committee
members, who already have a background and expertise on the issue area (Gilligan and Krehbiel
1997, Krehbiel 1991), political information about their colleagues from frequent interactions
(Hall 1996, 91), and staff attending to the issue.
Jonathan Woon (2009) straightens out some of these competing explanations by
disentangling the resources of committee membership from the benefits of responding to
constituency demand. By isolating legislators who are newly assigned to or reassigned from a
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committee, he finds that the issue attention reflected in bill sponsorship develops with committee
membership and persists even after a legislator is reassigned. Additionally, he compares the bill
sponsorship of senators who represent the same state but do not both serve on a particular
committee, and finds that the senator who is a committee member pursues committee-relevant
bill sponsorship more so than her same-state colleague who does not serve on the committee.
These findings indicate that committee membership affects bill sponsorship beyond the influence
of constituency demand. Woon argues that this finding suggests that senators’ bill sponsorship is
motivated, not only by position-taking, but by policy outcomes (p. 46).
However, constituency demand plays a role in legislative behavior as well. Members of
Congress participate, in part, to represent their constituency and reap the electoral benefits of
appearing responsive. Hall (1996) concludes that the intensity of district policy interests has a
great deal of influence on the amount time and energy legislators spend on issues. Constituency
characteristics affect legislators’ committee participation (Hall 1996, p. 198) and their bill
sponsorship. The size of a state’s economy (Schiller 1995) and the importance and concentration
of particular industries within a state (Woon 2009) affects volume of bill sponsorship. Clearly,
while scholars have grappled with the challenge of how to measure and untangle the various
factors affecting legislative participation, they have successfully managed to show that both the
benefits of participation, and the advantages provided by institutional positions enabling
participation, play distinct but often interacting roles.
To a great extent, the factors affecting legislator behavior hold across policymaking
venues.  If I am correct to assert that members of Congress use the bureaucracy to pursue policy
goals, we should expect previously uncovered patterns of legislative participation to extend to
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the bureaucratic arena. Indeed, the work on legislative participation informs my expectations
about the factors influencing senators’ contact with the bureaucracy.
Institutional Positions & Capacity
First, like previous work, I expect a senator’s institutional position to affect the extent to
which he tries to use backchannel policymaking. Institutional positions can raise expectations of
successful participation or lower costs of participation (Woon 2009), thus increasing a senators’
capacity to participate. Previous work has shown that seniority, leadership positions, (Hall 1996)
and committee membership (Schiller 1995, Woon 2009) can all contribute to participation in
legislative activities.
I argue that these measures of capacity to participate in legislative activities also lower
the costs of engaging in policy contact with the bureaucracy. In fact, seniority, committee
membership, and leadership positions all offer resources that facilitate legislators’ ability to
participate across the venues. With seniority comes experience and expertise with the
policymaking process and additional staff, all of which would facilitate any type of policymaking
activity. Additionally, seniority can also lead to relationships with bureaucratic departments
which could further facilitate backchannel policymaking. Committee membership not only
facilitates bill sponsorship, but can also offer issue-specific policy expertise, staff members, and
other resources that could allow legislators to be particularly active with the agencies that
oversee the policy area. Finally, beyond the additional staff and resources, leadership positions
provide advantages via agenda-setting powers and control over the process. Leaders are more
aware of the details of bills that pass (Curry 2015) and, thus, could have a better sense of how the
bureaucracy could make tweaks to policies that leaders were not able to get in the actual
legislation.
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In addition, a member of Congress’ power within the legislative process could offer
advantages with the bureaucracy due to the potential for reciprocity and, thus, raise the
expectations of success. Similar to logrolling among legislators, agencies are more likely to give
a member of Congress what he wants if they have reason to believe he can pay the agency back
in the future. This potential for reciprocity is biased toward powerful legislators. The more
influence a member of Congress has in the legislative process, particularly on issues an agency
cares about, the more influence he will have with an agency. While I do not measure the
agency’s response to policy contacts in this chapter, the potential for reciprocity has implications
for how often legislators contact agencies. If a legislator knows, perhaps from previous
experience, that an agency is likely to try to fulfil his policy request, he will be more likely to
recognize the backchannel as an effective way for him to accomplish his policy goals. A
bureaucrat I spoke with confirmed this scenario. He said that his agency tries to fulfill policy-
related requests from senior legislators on the committee that oversees the agency as well as
members of leadership, and that, during his reign as Senate Majority Leader, Harry Reid made
frequent requests to the agency, which they would generally try to fulfill. Such relationships
between powerful legislators and agencies, and expectations of success, could affect how often a
legislator contacts the agency.25
Comparing Venues
However, the legislative need hypothesis suggests a different set of results. If legislative
constraints motivate backchannel policymaking, and if constraints vary by individual legislators,
I might expect my measures of institutional position to have an inverse relationship with policy
25 This information and quote are from an interview conducted on November 28, 2015 with a Division
Chief within the agency’s Washington, DC office.
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contact. Junior, rank-and-file senators and non-committee members may be more likely to use
the backchannel, having faced too many hurdles in the legislative process.
Of course, if my broader theoretical framework is accurate, both hypotheses could be
occurring. If constraints motivate legislators to turn to the bureaucracy but capacity facilitates it,
my results could wash out or only support one hypothesis. First, the factors limiting members of
Congress in the legislative process could also be limiting their capability with the bureaucracy.
Lacking staff, experience, and policy expertise is a hurdle within both the legislative and
bureaucratic venues. Second, consider that while constraints in the legislative process motivate
backchannel policymaking, they might not vary so much by individual legislator or play a role in
the volume of policy contact. All members of Congress face constraints of some sort, whether
due to freshman status or the powers maintained by the minority in the Senate. Even former
Senate Majority Leader Harry Reid was not able to push through whatever law he desired.
Indeed, constraints in the legislature are not limited to issues of institutional position. As I
explained in Chapter 2, members of Congress also face conflicts from their constituencies. In
addition to evaluating the constraints of institutional position and power (or lack thereof), I also
consider senators who face conflicts between party and constituency, a strain that is exacerbated
by dichotomous votes and the public nature of legislative policymaking.
Constrained, Cross-Pressured Senators
Fenno quotes a freshman representative who struggled with the need to preserve his
connection to his constituents yet pursue lawmaking: “‘I can see where you would tear yourself
apart here trying to balance representation of your district against your effectiveness. On the one
hand you owe it to your constituents to voice their views; on the other hand you owe it to them to
be effective within the institution,’” (230). Representation of constituency and legislative
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effectiveness do not always go hand-in-hand. There are benefits to towing the party line and
supporting the president’s policies, which can conflict with constituency interests. Moreover,
members of Congress can face disagreement within their own constituencies. While the
legislative arena forces up-or-down votes and is printed in the Congressional Record, picked up
by the media and election challengers, communication with the bureaucracy is less public. This
control over dissemination of policy contact can make backchannel policymaking an effective
way for legislators to satisfy competing principals.
I am not the first to consider the strategic decisions of cross pressured members of
Congress. Box-Steffensmeier, Arnold, and Zorn (1997) find that cross pressured members take
longer to publically state their positions on salient votes. Using the case of the North American
Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA), the authors find that as conservative legislators delay taking a
position on NAFTA as unionization in their district increases, reflecting the signals these
legislators receive from their constituencies that conflict with their policy preferences. The
authors’ explain:
Liberal members with high unionization in their district will declare their position
early, while liberals with low unionization in their district receive conflicting
signals, that is, their constituency factors suggest voting for NAFTA, while their
ideological and policy predispositions suggest voting against it, and thus delaying
their announcement. The process for conservatives is similar: Those from low-
union districts receive a constituency signal consistent with their personal
preference, while those from high-union districts find their preference at odds
with that of constituents. (329)
These cross pressures “indicate contradictory forces that prompt members to delay their
decision.” (329).
The Box-Steffensmeier, et al.’s findings are consistent with the mechanism underlying
my theory of backchannel policymaking. Cross pressured members of Congress are constrained
by up-or-down votes and competing signals. One strategic decision they can make is to delay
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taking a position on the salient issue. Another strategy, I argue, is to use the bureaucracy to
satisfy party and diverging constituency interests through different policymaking venues.
I measure cross pressure using two different types of interactions in order to consider
conflicts due to both state interests and partisan divergence. I would expect cross pressure to
primarily be a problem for senators when a salient issue in the state conflicts with the senator’s
partisan position. Like Box-Steffensmeier, et al. (1997), I measure issue salience using state
characteristics. However, rather than a measure of the legislators’ personal preferences (i.e.,
ideology), I consider the cross pressures of party and constituency. A great deal of scholarship
(see Canes-Wrone, Brady, Cogan 2002, Aldrich 1995; Cox and McCubbins 1993; Rohde 1991;
Snyder and Groseclose 2000) considers conflicting party and constituency influence over votes.
First, I expect Republican senators to contact the Labor Department about policy more
often as the blue collar population of their state increases. Due to the partisan support for free
trade, Republicans from states with a blue collar population would face more conflict on labor
issues. Democrats’ policy contact should not be affected by the blue collar population of their
state because they do not face cross pressure. However, since Democrats are considered to be
weak on national security, I expect Democratic senators to contact the Department of Homeland
Security more often if they serve states along the southern border26, which have more of a stake
in the department’s policies and diverging interests among citizens demanding tighter borders
and the Latino population. My expectations for Democrats representing southern border states is
26 The independent variable indicating states along the southern border include states that share a land
border with Mexico as well as states bordering the Gulf of Mexico. The included states are: California,
Arizona, New Mexico, Texas, Louisiana, Mississippi, Alabama, and Florida.
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weak, since it is less clear whether such senators are substantially more cross pressured than
Republicans representing similar states or constituencies with large Latino communities.
However, cross pressures on policies can be due to conflicting partisan stances rather
than tied to a state interest. Thus, the second type of interaction I use is the previous presidential
vote share of the senator’s state. I expect Republicans to more frequently contact the Labor
Department as the Democratic presidential candidate’s vote share in the state increases.
Likewise, I expect Democrats’ policy contact with the Department of Homeland Security to be
more frequent as the Republican presidential candidate’s vote share increases. In contrast,
Democratic senators representing blue states with large blue collar populations and Republicans
from red states along the southern border are less cross pressured,27 and so the constituency
characteristics should not affect their engagement with the departments.
Alternative Hypotheses
The previous literature on participation in Congress offers some common hypotheses that
I should consider. First, rather than cross pressures influencing use of the backchannel,
constituency demand and party may have independent effects. For example, Woon (2009) finds
that constituency demand influences bill sponsorship. Thus, I include measures of constituency
characteristics to consider whether the proportion of the blue collar population of a state affects
senators’ policy contact with the Labor Department and whether representing a southern border
state affects contact with the Department of Homeland Security.
27 On the other hand, Republicans representing southern border states could be increasingly cross-
pressured as the Latino voting population increases in these states, which could lead to cross pressures for
both parties in these states. Thus, my expectations for how often cross pressured senators contact the
Department of Homeland Security are weak.
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The theory of party issue ownership could offer alternative expectations as well. Petrocik
(1996) argues that each party has core constituencies which care about different sets of issues. As
a result, members of each party focus on the issues associated with their core constituencies and
build a reputation of being competent within the policy areas “owned” by their party. For
example, labor issues are considered to be “owned” by Democrats and national security and
defense are “owned” by Republicans. The parties’ focus on different sets of issues could extend
to their participation with the bureaucracy. However, if members of Congress use the
bureaucracy as an “inoculation strategy” (Sulkin 2005), we might predict that senators pursue
issues on which their party is, by reputation, weak, as a way of compensating for the perceived
deficiency.
Policy Contact with the Bureaucracy: Variation across Senators
In order to test these hypotheses, I estimated separate models depending on the
department receiving the policy contact (i.e., either the Department of Labor or Homeland
Security). Since the dependent variable consists of count data (the number of policy contacts
from a senator to a department), I employ a negative binomial model, which allows for
overdispersion in my data.28 The unit of analysis is the individual senator during a Congress, and
I include robust standard errors, clustering on the individual senator.
28 Using the Labor Department data, the dependent variable’s variance is 60.95, which is about 7 times
greater than its mean of 8.61. For the Department of Homeland Security, the variance is 63.87, about 8
times larger than its mean of 8.29.
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The independent variables are the number of bills a senator introduced regarding
labor/homeland security issues29; labor/homeland security committee membership; ideological
extremity (based on Poole and Rosenthal’s DW-NOMINATE30); seniority; a variable indicating
if the senator was a member of leadership31, party identification; the percentage of blue collar
workers in the senator’s home state/an indicator variable identifying southern border states; and
the vote share of the Democratic/Republican presidential candidate in the senator’s home state
during the previous election.  I also include two interaction variables. The first interaction term
includes party affiliation and a salient state characteristic (i.e., the proportion of the blue collar
29 The data for labor bill introductions comes from the Policy Agendas Project, originally collected by
Frank R. Baumgartner and Bryan D. Jones, with the support of National Science Foundation grant
numbers SBR 9320922 and 0111611, and distributed through the Department of Government at the
University of Texas at Austin. Neither NSF nor the original collectors of the data bear any responsibility
for the analysis reported here. I included labor bill introductions within my measure when coded with the
major topic category, “Labor, Employment, and Immigration,” as well as bills which were coded with the
major topic category, “Macroeconomics,” and the subtopic category, “Unemployment Rate”. I included
homeland security bill introductions when coded with the subtopic category, “Civil Defense & Homeland
Security,” “Immigration and Refugee Issues,” “Domestic Disaster Relief,” and “Terrorism, Hijacking.”
30 My measure for ideological extremity is the absolute value of first-dimension DW-NOMINATE scores
(Poole and Rosenthal 1997). High values indicate an “extreme” and potentially partisan voting record
while low values reveal voting behavior that is not always in sync with a legislator’s party.
31 The measure of leadership used in the tables presented in this chapter do not include committee chairs
and ranking members. However, when I include committee chairs and ranking members of the labor
committee/homeland security committee in the leadership variable, the results are consistent (see Tables
A.1 and A.2 in the Appendix A).
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population of the senator’s state/an indication of whether the senator represents a southern border
state) and the second measures the interaction between party and the previous presidential vote
share (i.e., of the Democrat/Republican candidate), to consider cross pressured senators.  The
models also contain control variables indicating the Congress in which the policy contact
occurred (111th = 1) and if the legislator served for the entire Congress.32
Results
Tables 4.1 and 4.2 display a series of models. The dependent variable in Table 4.1 is the
count of policy contact with the Labor Department and, in Table 4.2, with the Department of
Homeland Security. The second column in both tables contains coefficients and robust standard
errors of the baseline model, excluding the interaction variables. The third column in both tables
presents the full models.
As Tables 4.1 and 4.2 show, there is some consistency across the two departments, as
expected. Consistent with the correlations I present in Chapter 3, the number of labor bill
introductions is positively and significantly (p < .001) related to policy engagement with the
Labor Department. Likewise, introducing bills on homeland security issues predicts senator
involvement with the Department of Homeland Security (p < .001). This finding indicates that
senators’ attention to particular policy issues extends beyond the halls of Congress.
32 I obtained the measures for seniority, leadership, committee membership (specifically, the Senate
Committee on Health, Education, Labor, and Pensions and the Senate Committee on Homeland Security
and Government Affairs), party identification, percentage of states’ blue collar population, and
information for the indicator for serving a partial Congress from the Almanac of American Politics.
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Table 4.1  Characteristics Affecting Senators’ Policy Contact with Labor Dept., 110th-111th
Variables Baseline Model
(Robust S.E.)
Full Model
(Robust S.E.)
Seniority 0.015*
(0.006)
0.015**
(0.006)
Leader 0.034
(0.171)
0.061
(0.167)
Labor Committee 0.503***
(0.141)
0.592***
(0.145)
Ideological Extremity -1.040*
(0.510)
-0.553
(0.536)
Republican 0.030
(0.156)
-5.581**
(1.749)
Proportion of Blue Collar Population in
State
3.895
(2.576)
-0.755
(2.794)
Republican*Blue Collar Prop. 12.618**
(4.855)
Democratic Presidential Candidate’s Vote
Share (%)
0.014
(0.010)
-0.005
(0.010)
Republican*Democratic Presidential Vote
Share
0.054**
(0.019)
# of Labor Bill Introductions 0.101***
(0.028)
0.095***
(0.027)
Partial Term -0.737**
(0.281)
-0.733*
(0.294)
Congress 0.096
(0.086)
0.113
(0.083)
Constant 0.378
(1.039)
2.261*
(1.054)
N 209 209
Log likelihood -631.868 -626.301
Note: Cell entries are negative binomial regression coefficients with robust standard errors, clustering on the
individual senator. The columns display coefficients for all senators (number of clusters=124). The unit of
analysis is the senator-Congress.  The dependent variable is the total number of correspondences concerning
policy (labeled as “policy contact” in the table) initiated by the senator to the department each Congress.  *** =
p <.001; ** =p<.01; * = p <.05; # = p <.1
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Table 4.2  Characteristics Affecting Senators’ Policy Contact with DHS, 110th-111th
Variables Baseline Model
(Robust S.E.)
Full Model
(Robust S.E.)
Seniority 0.028***
(0.006)
0.028***
(0.006)
Leader 0.494**
(0.151)
0.525**
(0.157)
Homeland Security Committee 0.407*
(0.188)
0.415*
(0.192)
Ideological Extremity -0.509
(0.443)
-0.591
(0.475)
Democrat -0.238#
(0.133)
0.067
(0.801)
Southern Border State -0.067
(0.125)
0.144
(0.163)
Democrat*Southern Border State 0.198
(0.230)
Republican Presidential Candidate’s Vote
Share (%)
-0.021**
(0.007)
-0.017
(0.011)
Democrat*Republican Presidential Vote
Share
-0.007
(0.016)
# of Homeland Security Bill Introductions 0.107***
(0.025)
0.104***
(0.026)
Partial Term -0.980**
(0.289)
-0.959**
(0.288)
Congress -0.397***
(0.076)
-0.404***
(0.076)
Constant 2.966***
(0.419)
2.796***
(0.563)
N 209 209
Log likelihood -597.269 -596.942
Note: Cell entries are negative binomial regression coefficients with robust standard errors, clustering on the
individual senator. The columns display coefficients for all senators (number of clusters=124). The unit of
analysis is the senator-Congress.  The dependent variable is the total number of correspondences concerning
policy (labeled as “policy contact” in the table) initiated by the senator to the department each Congress.  *** =
p <.001; ** =p<.01; * = p <.05; # = p <.1
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Several of the findings support the capacity hypothesis. Policy contact increases with
seniority for both departments (p < .001). Committee membership is positively related to policy
contact with the Labor Department (p < .001) and Department of Homeland Security (p < .05).
Leaders contact both departments more frequently than the rank-and-file. The coefficients in the
Department of Homeland Security model are statistically significant (p < .01). Considered
together, the results for these variables support the hypothesis that the additional capacity offered
by seniority, committee membership, and leadership are put to use as senators try to take
advantage of backchannel policymaking. The less consistent results for members of leadership
could suggest that, while leaders have additional resources and advantages at their disposal, they
may exploit them selectively across agencies.
In order to consider the magnitude of the effect of capacity on policy contact, I calculated
a baseline expected value by holding all continuous variables at their mean and dichotomous
variables at 0. Substantively, this represents a rank-and-file Democrat who is not a member of
the relevant committee and served the entirety of the 110th Congress. Increasing seniority by one
standard deviation raises the number of expected policy contacts with the Labor Department
from the baseline of 7 contacts (CI0.95 = 5.320, 8.499) to 8 contacts (CI0.95 = 5.965, 10.411) and,
with the Department of Homeland Security, from the baseline of 9 contacts (CI0.95 = 7.233,
11.224) to 13 contacts (CI0.95 = 9.453, 15.586), an increase of about 18% and 36% respectively.
These effects represent about 15% of the average number of policy contacts (mean = 8.603) with
the Labor Department and about 40% of the average number of policy contacts with the
Department of Homeland Security (mean = 8.287). Additionally, Senate leaders contact the
Department of Homeland Security approximately 16 times (CI0.95 = 10.145, 21.064), about a
69% increase over the baseline expected value. Committee members contact the Labor
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Department about 13 times (CI0.95 = 8.681, 16.291), an increase of over 80% of the baseline.
Finally, committee members contact the Department of Homeland Security about 14 times
(CI0.95 = 8.100, 19.847), an increase of over half of the baseline expected value.
Moreover, Figure 4.1 shows that when we consider senior, committee members who are
also leaders, the expected number of contacts with the Labor Department jumps to 16 (CI0.95 =
7.715, 23.729), over two times the number of contacts of rank-and-file senators who are not on
the labor committee and have served an average number of years in the Senate. Figure 4.2
indicates that senior, committee members who are leaders contact the Department of Homeland
Security 32 times (CI0.95 = 14.768, 49.348), over three times the number of contacts from their
more junior, rank-and-file colleagues who do not have a seat on the committee. Of course, only a
few senators actually possess all three sources of capacity, hence the large confidence intervals.
Substantively, this finding suggests that it is a few, resource and information rich senators who
engage with the departments far more often than the average senator.
While the results for seniority, committee membership, and leadership do not offer
support for the legislative constraint hypothesis, my results show that cross pressured senators
reach out to the Labor Department more frequently than their less conflicted colleagues. This
finding holds when party affiliation (Republican = 1) is interacted with the blue collar population
(p < .01) and with the vote share of the Democratic presidential candidate (p < .01). The
coefficient for the interaction between party affiliation and southern border states is in the
expected direction, but is not significant, and the interaction between party and the Republican
presidential vote share is not significant or in the expected direction. However, we cannot make
inferences about meaningful conditional effects based on the magnitude and significance of an
interaction term’s coefficient (Brambor, Clark, and Golder 2006).
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FIGURE 4.1 Effect of Capacity on Frequency of Policy Contact with Labor Department
FIGURE 4.2 Effect of Capacity on Policy Contact with Department of Homeland Security
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As such, in order to consider my conditional hypothesis, that salient constituency
interests condition the effect of party affiliation on senators’ use of policy contact with the
bureaucracy, I consider the conditioned effects at varying levels of the state characteristics.
Figure 4.3 indicates the marginal effect of party affiliation across the observed range of states’
blue collar populations. The dark sloping line denotes the marginal effect of party as the
proportion of the blue collar population in senators’ states increases from the minimum of 0.162
to the maximum of 0.282 by increments of 0.01 (but shown as increments of 0.02 on the figure’s
x-axis). The shaded region represents 95% confidence intervals based on the estimates of the full
model in Table 4.1. The marginal effect is statistically significant when both the upper and lower
bounds of the confidence interval are above or below the dashed reference line (y = 0). Figure
4.3 indicates that the effect is significant when the proportion of states’ blue collar population is
under .182 (p = 0.05) and over .252 (p = 0.056). Over 30% of the cases in my sample fall into the
ranges of the blue collar population for which the effect is significant (21 observations are below
.182 and 44 are above .252).
Figure 4.4 provides a more intuitive illustration of the interaction between party and blue
collar population using the expected number of policy contacts predicted by the model. The solid
line denotes Republican senators’ policy contact with the Labor Department and the intersecting
dashed line represents Democratic senators’ policy contact. Moving horizontally across the x-
axis, a Republican senators’ frequency of contact with the department is positively related to
their states’ blue collar population, as predicted. The dashed line indicating Democrats’ policy
contact, in relation, has a gradual slope that declines slightly as the blue collar population
increases. The cases in the significant upper range of the blue collar population includes North
Carolina’s Republican Senators Dole and Burr (including their communication about CAFTA
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from the opening example of Chapter 1), who contacted the Labor Department 12 and 10 times,
respectively, and Democratic Senators Blanche Lincoln and Mark Pryor from Arkansas, who
both contacted the department once during the 110th Congress.
Figures 4.5 and 4.6 indicate a similar, expected effect of party along the observed range
of Democratic presidential candidates’ vote percentages. Figure 4.5 indicates that the marginal
effect of party is significant when the Democratic presidential vote share is below 42% (p =
0.059) and approaches the significance threshold towards the highest percentages attained by
Democratic presidential candidates in senators’ states, even crossing the threshold at 62% (p =
0.05). These ranges include over 35% of the observations in the sample (40 cases are included in
the lower range and 38 cases are in the upper range). Figure 4.6 shows Republican senators’
predicted number of policy contacts increases with the Democratic presidential vote share while
Democrats’ predicted contacts is relatively stable and decreases slightly. These results are largely
robust when I remove senators who did not serve the full Congress and outliers from the analysis
and when I examine each Congress separately (see Tables A.3-A.10 and Figures A.1-A.18 in
Appendix A).
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FIGURE 4.3 Marginal Effects of Party on Frequency of Policy Contact with Labor
Department by Blue Collar Population
FIGURE 4.4 Predicted Frequency of Policy Contact with Labor Department across Blue
Collar Population
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FIGURE 4.5 Marginal Effect of Party on Frequency of Policy Contact with Labor
Department by Democratic Presidential Vote Share
FIGURE 4.6 Predicted Frequency of Policy Contact with Labor Department by
Democratic Presidential Vote Share
The finding indicating that cross pressured senators contact the bureaucracy more
frequently is not as consistent across the Homeland Security models. Figure 4.7 shows that the
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marginal effects of party when conditioned by representation of a southern border state is not
significant when using 95% confidence intervals, although 90% confidence intervals do not cross
the reference line for senators who do not represent southern border states (see Figures A.19 and
A.20 in Appendix A.). Figure 4.8 shows that the difference between the parties’ predicted
frequency of policy contacts is greater when not representing southern border states (with
Republicans contacting more frequency than Democrats) but becomes statistically
indistinguishable when representing southern border states. While the frequency of Democrats’
policy contact does seem to increase when representing southern border states, as expected, the
increase is very slight.
Moreover, the effect of party affiliation is not significant across Republican presidential
vote share and not in the expected direction (see Figures A.21 and A.22 in Appendix A). These
results could be due to my measure of cross pressures. Democrats from southern border states
and red states may not be cross pressured on national security issues or that senators of both
parties experience conflict between the diverging interests along the southern border. The null
results could be due to characteristics of the issue areas (e.g., level of political divisiveness) or of
the departments themselves (e.g., politicization). However, I will leave such considerations for
future versions of this research.
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FIGURE 4.7 Marginal Effects of Party on Frequency of Policy Contact with Department of
Homeland Security by Southern Border State
FIGURE 4.8 Predicted Frequency of Policy Contact with Department of Homeland
Security by Southern Border State
There is little support for the alternative hypotheses. The baseline models in Tables 4.1
and 4.2 allow us to consider the unconditional relationship of the constitutive variables
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(comprising the interaction terms in the full models) on the dependent variables (see Brambor,
Clark, and Golder 2006). First, neither model offers strong support for party issue ownership.
The relationship between party affiliation and policy contact with both departments indicates that
Republicans contact the bureaucracy more often, but it is not significant (although approaching
significance in Table 4.2).
Second, beyond the interaction effects, there is little support for the constituency demand
hypothesis. While the coefficients are in the direction we might expect, they are not statistically
significant. There is a positive relationship between a state’s blue collar population and policy
contact with the Labor Department and a negative relationship between southern border states
and policy contact with the Department of Homeland Security, but the results do not cross the
threshold of significance in either of the baseline models.
Conclusion
My results offer a strong indication that the senators who try to use backchannel
policymaking the most are senior, committee members, and leaders, the same elite group of
senators who wield power in the legislative process. This finding raises several additional
implications and questions. Would senior senators continue to try to use backchannel
policymaking if they were not benefiting from it, either in the form of policy or electoral
outcome? My results could suggest that senators learn backchannel policymaking is an effective
way of accomplishing goals and thus increasingly engage in it as they accrue years and
experience in office and observe the behavior from their colleagues. It also offers additional
evidence that policy contact is not “cheap talk” but that there are real policy and political benefits
accrued from this behavior.
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Second, if powerful senators have a great deal of influence within the legislative process,
why would they spend time and resources pursuing their goals through the bureaucracy? While
the results for seniority, committee membership, and leadership offer support for the capacity
hypothesis and not the legislative constraint hypothesis, we might wonder why these powerful
senators would bother to reach out to the bureaucracy if they have such positions of influence
over the legislative arena. One answer, of course, is that even the most powerful members of
Congress face constraints in the legislative process.
However, my other substantive finding could provide additional insight. My results
indicate that cross pressured senators, those constrained by conflicting party and state interests,
contact the Labor Department more frequently than senators whose party and constituency are
relatively in sync. This finding suggests that backchannel policymaking could be a way for
senators to “have it both ways” and satisfy competing interests and conflicting principals. The
covert quality of this backchannel communication could lend itself to such opportunities for
strategic dodging by savvy senators. I explore this implication further in Chapter 5.
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CHAPTER 5
Policymaking across Venues
In the previous chapters, I have shown that members of Congress regularly engage with
the bureaucracy about policy issues and that their interests are consistent across the legislative
and bureaucratic domains. That is, members of Congress who reach out to particular agencies are
also more active legislatively on the issues related to those agencies’ jurisdictions. This finding
conforms to my claim that, when legislators contact the bureaucracy about policy, they are
compelled by the same general motivations that drive their legislative pursuits.
However, while behavior in both venues is motivated by the intensity of legislators’
policy preferences, there are important differences between how members of Congress use
legislative activities and the backchannel. In this chapter, I argue that constraints within the
legislative process and within constituencies motivate legislators’ communication with the
bureaucracy. Legislators choose to reach out to the bureaucracy when the backchannel venue
offers advantages over legislative activities.
Building a Strategy
I am not the first to consider whether members of Congress strategically choose means of
policy influence based on the constraints they face in Congress and back home. Scholars have
found that agenda-based representation offers findings that can sometimes differ from positional
models of policy congruence (Harbridge 2015; Jones, Larsen-Price, and Wilkerson 2009; Sulkin
2005, 2011).  For example, Hayes, Sulkin, and Hibbing (2010) consider whether legislators’
issue attention (i.e. bill introductions or cosponsorship) or policy congruence on roll call votes
indicates responsiveness to redistricting-induced changes within their constituency. The authors
reason that there could be differences in responsiveness based on the particular characteristics of
each legislative activity:
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“Roll call votes are perhaps most visible to constituents and other interested
observers, and these votes provide legislators with a venue for taking positions
that requires very little initiative, which should provide clear incentive for
members to demonstrate responsiveness. At the same time, though, votes consist
of a series of dichotomous choices that usually break out along partisan or
ideological lines, which may leave relatively little variation to be explained by
demographic shifts. In contrast, introductions and cosponsorships are the focus of
less partisan pressure (both formal and informal) and offer considerable individual
freedom over the volume and content of activity. Thus, there is more opportunity
to adjust behavior in response to constituency changes, and we could see more
evidence of responsiveness for these activities” (Hayes, et al. 2010, p. 95).
The authors find that legislators’ responsiveness to redistricting-induced demographic shifts is
reflected more by the bills legislators introduce and cosponsor than by how they vote, but
responsiveness to partisan shifts is more evident in voting patterns (Hayes, et al. 2010). This
finding offers some indication that members of Congress use the various policymaking tools
available to them differently. In this chapter, I argue that legislators make decisions about
participation based on the constraints they face and the advantages provided by different
policymaking options, which could have important implications for representation and policy
outcomes. In particular, I expect that backchannel policymaking offers unique advantages over
legislative activities that appeal to senators constrained by cross pressures of party and
constituency interests.
The Decisions of Cross-Pressured Senators
Cross-pressured members of Congress, legislators who face conflicting pressures from
their constituency, party leadership, or among key interest groups (Glazer et al. 1995), confront
challenging decisions and make strategic choices, especially when public position-taking is
required. They delay taking public positions on salient, controversial issues (Box-Steffensmeier,
et al. 1997). There is also evidence that cross-pressured legislators use less visible strategies in
order to satisfy competing principals of party leadership (both in Congress and the White House)
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and salient constituency interests. These conflicted legislators strategically delay (Glazer, et al.
1995) and abstain from voting (Cohen and Noll 1991), especially on close votes. Cross-pressured
members of the President’s party have higher rates of absenteeism than consonantly pressured
members on votes that are important to the president, and they strategically use less visible, but
still crucial, procedures (e.g., interim motions) to show support for the President’s policies
(Covington 1988). Cross-pressured majority party members also avoid signing discharge
petitions on legislation they cosponsored, an indication of support for party leadership (Miller
and Overby 2010). This literature finds that cross-pressured members of Congress make strategic
choices in order to maneuver problematic position-taking and to satisfy competing principals.
This chapter shares the theoretical reasoning of this literature and builds on the previous
findings. I argue that cross-pressured senators use the bureaucratic backchannel as another way
of approaching position-taking and satisfying competing interests by going under the radar.
Some of the findings of Chapter 4 conform to this theory. However, it is important to consider
whether these findings are particular to how senators use backchannel policymaking, or if they
are general patterns we might find across other types of policymaking activities. Cross-pressured
senators try to use the backchannel more than their consonantly pressured colleagues, but is this
unique to backchannel policymaking? Or do cross-pressured senators more actively pursue
policy goals through other means as well? More importantly, what might account for the
variation across policymaking options?
Comparing Venues
In order to consider these questions, I compare senators’ use of backchannel
policymaking with their bill introductions. This choice of comparison is useful for several
reasons. There are several similarities between bill introductions and policy contact. Like policy
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contact, legislators “are free to introduce any number and types of bills they choose” (Schiller
1995, p. 187) and can introduce bills without facing formal constraints (e.g., not getting a
preferred committee assignment, agenda setting, etc.). Also, unlike committee participation, bill
introductions offer private benefits that are traceable to the bill’s sponsor, and, unlike
cosponsorships, a bill’s initiation can be credited to a particular legislator, much like policy
contact.
However, bill introductions differ from policy contacts in a key way that offers leverage
on the questions posed in this chapter. While policy contact is relatively under the radar, bill
introductions are very public displays of position-taking that are easy targets for challengers.
Scholars have considered the visibility of policymaking activities; such as voting, bill
introductions, and cosponsorship; and how it factors into legislators’ decision-making.
Covington describes visibility as the “ease with which an outside actor (e.g., an interest
group, and electoral constituency) can determine that a member voted against its interests,”
(1988, p. 49). In her study of how legislators use bill sponsorship, Schiller makes note of the
potential consequences of this visibility when describing the costs of introducing a bill:
The political costs of bill introduction consist of opposition among constituents,
interest groups and other senators. A campaign opponent or an interest group can
point to a senator's bill as easily as they can point to a roll-call vote. Every bill
stands out as a concrete example of the senator's work and can be seized upon by
a challenger in a reelection campaign. Despite the senator's efforts to judge the
possible reaction to a bill, there is always the risk of misjudging the strength of
opposition to it. Such miscalculations can harm a senator's reputation, influence,
and ultimately the chance to be reelected. (1995, p. 189)
As Schiller points out, the visibility of bill introductions and roll call votes can add risk to these
legislative activities.
This visibility extends to cosponsorship of legislation as well. Koger considers how
visibility of legislator behavior and the risks associated with widespread visibility can influence
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legislators’ decisions about cosponsorship, arguing that “a key variable is the extent to which
each legislator’s actions are scrutinized and communicated by the news media in his or her
district,” (2003 p. 235). He considers whether media access within a district could affect
legislators’ cosponsorship activity, reasoning that, “If news coverage is relatively frequent, then
a legislator must be concerned with the preferences of a broad range of constituencies because
voters are more likely to learn of his or her actions,” but “if a member is rarely mentioned in the
mainstream media, that representative can cosponsor bills that appeal to narrow segments of the
constituency while discounting the concerns of other subconstituencies,” (p. 235). In other
words, the broad media coverage members of Congress receive in rural areas decreases “their
need to take positions to attain publicity and increases the potential costs of signaling by
increasing the likelihood that constituents will learn of a position they find disagreeable,” (p.
235). Koger’s results are consistent with his hypothesis, which could suggest that legislators are
less inclined to cosponsor bills (or engage in other, equally visible policymaking activities)
involving policy issues on which they face cross-pressures when there is a good chance the
various segments of their constituencies will find out about it.
A legislator’s control over the dissemination of her communication with the bureaucracy
reduces some of this risk. Of course, there is always the potential for her policy contact to be
uncovered by challengers, but they would have to do some digging or have reason to expect
policy contact with particular agencies and go through the process of making FOIA requests.
Many may not even think to dig through a legislator’s contact with the bureaucracy. On the other
hand, bill introductions are quite vulnerable to exposure and public scrutiny.
Why is this difference important? As I explained earlier, visibility is a critical factor
influencing how cross-pressured members of Congress decide to pursue policy goals. I argue that
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policy contact is a less visible avenue for pursuing policy goals in comparison to introducing a
bill. As such, I expect cross pressured senators to pursue the strategy of backchannel
policymaking more than consonantly pressured senators in comparison with the strategy of
introducing bills. Of course, cross-pressured senators can engage in both forms of participation.
Yet, we know that senators have limited time and resources and should devote themselves to
strategies that offer the greatest benefits in relation to the costs, particularly within issue areas on
which they face conflicting interests.
Policy Contact versus Bill Introductions
If my theory is an accurate account of how members of Congress choose between means
of participation, we should expect cross-pressures to predict senators’ use of policy contact, but
not the volume of their bill introductions. In fact, we might expect cross-pressured senators to
introduce fewer bills and for bill introductions to reflect constituency interests directly and
independently. Senators who do not face cross-pressures may be freer to use the visible option of
bill introductions to represent constituency interests, if those interests are not in conflict.
The models presented in Tables 5.1 and 5.2 test these hypotheses. The first two columns
of each table present the same models (baseline and full) shown in Tables 4.1 and 4.2 of Chapter
4, which use the number of policy contacts to the Labor Department (Table 5.1) and to the
Department of Homeland Security (Table 5.2) as the dependent variables. The third and fourth
columns of Table 5.1 present models with the number of bills related to labor issues a senator
introduced as the dependent variable.33 The dependent variable for the models presented in the
33 The data for labor bill introductions comes from the Policy Agendas Project, originally collected by
Frank R. Baumgartner and Bryan D. Jones, with the support of National Science Foundation grant
numbers SBR 9320922 and 0111611, and distributed through the Department of Government at the
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third and fourth columns of Table 5.2 is the number of bills related to homeland security issues a
senator introduced. The independent variables across all the models are the same:
labor/homeland security committee membership; ideological extremity;34 seniority; a variable
indicating if the senator was a member of leadership35, party identification; the percentage of
blue collar workers in the senator’s home state/an indicator variable identifying southern border
states; and the vote share of the Democratic/Republican presidential candidate in the senator’s
home state during the previous election, the Congress in which the policy contact occurred36, and
a variable indicating if the legislator served for the entire Congress. However, the models
presented in the first two columns of the tables (which use policy contacts as the dependent
University of Texas at Austin. Neither NSF nor the original collectors of the data bear any responsibility
for the analysis reported here. I included labor bill introductions within my measure when coded with the
major topic category, “Labor, Employment, and Immigration,” as well as bills which were coded with the
major topic category, “Macroeconomics,” and the subtopic category, “Unemployment Rate”. I included
homeland security bill introductions when coded with the subtopic category, “Civil Defense & Homeland
Security,” “Immigration and Refugee Issues,” “Domestic Disaster Relief,” and “Terrorism, Hijacking.”
34 I created the variable for ideological extremity using the absolute value of the first-dimension of Poole
and Rosenthal’s DW-NOMINATE (Poole and Rosenthal 1997). High values indicate an “extreme” and
voting record while low values represent ideologically moderate senators.
35 The measure of leadership used in the tables presented in this chapter do not include committee chairs
and ranking members. However, when I include committee chairs and ranking members of the labor
committee/homeland security committee in the leadership variable, the results are consistent (see Tables
B.1, B.2, B.11, and B.12 in Appendix B).
36 A value of 1 represents the 111th Congress.
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variable) also include the number of bill introductions related to labor issues (Table 5.1) or
homeland security (Table 5.2) while the models in the third and fourth columns of each table
(which use bill introductions as the dependent variable) include, as independent variables, the
number of policy contacts with the Department of Labor (Table 5.1)/Homeland Security (Table
5.2). Also, the models in columns 1 and 3 are baseline models (of both tables) while columns 2
and 4 include the interaction variables measuring cross-pressures. The first interaction term
includes party affiliation and a salient state characteristic (i.e., the proportion of the blue collar
population of the senator’s state/an indication of whether the senator represents a southern border
state) and the second measures the interaction between party and the previous presidential vote
share (i.e., of the Democrat/Republican candidate).37 The columns report negative binomial
coefficients and robust standard errors, clustering on the individual senator.
37 I obtained the measures for seniority, committee membership (specifically, the Senate Committee on
Health, Education, Labor, and Pensions and the Senate Committee on Homeland Security and
Government Affairs), party identification, percentage of states’ blue collar population, and information
for the indicator for serving a partial Congress from the Almanac of American Politics.
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Table 5.1  Policy Contact with Labor Department & Labor Bill Introductions 110th-111th
Policy Contacts Bill Introductions
Variables Baseline
Model (1)
(Robust
S.E.)
Full
Model (2)
(Robust
S.E.)
Baseline
Model (3)
(Robust
S.E.)
Full
Model (4)
(Robust
S.E.)
Seniority 0.015*
(0.028)
0.015**
(0.006)
-.006
(0.009)
-0.006
(0.009)
Leader 0.034
(0.171)
0.061
(0.167)
0.528*
(0.249)
0.512*
(0.251)
Labor Committee 0.503***
(0.141)
0.592***
(0.145)
0.158
(0.249)
0.138
(0.225)
Ideological Extremity -1.040*
(0.510)
-0.553
(0.536)
1.127#
(0.645)
1.465#
(0.759)
Republican 0.030
(0.156)
-5.581**
(1.749)
0.120
(0.217)
0.989
(3.126)
Proportion of Blue Collar Population in State 3.895
(2.576)
-0.755
(2.794)
0.169
(4.112)
1.663
(4.652)
Republican*Blue Collar Prop. 12.618**
(4.855)
-6.312
(8.253)
Democratic Presidential Candidate’s Vote Share (%) 0.014
(0.010)
-0.005
(0.010)
0.049**
(0.017)
0.0445
(0.023)
Republican*Democratic Presidential Vote Share 0.054**
(0.019)
0.012
(0.037)
# of Labor Bill Introductions 0.101***
(0.028)
0.095***
(0.027)
# of Policy Contacts with Labor Dept. 0.036***
(0.009)
0.036***
(0.010)
Partial Term -0.737**
(0.281)
-0.733*
(0.294)
-1.590**
(0.508)
-1.661***
(0.467)
Congress 0.096
(0.086)
0.113
(0.083)
-0.141
(0.134)
-0.148
(0.129)
Constant 0.378
(1.039)
2.261*
(1.054)
-2.976*
(1.641)
-3.166
(2.025)
N 209 209 209 209
Log likelihood -631.868 -626.301 -324.254 -323.6112
Note: Cell entries are negative binomial regression coefficients with robust standard errors, clustering on the
individual senator (number of clusters=124). The dependent variables are the number of correspondences
concerning policy initiated by the senator to the department each Congress (models 1 and 2) and the number of
labor bills introduced by a senator (models 3 and 4).  *** = p <.001; ** =p<.01; * = p <.05; # = p <.1
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Table 5.2  Policy Contact with DHS and Homeland Security Bill Introductions, 110th-111th
Policy Contacts Bill Introductions
Variables Baseline
Model (1)
(Robust
S.E.)
Full
Model (2)
(Robust
S.E.)
Baseline
Model (3)
(Robust
S.E.)
Full
Model (4)
(Robust
S.E.)
Seniority 0.028***
(0.006)
0.028***
(0.006)
-0.010
(0.009)
-0.009
(0.009)
Leader 0.494**
(0.151)
0.525**
(0.157)
0.137
(0.282)
0.124
(0.306)
Homeland Security Committee 0.407*
(0.188)
0.415*
(0.192)
0.243
(0.266)
0.211
(0.256)
Ideological Extremity -0.509
(0.443)
-0.591
(0.475)
0.697
(0.652)
0.979
(0.650)
Democrat -0.238#
(0.133)
0.067
(0.801)
0.319
(0.194)
-0.658
(1.085)
Southern Border State -0.067
(0.125)
0.144
(0.163)
1.073***
(0.256)
1.094**
(0.408)
Democrat*Border or Coastal State 0.198
(0.230)
-0.029
(0.564)
Republican Presidential Candidate’s Vote Share
(%)
-0.027**
(0.007)
-0.017
(0.011)
-0.016
(0.011)
-0.030
(0.020)
Democrat*Republican Presidential Vote Share -0.007
(0.016)
0.020
(0.022)
# of Homeland Security Bill Introductions 0.107***
(0.025)
0.104***
(0.026)
# of Policy Contacts with DHS 0.043***
(0.010)
0.043***
(0.011)
Partial Term -0.980**
(0.298)
-0.959**
(0.288)
-1.191***
(0.327)
-1.204***
(0.345)
Congress -0.397***
(0.076)
-0.404***
(0.076)
-0.384**
(0.141)
-0.373**
(0.142)
Constant 2.966***
(0.419)
2.796***
(0.563)
0.356
(0.683)
-0.943
(1.016)
N 209 209 209 209
Log likelihood -597.269 -596.942 -321.984 -321.709
Note: Cell entries are negative binomial regression coefficients with robust standard errors, clustering on the
individual senator (number of clusters=124). The unit of analysis is the senator-Congress.  The dependent
variables are the number of correspondences concerning policy initiated by the senator to the department each
Congress (models 1 and 2) and the number of homeland security bills introduced by a senator (models 3 and
4).  *** = p <.001; ** =p<.01; * = p <.05; # = p <.1
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Results
While the results are fairly mixed, there is some support for my hypotheses.38 As I
reported in Chapter 4, cross pressured senators reach out to the Labor Department more
frequently than their less conflicted colleagues (see Figures 4.3-4.6 in Chapter 4). Turning to
column 4 in Table 5.1, the coefficient for the variable interacting party affiliation and the
percentage of the blue collar population in a senator’s state is in the expected direction, although
not significant (see Figure B.23 in Appendix B). Figures 4.4 (see Chapter 4) and 5.1 offer an
illustration of the diverging patterns of participation. Figure 4.4 shows the effect of the
relationship between party and the blue collar population on the number of policy contacts, while
Figure 5.1 presents the interaction using the number of labor-related bill introductions predicted
by the model. The solid line representing Republican activity increases with the proportion of the
blue collar population in Figure 4.4 but seems to decrease (although slightly and not
significantly) in Figure 5.1. The dashed line denoting Democrats’ activity gradually decreases in
Figure 4.4, but increases slightly in Figure 5.1. While the interaction’s effect on bill introductions
is not significant across the range of observed values, the relationship is in the expected direction
and suggests a need for continued examination.
The interaction effect measured by party affiliation and the Democratic presidential vote
share on labor-related bill introductions is not significant or in the expected direction (see
Figures B.24 and B.25 in Appendix B). However, the baseline model (the third column) indicates
that Democratic vote share has an independent effect (p < 0.01) on labor-related bill
introductions, as expected.
38 While I do not discuss the results of the capacity variables in this chapter, please see Figures B.34-B.39
in Appendix B for a comparison across policy contact and bill introductions.
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FIGURE 5.1 Predicted Frequency of Labor Bill Introductions across Blue Collar
Population
Interestingly, ideological extremity is significant or approaching significance across 3 of
the models in Table 5.1, but is negatively related to policy contacts (p < 0.05 for the baseline
model) and positively related to bill introductions (p < 0.1). This result indicates that ideologues
introduce bills more frequently than moderates but that moderates contact the Labor Department
more often than their ideological colleagues. Ideological extremity could be capturing some
general cross pressure and suggests additional examination is necessary, particularly since the
pattern is consistent across the models in Table 5.2 as well, although not at a level of
significance.
My expectations for the results in Table 5.2 were weaker since the models in the first two
columns (as reported in Chapter 4) did not present significant results for the interaction variables.
While the direction of the coefficients for the interaction between party affiliation and southern
border states appear to be in the expected direction, the conditioned relationship is not as I
expected and not significant (see Figures B.26 and B.27 in Appendix B). Likewise, the
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interaction between party affiliation and Republican presidential vote share is also not significant
or in the expected direction for either model (see Figures B.28 and B.29 in Appendix B).
However, representing a southern border state independently predicts bill introductions in the
expected direction (p < 0.001 in the baseline model).
Choosing Strategies
The results described above are mixed but provide a basis for further examination of how
senators divvy up their resources between policymaking venues. 39 Does the pinch of cross
pressures lead senators to rely more heavily on a backchannel strategy and less on legislative
activity? In order to consider this question, I incorporate multiple approaches, each of which has
trade-offs.
To examine how cross-pressured senators choose policymaking venues, I create
dependent variables allowing me to consider how frequently senators pursue one activity in
relation to the other. The first dependent variable I construct is the ratio of the number of a
senator’s policy contacts with the Department of Labor/Homeland Security to the number of bills
the senator introduces that are related to labor/homeland security issues. This measure allows me
to consider the number of policy contacts in relation to bill introductions. However, this method
has several disadvantages. First, ratios can create severe outliers, making the spread between
cases much greater. Second, both variables have a substantial number of zeros or senators who
did not contact a department or introduce a bill. This issue, of course, creates cases with
undefined values as well as instances when 0 policy contacts and 20 bill introductions is treated
39 I replicate Tables 5.1 and 5.2 and Figures 5.1 and 5.2 separately for each Congress, excluding senators
who served a partial Congress, and excluding outliers (see Tables B.3-B.10 and Figures B.1-B.6 in
Appendix B).
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the same as 0 policy contacts and 1 bill introduction. Even among cases in which a senator
introduced a bill and contacted a department, the ratio method equates 2 policy contacts and 1
bill introduction with 10 policy contacts and 5 bill introductions.
In order to deal with some of these issues, I re-scale both variables from 1 to 2,
eliminating any zeros, before creating the ratio. While this approach “solves” some of the
problems, it potentially creates new issues. There is an implicit transformation when rescaling
count variables that, while not altering correlations between the number of policy contacts and
the number of bill introductions, could produce different correlations between the original
(without re-scaling) ratio and an independent variable and the re-scaled ratio and the independent
variable.
Due to these issues, I incorporate another method as well. The second dependent variable
I construct is the difference between the number of a senator’s policy contacts with the
Department of Labor/Homeland Security and the number of bills the senator introduces that are
related to labor/homeland security issues. This measure allows me to consider how the raw
difference between the number of times a senator contacts a department and the number of bills a
senator introduces changes across individual-level characteristics of senators. Of course, this
method also has drawbacks since I am comparing two distinct variables, each with their own
distribution. However, by using both methods, I can offer some support for the robustness of my
findings.
Tables 5.3 and 5.4 present a series of OLS models and robust standard errors, clustering
on the individual senator. The dependent variable of the models in the first two columns of each
table is the difference between the number of a senator’s policy contacts (with the Labor
Department in Table 5.3 and the Department of Homeland Security in Table 5.4) and the number
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of bills the senator introduced (related to labor issues in Table 5.3 and homeland security issues
in Table 5.4). The last two columns employ the ratio of the number of policy contacts to the
number of bill introductions as the dependent variable. The independent variables in the tables
are the same as in the previous tables of this chapter except the number of bill introductions and
the number of policy contacts are excluded. Like the previous tables, the first and third columns
present baseline models and the second and third columns include interaction terms. Across all
the models, positive coefficients indicate the senator increasingly pursuing a policy contact
strategy in relation to bill introductions.
In Table 5.3, both measures of cross-pressured senators are significantly (or nearly
significantly) and positively related to pursuing policy contact in relation to bill introductions
across each model, as expected. When using the difference between the activities as the
dependent variable, the interaction term between party affiliation and blue collar population is
positive and significant (p < 0.05) as well as the interaction between party affiliation and
Democratic presidential vote share (p < 0.01). When the ratio is used, both interaction terms are
positive and at a level approaching significance (p < 0.1).
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Table 5.3 Policy Contact with Labor Department & Labor Bill Introductions, Difference/Ratio
110th-111th
Difference Ratio
Variables Baselin
e Model
(Robust
S.E.)
Full Model
(Robust
S.E.)
Baseline
Model
(Robust
S.E.)
Full
Model
(Robust
S.E.)
Seniority 0.156#
(0.089)
0.170*
(0.085)
0.002
(0.002)
0.002
(0.002)
Leader -0.110
(1.648)
-0.133
(1.565)
-0.044
(0.045)
-0.043
(0.044)
Labor Committee 4.535**
(1.561)
5.365**
(1.562)
0.024
(0.028)
0.035
(0.028)
Ideological Extremity -8.613#
(4.971)
-4.417
(4.775)
-0.189*
(0.077)
-0.151#
(0.089)
Republican 0.569
(1.754)
-53.895***
(14.979)
0.003
(0.030)
-0.698*
(0.300)
Proportion of Blue Collar Population in State 39.578
(27.380)
-8.670
(31.168)
0.538
(0.501)
-0.139
(0.656)
Republican*Blue Collar Prop. 116.745*
(44.830)
1.667#
(0.928)
Democratic Presidential Candidate’s Vote Share
(%)
0.140
(0.100)
-0.081
(0.091)
-0.002
(0.002)
-0.005*
(0.002)
Republican*Democratic Presidential Vote Share 0.055**
(0.166)
0.006#
(0.003)
Partial Term -2.00
(0.281)
-2.037
(1.763)
0.045
(0.039)
0.046
(0.036)
Congress 1.174
(0.884)
1.375
(0.843)
0.026
(0.017)
0.028
(0.017)
Constant -9.101
(9.568)
11.493
(9.810)
1.050***
(1.649)
1.317***
(1.317)
N 209 209 209 209
R-squared 0.160 0.212 0.114 0.135
Note: Cell entries are OLS coefficients with robust standard errors, clustering on the individual senator (number of
clusters=124). The dependent variables are the difference between the number of correspondences concerning
policy initiated by the senator to the department and the number of labor bills introduced by a senator (models 1
and 2) and a ratio comprised of the number policy contacts in the numerator and bill introductions in the
denominator (models 3 and 4).  *** = p <.001; ** =p<.01; * = p <.05; # = p <.1
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Table 5.4 Policy Contact with DHS and Homeland Security Bill Introductions,
Difference/Ratio 110th-111th
Difference Ratio
Variables Baseline
Model
(Robust
S.E.)
Full
Model
(Robust
S.E.)
Baseline
Model
(Robust
S.E.)
Full
Model
(Robust
S.E.)
Seniority 0.221**
(0.065)
0.222**
(0.066)
0.004***
(0.001)
0.004**
(0.001)
Leader 3.867*
(1.808)
4.072*
(1.842)
0.051#
(0.031)
0.050
(0.031)
Homeland Security Committee 2.752
(1.833)
2.719
(1.898)
0.033
(0.033)
0.033
(0.034)
Ideological Extremity -5.299
(4.002)
-4.996
(4.157)
-0.091
(0.066)
-0.093
(0.069)
Democrat -2.034
(1.401)
-3.083
(8.242)
-0.045*
(0.022)
-0.039
(0.122)
Southern Border State -1.183
(1.107)
-2.157
(1.324)
-0.074**
(0.024)
-0.069*
(0.033)
Democrat*Border or Coastal State 2.612
(2.247)
-0.013
(0.049)
Republican Presidential Candidate’s Vote
Share (%)
-0.176*
(0.069)
-0.183#
(0.108)
-0.002
(0.001)
-0.002
(0.001)
Democrat*Republican Presidential Vote
Share
0.014
(0.157)
0.000
(0.002)
Partial Term -2.791*
(1.278)
-2.573*
(1.247)
-0.012
(0.022)
-0.013
(0.022)
Congress -3.180***
(0.758)
-3.178***
(0.768)
-0.033*
(0.015)
-0.033*
(0.015)
Constant 17.082**
(5.266)
17.543**
(6.635)
1.197***
(0.078)
1.194***
(0.087)
N 209 209 209 209
R-squared 0.282 0.285 0.235 0.235
Note: Cell entries are OLS coefficients with robust standard errors, clustering on the individual senator
(number of clusters=124). The dependent variables are the difference between the number of correspondences
concerning policy initiated by the senator to the department and the number of labor bills introduced by a
senator (models 1 and 2) and a ratio comprised of the number policy contacts in the numerator and bill
introductions in the denominator (models 3 and 4).  *** = p <.001; ** =p<.01; * = p <.05; # = p <.1
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Of course, in order to make inferences about meaningful conditional effects, we cannot
rely on the magnitude and significance of an interaction term’s coefficient (Brambor, Clark, and
Golder 2006) and must, instead, consider the conditioned effects at varying levels of the state
characteristics. Figure 5.2 indicates the marginal effect of party affiliation across the observed
range of states’ blue collar populations on the difference between policy contact with the Labor
Department and labor bill introductions (image on the left) and on the ratio of policy contact over
bill introductions (image on the right). The dark sloping line indicates the marginal effect of
party as the proportion of the blue collar population in senators’ states increases from the
minimum of 0.162 to the maximum of 0.282 by increments of 0.01 (but shown as increments of
0.02 on the figure’s x-axis). The shaded region represents 95% confidence intervals based on the
estimates of the full models in Table 5.2. The marginal effect is statistically significant when
both the upper and lower bounds of the confidence interval are above or below the dashed
reference line (y = 0). Figure 5.2 indicates that the effect on the difference between policy
contact and bill introductions is significant when the proportion of the states’ blue collar
population is under .182 (p = 0.062) and over .262 (p = 0.054), which includes 25% of the
sample.40 While the 95% confidence intervals do not quite indicate a significant effect on the
ratio of policy contact to bill introductions, the effect approaches a level of significance when the
blue collar population is 0.162 (p = 0.110) and 0.282 (p = 0.116).
Values predicted by both of the full models in Table 5.3 reveal a consistent, expected
conditional relationship, as shown in Figure 5.3. The solid line indicates that Republican
senators’ policy contact with the Labor Department relative to labor bill introductions increases
40 The significant range includes 21 cases are the lower range and 32 in the upper range.
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with the blue collar population, but that Democratic senators (denoted by the dashed line)
decreases slightly.
Figure 5.4 presents the marginal effects of party affiliation on the two dependent
variables across the Democratic presidential vote share. The effect on the difference between
policy contact with the Labor Department and labor bill introductions (left image) is significant
when the Democratic presidential vote share is at and under 42% (p = 0.031) and over 57% (p =
0.064), with about 46% of the sample included in the significant ranges.41 While the 95%
confidence intervals overlap with the dashed reference line, p values indicate that the effect on
the ratio of policy contact to bill introductions (right image) approaches significance when the
Democratic presidential vote share is at 27% (p < 0.089) and over 67% (p < 0.078).
Figure 5.5 illustrates the expected relationship between party affiliation and Democratic
presidential vote share using values predicted by the models in Table 5.3. Republican senators’
policy contact with the Labor Department increases relative to labor bill introductions as
Democratic vote share increases, while Democrats’ favor bill introductions as their states
become “bluer”.
This analysis offers several consistent, often significant findings suggesting that cross-
pressured senators favor the backchannel relative to bill introductions. While the interaction
terms in the models of Table 5.4 are not significant and the relationships not in the expected
direction (see Figures B.30-B.33 in Appendix B), none of the significant findings contradict my
theory. Tables 5.3 and 5.4 and Figures 5.2 through 5.5 are replicated separately for each
congress, excluding senators who served a partial Congress, and excluding outliers (see Tables
B.13-B.20 and Figures B.7-B.22 in Appendix B), and show that the results are largely consistent.
41 The sample includes 40 cases in the lower range and 56 cases in the upper range.
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FIGURE 5.2. Marginal Effects of Party Affiliation on Difference between Policy Contact
and Bill Introductions (left) and on the Ratio of Policy Contact to Bill Introductions (right)
across Blue Collar Population, Labor Model
FIGURE 5.3. Predicted Difference between Policy Contact and Bill Introductions (left) and
Ratio of Policy Contact to Bill Introductions (right) across Blue Collar Population, Labor
Model
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FIGURE 5.4. Marginal Effects of Party Affiliation on Difference between Policy Contact
and Bill Introductions (left) and the Ratio of Policy Contact to Bill Introductions (right)
across Democratic Presidential Vote Share, Labor Model
FIGURE 5.5. Predicted Difference between Policy Contact and Bill Introductions (left) and
the Ratio of Policy Contact to Bill Introductions (right) across Democratic Presidential
Vote Share, Labor Model
Another consistent result reveals that ideological moderates engage in policy contact
more in relation to bill introductions. The direction of the coefficients for ideological extremity is
consistent across all the models in both tables and significant or approaching significance in
three of the models in Table 5.3. Since my measure of ideological extremity is based on roll call
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voting, this finding suggests further examination of the relationship between voting and
backchannel policymaking could be promising.
Conclusion
In this chapter, my analyses indicate that not only do cross-pressured senators try to use
backchannel policymaking more than their consonantly pressured colleagues, but that this
finding is relatively unique. Cross-pressured senators do not pursue bill introductions as actively,
and they seem to favor policy contact in relation to bill introductions. In this way, policy contact
with the bureaucracy joins the other strategic decisions of cross-pressured senators, previously
studied by congressional scholars.
In many ways, this finding is intuitive and consistent with what we know about these
conflicted and constrained members of Congress. Backchannel policymaking is a less visible
way of pursuing policy goals and allows legislators to “explain away” bad votes and satisfy party
and competing constituency interests. Thus, it offers advantages to cross-pressured members of
Congress over more visible, legislative means of pursuing policy goals, such as bill
introductions. However, there are several unanswered questions that remain. In my concluding
chapter, I consider many such questions and my plan for considering them. I also discuss the
normative implications of my findings and why the relationship between individual members of
Congress and the bureaucracy warrants increased scrutiny.
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CHAPTER 6
The Backchannel: Unexplored Territory
My goal for this dissertation has been to shed light on a previously neglected channel of
policy influence. I have shown that senators regularly communicate with the bureaucracy about
policy issues and that this behavior occurs broadly across the U.S. Senate. This finding indicates
that the relationship between members of Congress and the bureaucracy is not limited to
casework and grants. Nor is the relationship solely explained by congressional oversight of the
bureaucracy, an explanation which assumes Congress’ interactions with agencies are limited to
carrying out the intent of Congress (i.e., assuring the implementation of law and the preferences
of the winning majority) and reigning in the bureaucracy’s discretion over policy. In fact,
individual legislators take advantage of the discretion granted to agencies by the institution of
Congress, at times, even undermining laws that have been passed and signed by the President.
My theory presents the relationship between legislators and the bureaucracy as a function
of the individualistic goals members of Congress as described by a long line of congressional
scholars (e.g. Fenno 1973, Fiorina 1977b, Mayhew 1974, Hall 1996). To paraphrase Hall’s
depiction of legislative behavior, members of Congress are individuals who pursue their own
interests, not the interests of the group (Hall 1996, p. 56). However, the congressional literature
has primarily focused on how members of Congress pursue their interests within the legislative
process.
While widespread, backchannel policymaking has been largely beyond of the view of
congressional scholars precisely because it occurs outside of the Senate chamber and off the
Congressional Record. Using original records of communication between senators and agencies
has allowed me to begin to explore this uncharted frontier of policy influence. However, like any
congressional behavior, backchannel policymaking is complex, diverse, and warranting of
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further examination. In this chapter, I will discuss my findings but also set an agenda for
unanswered questions and my plan for answering them.
Summary of Findings
While policy contact with the bureaucracy is widespread across senators, I find consistent
evidence that seniority, relevant committee membership, and leadership predict the frequency
with which senators contact the bureaucracy about policy. Senior senators, members of the
committee overseeing the issue area managed by the agency, and leaders engage with agencies
more often. This finding offers support for the “capacity hypothesis,” that senators with the
greatest capability to engage in backchannel policymaking take advantage of it most often. This
finding is important because it indicates that the senators who have the most power over policy
in Congress also try to use this the backchannel to influence policy.
One implication of this finding is that the bureaucracy might serve as a second pathway
for already powerful senators to influence policy, which could further exacerbate the power
difference between the “haves” and “have nots” in Congress. Thus, the senators I identified as
being the most constrained and in the most need of an alternative way of influencing policy lose
out to the more powerful senators both in the chamber of the Senate but also through this
backchannel. It is an elite group of powerful members of Congress who influence policy both
within the chambers of Congress and via the bureaucracy.
However, I also find some evidence that senators who face constraints due to partisanship
and diverging interests within their constituencies use the bureaucracy as a way of satisfying
competing interests. I find that cross-pressured senators engage with the bureaucracy more
frequently than senators whose party and constituency are in sync. Moreover, this result is
particular to backchannel policymaking; cross-pressured senators take advantage of the
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backchannel more but seem to introduce fewer bills. I argue that this difference can be explained
as a strategic move by cross-pressured senators to choose less visible channels of policy
influence, consistent with the previous literature on cross-pressured legislators. The covert nature
of backchannel policymaking allows these senators to “have it both ways” and satisfy competing
interests and conflicting principals.
However, this finding is not consistent across agencies. While this could be due to my
measure of cross-pressures, it is possible that characteristics of the agency and issue area are also
factors. I plan to consider how agency and issue characteristics influence backchannel
policymaking in subsequent research, in addition to several remaining questions.
Who Gets What They Want from the Bureaucracy?
Perhaps the most important remaining question is, which members of Congress are most
likely to get a favorable response from an agency? Under what circumstances is backchannel
policymaking likely to be an effective way of influencing policy? The answer is likely dependent
on characteristics of the legislator, but also of the issue, and of the agency.
My finding indicating that the most powerful senators engage with agencies most often
provides some insight and is suggestive of a relationship of reciprocity. In particular, if senior
senators, who have spent years in Congress and accumulated policy expertise, procedural
knowledge, and political savvy, are frequently engaging with agencies, it suggests these senators
have learned that they can benefit from reaching out to the bureaucracy. Furthermore, agencies
are more likely to benefit from doing favors for powerful senators who have influence over the
legislative process (and, consequently, agency budgets and programs).
This theoretical framework describing a complicit relationship between powerful
legislators and agencies conforms to an accounts of bureaucrats who describe agencies interested
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in responding favorably to members of Congress because, “they fund us,” “it’s safer,” and
“because they’re the people that pay our salaries,”42 and that they are more likely to fulfil the
requests of senior members of Congress on the relevant committee, of the majority party, and
who share the party affiliation of the administration. However, a legislator from the minority
party who does not share the party affiliation of the administration is unlikely to receive a
favorable response from the agency. I previously mentioned a bureaucrat I spoke with who
disclosed that Senator Harry Reid (who was Senate Majority Leader at the time) often gets what
he wants when he makes policy requests to the agency. The bureaucrat also mentioned that
Senator Reid, who was about to lose the Senate majority to the Republicans, was trying to “get a
bunch of stuff now” before he lost his position of power.43 This observation suggests that the
Senate Majority Leader’s “pull” with the bureaucracy significantly declined once he became the
Senate Minority Leader. However, the bureaucrat also described his agency as “a very political
agency,” and said he was not sure whether this type of complicit relationship with powerful
legislators would extend to less political agencies.
Thus, the effectiveness of backchannel policymaking could also be influenced by
characteristics of the agency, such as politicization. On one hand, politicized agencies with a
high concentration of appointees could be less inclined to respond favorably to the requests of
members of Congress because they are more closely controlled by the administration, which may
not want agencies to be responsive to individual legislators. However, the administration might
also stand to gain from an agency incurring favor with and the support of members of Congress,
42 These quotes are taken from an interview conducted on August 3, 2012.
43 This information and quote are from an interview conducted on November 28, 2015 with a Division
Chief within the agency’s Washington, DC office.
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and may encourage this complicit relationship (or, at least, tolerate it). Insulated agencies might
lack the motivation and savvy to carry out these political exchanges to the same degree.
The effectiveness of backchannel policymaking could also depend on characteristics of
the issue area and particular policy. Is there widespread public support for the senator’s request
or is it a contentious issue? Is the issue salient on a national level or is it mainly important to a
particular region or regions of the country? Are the media or interest groups likely to pick up on
the policy change and could there be opposition? Does the administration share the legislator’s
preference on the issue? The answers to these questions could factor into the effectiveness of
backchannel policymaking.
Persuading Agencies
What if a legislator’s direct communication with the bureaucracy is ineffective? Do
legislators have other recourse? Or are they simply out of luck when it comes to pursuing their
policy goals? In fact, I would argue that the circumstances for these legislators may not be as dire
as it would seem when it comes to influencing policy via the bureaucracy, and I plan to explore
this possibility in future work.
While direct communication may be effective for a powerful senator, a second option a
legislator has is to leverage public opinion against a department or agency. If an agency is
implementing policy in a way that is unfavorable to a legislator’s district or state, he can take his
grievances public by criticizing the agency in the press. Agencies have an incentive to avoid
negative press attention, which can lead an agency head to lose his job and reputation (e.g.,
FEMA Administer Michael Brown) (Lewis 2008). The negative press attention (or the threat of
it) may motivate a department or agency to agree to the legislator’s request. This second strategy
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of backchannel policymaking (i.e., using press battles to influence policy) will be the subject of
future work.
Finally, a legislator could even introduce a bill that would require an agency to change its
regulations and procedures, knowing that the bill is unlikely to become law, but as a threat that
could lead risk-averse agencies to informally change policy independent of a change in the law.
Agencies may prefer to make this sort of independent, informal change rather than to be forced
by statute.
Interbranch Cooperation: Backchannel Complicity
Another remaining question is whether party leadership and the administration play a
direct role in backchannel policymaking. For example, during unified government, does the party
in power use the backchannel to facilitate cooperation across the branches of government? I have
suggested that congressional leadership may use backchannel policymaking as a logrolling tool,
using their status to request favors for individual legislators in exchange for votes. The
backchannel could be useful for party leaders on critical votes, since it could allow them to pass
legislation and provide cross-pressured members a way to explain their votes to disgruntled
interests in their constituencies, thus protecting party control of Congress.
However, the president also has an interest in getting his preferred legislation passed, and
may play a role as well. Some work already indicates that presidents pursue private lobbying
when trying to win over cross-pressured legislators who could provide crucial votes. Cary
Covington argues that, “When a president’s chances for success rest with winning the support of
cross-pressured, marginally supportive members, he may improve those chance by privately
lobbying for his position but reducing the visibility of the issue by avoiding a position in public,”
(1987, p. 741). The president could use the backchannel in a similar way.
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For example, in order to get votes for a trade agreement like the Central American Free
Trade Agreement (CAFTA), the president might encourage the bureaucracy to be quietly
responsive to requests for exceptions on particular goods from critical, cross-pressured
legislators. The president may even make promises to members of Congress in order to secure
their votes on pending legislation. In fact, news coverage of the opening example of this
dissertation, describing how Republican members of Congress were pressured to vote for
CAFTA despite considerable pushback from the textile industry of their state, offers some
evidence of this type of deal-making via the bureaucracy. The coverage describes a late night
meeting when a deal was made between President Bush and Republican Congressman Robert B.
Aderholt, who represented Fort Payne, Alabama, self-described as the “sock capital of the
world.” The legislator agreed to vote for CAFTA, and, in exchange, the White House committed
to reinstate tariffs on socks from Honduras by December 19, 2007.44 In October of 2007,
Congressman Aderholt contacted the Labor Department to remind the administration of its
promise.
Deliberate Discretion
If this type of interbranch partisan cooperation is occurring, what are the implications for
our current understanding of the relationship between Congress and the bureaucracy? In
Deliberate Discretion, Huber and Shipan (2002) argue that legislators give less discretion to the
bureaucracy when there is conflict amongst legislators. The authors reason that the winning
44 See “World Sock Capital Suffers From Duty-Free Imports.” Transcript on NPR.org. Published:
November 27, 2007 Last accessed: June 18, 2015.
http://www.npr.org/templates/transcript/transcript.php?storyId=16661333.
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coalition gives less discretion to the bureaucracy out of concern that an opposing coalition will
take advantage of that discretion.
My findings could supplement Huber and Shipan’s findings by offering a different
perspective. If the legislators who have the most power in Congress also use the backchannel
strategy most often, it could suggest that they use their influence over legislation to give the
bureaucracy discretion that they themselves plan to use to their advantage. For example, if
leaders and committee members want to pass a bill, but they think it will be difficult to get it to
pass the chamber, they could write the bill in a vague way (that would pass the chamber)
knowing that they could go to the bureaucracy after passage to get what they really wanted.
Backchannel Representation and Accountability
Who is represented by backchannel policymaking? This question is, perhaps, the most
important. The covert quality of the backchannel could lend itself to the representation of special
interests. What groups are represented? Is there a connection between campaign contributions
and backchannel representation? The bureaucracy could provide a covert channel for legislators
to favor the interests of industry lobbyists, who have the greatest resources to contribute to
congressional campaigns. For example, when Secretary Hilda Solis took control of the Labor
Department, she vowed to crack down on unfair labor practices within the hospitality industry.
Notably, my records indicate that nine members of Congress contacted the Labor Department to
oppose Secretary Solis’ new enforcement initiative at the request of members of the hotel
industry. This stealth representation is problematic because it is difficult for the public to hold
the legislator accountable for favoring special interests in exchange for campaign contributions. I
intend to consider these questions, which could offer important information for normative
evaluations of this behavior.
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Additionally, we might ask whether legislators’ policy contact with the bureaucracy has
an impact on legislative behavior. If cross-pressured senators are using backchannel
policymaking to modify policies or explain away partisan votes, how might they vote if they did
not have the backchannel option? It could actually force cross-pressured senators to pursue less
partisan preferences within the legislative process because they would not be able to vote with
the party while advocating for diverging interests using the bureaucracy. In this way,
backchannel participation could actually be encouraging partisan voting patterns and
exacerbating polarization in Congress.
Who is Watching the Backchannel?
While backchannel policymaking lacks transparency and, thus, a mechanism of
accountability, I am not the only one interested in the communication between members of
Congress and the bureaucracy. FOIA records show that the Republican National Committee
(RNC) and Democratic National Committee (DNC) submit FOIA requests similar to mine, but
particularly for likely future presidential candidates of the opposing party. The party
organizations may use these records as a resource for accumulating damaging information for
negative attacks on the opposition. If this correspondence becomes more visible to challengers
and the public, it may cease to provide a stealth way of influencing policy.
Conclusion
Fiorina’s self-described cynical account of the exploitative relationship between the
bureaucracy and Congress has endured nearly four decades. Arguing that members of Congress
use the bureaucracy to build their “personal vote,” he asserts that legislators benefit electorally
from constituents’ frustrations with the complex bureaucracy and, therefore, allow the
inadequate system to continue to persist. I build on his work by exploring the policy-based
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interactions between individual members of Congress and the bureaucracy, arguing that
legislators turn to the bureaucracy to pursue their policy goals.
Does my approach suggest a more positive normative outlook? It is not clear. While
legislators engage with the bureaucracy on policy, they do so possibly by subverting the
legislative process. While some may view backchannel policymaking as the active, diligent
pursuit of the interests of constituents, others might point out the broader implications for
Congress as a policymaking body. Backchannel policymaking may put the interests of a region
or group above the collective decision-making body intended to represent the country as whole.
If the legislators most likely to engage with the bureaucracy are preference outliers, backchannel
policymaking could be producing policies that are unrepresentative of collective preferences or
biased in favor of special interests. However, if the policy changes legislators pursue are
particularly salient for the regions they represent, backchannel policymaking might primarily
affect those who care most about an issue, providing a means for tailoring broad policies for the
many unique regions of a diverse nation.
Clearly, the relationship between legislators and the bureaucracy is due for increased
scrutiny. My aim for this dissertation is to provide an initial look at this covert channel of policy
influence, to examine how members of Congress participate in it, and to make a case for the
importance of this research. Legislators’ policy influence is not constrained to the chambers of
Congress, and it is important that congressional scholars examine the ways they influence policy
off the Congressional Record.
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APPENDIX A (Chapter 4)
Table A.1 Replication, Table 4.1 including Committee Chair and Ranking Member as Leaders
Variables Baseline Model
(Robust S.E.)
Full Model
(Robust S.E.)
Seniority 0.015*
(0.006)
0.015*
(0.006)
Leader 0.123
(0.165)
0.136
(0.163)
Labor Committee 0.492***
(0.137)
0.579***
(0.140)
Ideological Extremity -1.074*
(0.515)
-0.579
(0.539)
Republican 0.037
(0.156)
-5.557**
(1.737)
Proportion of Blue Collar Population in
State
3.868
(2.588)
-0.744
(2.812)
Republican*Blue Collar Prop. 12.507**
(4.800)
Democratic Presidential Candidate’s Vote
Share (%)
0.015
(0.010)
-0.005
(0.010)
Republican*Democratic Presidential Vote
Share
0.054**
(0.019)
# of Labor Bill Introductions 0.099**
(0.029)
0.093**
(0.027)
Partial Term -0.743**
(0.286)
-0.737*
(0.299)
Congress 0.093
(0.087)
0.111
(0.083)
Constant 0.366
(1.050)
2.242*
(1.056)
N 209 209
Log likelihood -631.597 -625.989
Note: Cell entries are negative binomial regression coefficients with robust standard errors, clustering on the
individual senator (number of clusters=124). The dependent variable is the total number of correspondences
concerning policy initiated by the senator to the department each Congress.  *** = p <.001; ** =p<.01; * = p
<.05; # = p <.1
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Table A.2 Replication, Table 4.2 including Committee Chair and Ranking Member as Leaders
Variables Baseline Model
(Robust S.E.)
Full Model
(Robust S.E.)
Seniority 0.027***
(0.006)
0.027***
(0.006)
Leader 0.542***
(0.129)
0.136***
(0.136)
Homeland Security Committee 0.327#
(0.174)
0.328#
(0.176)
Ideological Extremity -0.392
(0.430)
-0.435
(0.472)
Democrat -0.197
(0.132)
0.030
(0.781)
Southern Border State -0.035
(0.124)
-0.135
(0.157)
Democrat*Southern Border State 0.268
(0.240)
Republican Presidential Candidate’s Vote
Share (%)
-0.019**
(0.007)
-0.016
(0.011)
Democrat*Republican Presidential Vote
Share
-0.005
(0.016)
# of Homeland Security Bill Introductions 0.097***
(0.025)
0.092***
(0.023)
Partial Term -0.959**
(0.288)
-0.935**
(0.287)
Congress -0.391***
(0.077)
-0.399***
(0.077)
Constant 2.800***
(0.404)
2.666***
(0.547)
N 209 209
Log likelihood -594.340 -593.835
Note: Cell entries are negative binomial regression coefficients with robust standard errors, clustering on the
individual senator (number of clusters=124). The dependent variable is the total number of correspondences
concerning policy initiated by the senator to the department each Congress.  *** = p <.001; ** =p<.01; * = p
<.05; # = p <.1
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Table A.3 Replication, Table 4.1: 110th Congress
Variables Baseline Model
(S.E.)
Full Model
(S.E.)
Seniority 0.016*
(0.007)
0.016*
(0.006)
Leader -0.088
(0.242)
-0.139
(0.239)
Labor Committee 0.418*
(0.206)
0.500**
(0.200)
Ideological Extremity -0.764
(0.538)
-0.082
(0.618)
Republican 0.122
(0.172)
-4.074#
(1.188)
Proportion of Blue Collar Population in
State
2.463
(3.073)
0.439
(3.764)
Republican*Blue Collar Prop. 5.965
(6.215)
Democratic Presidential Candidate’s Vote
Share (%)
0.011
(0.010)
-0.007
(0.013)
Republican*Democratic Presidential Vote
Share
0.056*
(0.023)
# of Labor Bill Introductions 0.094**
(0.038)
0.086**
(0.037)
Partial Term -0.235
(0.383)
-0.135
(0.380)
Constant 0.748
(1.081)
1.926
(1.312)
N 102 102
Log likelihood -308.772 -305.802
Note: Cell entries are negative binomial regression coefficients with standard errors in parentheses. The
columns display coefficients for all senators. The unit of analysis is the senator.  The dependent variable is the
total number of correspondences concerning policy (labeled as “policy contact” in the table) initiated by the
senator to the department during the Congress.  *** = p <.001; ** =p<.01; * = p <.05; # = p <.1
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Table A.4 Replication, Table 4.1: 111th Congress
Variables Baseline Model
(S.E.)
Full Model
(S.E.)
Seniority 0.018*
(0.007)
0.018*
(0.007)
Leader 0.196
(0.242)
0.233
(0.230)
Labor Committee 0.578**
(0.202)
0.664**
(0.197)
Ideological Extremity -1.344*
(0.534)
-0.700
(0.676)
Republican -0.032
(0.192)
-7.247**
(2.748)
Proportion of Blue Collar Population in
State
4.706
(3.831)
-2.489
(4.683)
Republican*Blue Collar Prop. 16.976*
(7.597)
Democratic Presidential Candidate’s Vote
Share (%)
0.021
(0.014)
-0.009
(0.019)
Republican*Democratic Presidential Vote
Share
0.066*
(0.030)
# of Labor Bill Introductions 0.101*
(0.042)
0.108**
(0.041)
Partial Term -1.139***
(0.312)
-1.105**
(0.341)
Constant 0.063
(1.364)
2.985#
(1.738)
N 107 107
Log likelihood -319.894 -316.550
Note: Cell entries are negative binomial regression coefficients with standard errors in parentheses. The
columns display coefficients for all senators. The unit of analysis is the senator.  The dependent variable is the
total number of correspondences concerning policy (labeled as “policy contact” in the table) initiated by the
senator to the department during the Congress.  *** = p <.001; ** =p<.01; * = p <.05; # = p <.1
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Table A.5 Replication, Table 4.2: 110th Congress
Variables Baseline Model
(S.E.)
Full Model
(S.E.)
Seniority 0.027***
(0.006)
0.023***
(0.006)
Leader 0.516**
(0.192)
0.543**
(0.204)
Homeland Security Committee 0.414
(0.255)
0.455#
(0.266)
Ideological Extremity -0.781#
(0.429)
-0.942#
(0.503)
Democrat -0.289#
(0.158)
0.258
(0.912)
Southern Border State -0.196
(0.192)
-0.212
(0.233)
Democrat*Southern Border State 0.023
(0.399)
Republican Presidential Candidate’s Vote
Share (%)
-0.030***
(0.008)
-0.023
(0.014)
Democrat*Republican Presidential Vote
Share
-0.011
(0.018)
# of Homeland Security Bill Introductions 0.083**
(0.026)
0.083**
(0.028)
Partial Term -0.763*
(0.376)
-0.801*
(0.383)
Constant 3.653***
(0.450)
3.338***
(0.687)
N 102 102
Log likelihood -311.259 -311.071
Note: Cell entries are negative binomial regression coefficients with standard errors in parentheses. The
columns display coefficients for all senators. The unit of analysis is the senator.  The dependent variable is the
total number of correspondences concerning policy (labeled as “policy contact” in the table) initiated by the
senator to the department during the Congress.  *** = p <.001; ** =p<.01; * = p <.05; # = p <.1
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Table A.6 Replication, Table 4.2: 111th Congress
Variables Baseline Model
(S.E.)
Full Model
(S.E.)
Seniority 0.034***
(0.007)
0.034***
(0.006)
Leader 0.480*
(0.215)
0.515*
(0.218)
Homeland Security Committee 0.433*
(0.194)
0.424*
(0.193)
Ideological Extremity -0.141
(0.479)
-0.012
(0.600)
Democrat -0.158
(0.179)
-0.519
(1.226)
Southern Border State -0.003
(0.215)
-0.131
(0.272)
Democrat*Southern Border State 0.314
(0.410)
Republican Presidential Candidate’s Vote
Share (%)
-0.011
(0.009)
-0.015
(0.018)
Democrat*Republican Presidential Vote
Share
0.006
(0.025)
# of Homeland Security Bill Introductions 0.140**
(0.043)
0.134**
(0.043)
Partial Term -1.099***
(0.307)
-1.115**
(0.326)
Constant 1.740**
(0.558)
1.952*
(0.880)
N 107 107
Log likelihood -281.212 -280.871
Note: Cell entries are negative binomial regression coefficients with standard errors in parentheses. The
columns display coefficients for all senators. The unit of analysis is the senator.  The dependent variable is the
total number of correspondences concerning policy (labeled as “policy contact” in the table) initiated by the
senator to the department during the Congress.  *** = p <.001; ** =p<.01; * = p <.05; # = p <.1
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FIGURE A.1 Replication of Figure 4.3, Marginal Effects of Party on Frequency of Policy
Contact with Labor Department by Blue Collar Population, 110th (left), 111th (right)
FIGURE A.2 Replication of Figure 4.4, Predicted Frequency of Policy Contact with Labor
Department across Blue Collar Population, 110th (left), 111th (right)
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FIGURE A.3 Replication of Figure 4.5, Marginal Effects of Party on Frequency of Policy
Contact with Labor Department by Democratic Presidential Vote Share, 110th (left), 111th
(right)
FIGURE A.4 Replication of Figure 4.6, Predicted Frequency of Policy Contact with Labor
Department across Democratic Presidential Vote Share, 110th (left), 111th (right)
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FIGURE A.5 Replication of Figure 4.7, Marginal Effects of Party on Frequency of Policy
Contact with DHS by Southern Border State, 110th (left), 111th (right)
FIGURE A.6 Replication of Figure 4.8, Predicted Frequency of Policy Contact with DHS
by Southern Border State, 110th (left), 111th (right)
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Table A.7 Replication, Table 4.1 excluding Senators Serving a Partial Congress
Variables Baseline Model
(Robust S.E.)
Full Model
(Robust S.E.)
Seniority 0.012#
(0.006)
0.012*
(0.006)
Leader -0.039
(0.167)
0.007
(0.165)
Labor Committee 0.336*
(0.143)
0.436**
(0.150)
Ideological Extremity -0.955#
(0.503)
-0.411
(0.535)
Republican 0.084
(0.158)
-5.799**
(1.744)
Proportion of Blue Collar Population in
State
3.276
(2.660)
-1.297
(2.748)
Republican*Blue Collar Prop. 12.853*
(5.116)
Democratic Presidential Candidate’s Vote
Share (%)
0.015
(0.010)
-0.006
(0.010)
Republican*Democratic Presidential Vote
Share
0.058**
(0.019)
# of Labor Bill Introductions 0.104***
(0.027)
0.096***
(0.026)
Congress 0.131
(0.083)
0.157*
(0.077)
Constant 0.482
(0.083)
2.411*
(1.025)
N 193 193
Log likelihood -594.317 -588.148
Note: Cell entries are negative binomial regression coefficients with robust standard errors, clustering on the
individual senator (number of clusters=112). The dependent variable is the total number of correspondences
concerning policy initiated by the senator to the department each Congress.  *** = p <.001; ** =p<.01; * = p
<.05; # = p <.1
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Table A.8 Replication, Table 4.1 excluding Senators Serving a Partial Congress
Variables Baseline Model
(Robust S.E.)
Full Model
(Robust S.E.)
Seniority 0.024***
(0.005)
0.024***
(0.005)
Leader 0.421**
(0.144)
0.454**
(0.150)
Homeland Security Committee 0.378#
(0.204)
0.396#
(0.212)
Ideological Extremity -0.498
(0.445)
-0.617
(0.478)
Democrat -0.271*
(0.134)
0.187
(0.871)
Southern Border State -0.034
(0.127)
-0.112
(0.168)
Democrat*Southern Border State 0.191
(0.239)
Republican Presidential Candidate’s Vote
Share (%)
-0.022**
(0.007)
-0.016
(0.012)
Democrat*Republican Presidential Vote
Share
-0.009
(0.017)
# of Homeland Security Bill Introductions 0.102***
(0.024)
0.099***
(0.025)
Congress 0.102***
(0.024)
-0.394***
(0.076)
Constant 3.097***
(0.416)
2.838***
(0.607)
N 193 193
Log likelihood -566.569 -566.151
Note: Cell entries are negative binomial regression coefficients with robust standard errors, clustering on the
individual senator (number of clusters=112). The dependent variable is the total number of correspondences
concerning policy initiated by the senator to the department each Congress.  *** = p <.001; ** =p<.01; * = p
<.05; # = p <.1
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FIGURE A.7 Replication of Figure 4.3, Marginal Effects of Party on Frequency of Policy
Contact with Labor Department by Blue Collar Population (excluding Senators serving a
Partial Congress)
FIGURE A.8 Replication of Figure 4.4, Predicted Frequency of Policy Contact with Labor
Department across Blue Collar Population (excluding Senators serving a Partial Congress)
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FIGURE A.9 Replication of Figure 4.5, Marginal Effects of Party on Frequency of Policy
Contact with Labor Department by Democratic Presidential Vote Share (excluding
Senators serving a Partial Congress)
FIGURE A.10 Replication of Figure 4.6, Predicted Frequency of Policy Contact with Labor
Department across Democratic Presidential Vote Share (excluding Senators serving a
Partial Congress)
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FIGURE A.11 Replication of Figure 4.7, Marginal Effects of Party on Frequency of Policy
Contact with DHS by Southern Border State (excluding Senators serving a Partial
Congress)
FIGURE A.12 Replication of Figure 4.8, Predicted Frequency of Policy Contact with DHS
by Southern Border State (excluding Senators serving a Partial Congress)
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Table A.9 Replication, Table 4.1 excluding Outliers
Variables Baseline Model
(Robust S.E.)
Full Model
(Robust S.E.)
Seniority 0.014*
(0.007)
0.014*
(0.006)
Leader 0.099
(0.168)
0.115
(0.167)
Labor Committee 0.491***
(0.136)
0.557***
(0.138)
Ideological Extremity -0.810
(0.494)
-0.509
(0.530)
Republican -0.067
(0.150)
-4.571*
(1.778)
Proportion of Blue Collar Population in
State
3.087
(2.520)
-0.892
(2.778)
Republican*Blue Collar Prop. 11.000*
(4.865)
Democratic Presidential Candidate’s Vote
Share (%)
0.010
(0.010)
-0.004
(0.010)
Republican*Democratic Presidential Vote
Share
0.039*
(0.019)
# of Labor Bill Introductions 0.072*
(0.032)
0.072*
(0.032)
Partial Term -0.723*
(0.281)
-0.711*
(0.289)
Congress 0.051
(0.085)
0.072
(0.085)
Constant 0.757
(1.005)
2.235*
(1.049)
N 204 204
Log likelihood -603.589 -600.065
Note: Cell entries are negative binomial regression coefficients with robust standard errors, clustering on the
individual senator (number of clusters=123). The dependent variable is the total number of correspondences
concerning policy initiated by the senator to the department each Congress.  *** = p <.001; ** =p<.01; * = p
<.05; # = p <.1
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Table A.10 Replication, Table 4.2 excluding Outliers
Variables Baseline Model
(Robust S.E.)
Full Model
(Robust S.E.)
Seniority 0.027***
(0.006)
0.027***
(0.006)
Leader 0.424**
(0.142)
0.458**
(0.148)
Homeland Security Committee 0.348#
(0.182)
0.356#
(0.189)
Ideological Extremity -0.353
(0.441)
-0.414
(0.484)
Democrat -0.201
(0.136)
0.063
(0.820)
Southern Border State -0.008
(0.125)
-0.097
(0.159)
Democrat*Southern Border State 0.231
(0.238)
Republican Presidential Candidate’s Vote
Share (%)
-0.019**
(0.007)
-0.015
(0.011)
Democrat*Republican Presidential Vote
Share
-0.006
(0.016)
# of Homeland Security Bill Introductions 0.093***
(0.022)
0.089***
(0.023)
Partial Term -0.950**
(0.297)
-0.929**
(0.297)
Congress -0.345***
(0.080)
-0.352***
(0.080)
Constant 2.763***
(0.419)
2.616***
(0.562)
N 205 205
Log likelihood -576.366 -575.961
Note: Cell entries are negative binomial regression coefficients with robust standard errors, clustering on the
individual senator (number of clusters=124). The dependent variable is the total number of correspondences
concerning policy initiated by the senator to the department each Congress.  *** = p <.001; ** =p<.01; * = p
<.05; # = p <.1
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FIGURE A.13 Replication of Figure 4.3, Marginal Effects of Party on Frequency of Policy
Contact with Labor Department by Blue Collar Population (excluding Outliers)
FIGURE A.14 Replication of Figure 4.4, Predicted Frequency of Policy Contact with Labor
Department across Blue Collar Population (excluding Outliers)
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FIGURE A.15 Replication of Figure 4.5, Marginal Effects of Party on Frequency of Policy
Contact with Labor Department by Democratic Presidential Vote Share (excluding
Outliers)
FIGURE A.16 Replication of Figure 4.6, Predicted Frequency of Policy Contact with Labor
Department across Democratic Presidential Vote Share (excluding Outliers)
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FIGURE A.17 Replication of Figure 4.7, Marginal Effects of Party on Frequency of Policy
Contact with DHS by Southern Border State (excluding Outliers)
FIGURE A.18 Replication of Figure 4.8, Predicted Frequency of Policy Contact with DHS
by Southern Border State (excluding Outliers)
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FIGURE A.19 Replication of Figure 4.7 with 90% Confidence Intervals
FIGURE A.20 Replication of Figure 4.8 with 90% Confidence Intervals
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FIGURE A.21 Marginal Effects of Party on Frequency of Policy Contact with Department
of Homeland Security Conditioned across Republican Presidential Vote Share
FIGURE A.22 Predicted Frequency of Policy Contact with Department of Homeland
Security Conditioned across Republican Presidential Vote Share
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APPENDIX B (Chapter 5)
Table B.1 Replication, Table 5.1 including Committee Chair and Ranking Member as Leaders
Policy Contacts Bill Introductions
Variables Baseline
Model (1)
(Robust
S.E.)
Full Model
(2)
(Robust
S.E.)
Baseline
Model (3)
(Robust
S.E.)
Full Model
(4)
(Robust
S.E.)
Seniority 0.015*
(0.006)
0.015*
(0.006)
-.008
(0.009)
-0.007
(0.009)
Leader 0.123
(0.165)
0.136
(0.163)
0.406
(0.250)
0.398
(0.252)
Labor Committee 0.492***
(0.137)
0.579***
(0.140)
0.115
(0.215)
0.095
(0.224)
Ideological Extremity -1.074*
(0.515)
-0.579
(0.539)
1.129#
(0.652)
1.492#
(0.768)
Republican 0.037
(0.156)
-5.557**
(1.737)
0.122
(0.216)
1.134
(3.111)
Proportion of Blue Collar Population in State 3.868
(2.588)
-0.744
(2.812)
0.094
(4.160)
1.792
(4.676)
Republican*Blue Collar Prop. 12.507**
(4.800)
-7.027
(8.244)
Democratic Presidential Candidate’s Vote Share (%) 0.015
(0.010)
-0.005
(0.010)
0.050**
(0.017)
0.045#
(0.023)
Republican*Democratic Presidential Vote Share 0.054**
(0.019)
0.012
(0.038)
# of Labor Bill Introductions 0.099**
(0.029)
0.093**
(0.027)
# of Policy Contacts with Labor Dept. 0.034**
(0.010)
0.034**
(0.011)
Partial Term -0.743**
(0.286)
-0.737*
(0.299)
-1.603**
(0.502)
-1.684***
(0.461)
Congress 0.093
(0.087)
0.111
(0.083)
-0.139
(0.137)
-0.146
(0.132)
Constant 0.366
(1.050)
2.242*
(1.056)
-2.948*
(1.656)
-3.183
(2.029)
N 209 209 209 209
Log likelihood -631.597 -625.989 -325.280 -324.519
Note: Cell entries are negative binomial regression coefficients with robust standard errors, clustering on the individual senator (number of clusters=124). The
dependent variables are the number of correspondences concerning policy initiated by the senator to the department each Congress (models 1 and 2) and the number
of labor bills introduced by a senator (models 3 and 4).  *** = p <.001; ** =p<.01; * = p <.05; # = p <.1
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Table B.2 Replication, Table 5.2 including Committee Chair and Ranking Member as Leaders
Policy Contacts Bill Introductions
Variables Baseline
Model (1)
(Robust
S.E.)
Full
Model (2)
(Robust
S.E.)
Baseline
Model (3)
(Robust
S.E.)
Full
Model (4)
(Robust
S.E.)
Seniority 0.027***
(0.006)
0.027***
(0.006)
-0.010
(0.009)
-0.009
(0.009)
Leader 0.542***
(0.129)
0.136***
(0.136)
0.153
(0.266)
0.144
(0.292)
Homeland Security Committee 0.327#
(0.174)
0.328#
(0.176)
0.229
(0.261)
0.197
(0.252)
Ideological Extremity -0.392
(0.430)
-0.435
(0.472)
0.721
(0.632)
1.006
(0.641)
Democrat -0.197
(0.132)
0.030
(0.781)
0.332#
(0.194)
-0.651
(1.093)
Southern Border State -0.035
(0.124)
-0.135
(0.157)
1.080***
(0.255)
1.092**
(0.406)
Democrat*Southern Border State 0.268
(0.240)
-0.011
(0.575)
Republican Presidential Candidate’s Vote Share
(%)
-0.019**
(0.007)
-0.016
(0.011)
-0.016
(0.011)
-0.029
(0.019)
Democrat*Republican Presidential Vote Share -0.005
(0.016)
0.020
(0.022)
# of Homeland Security Bill Introductions 0.097***
(0.025)
0.092***
(0.023)
# of Policy Contacts with DHS 0.042***
(0.011)
0.041**
(0.012)
Partial Term -0.959**
(0.288)
-0.935**
(0.287)
-1.190***
(0.327)
-1.202***
(0.345)
Congress -0.391***
(0.077)
-0.399***
(0.077)
-0.390**
(0.140)
-0.380**
(0.142)
Constant 2.800***
(0.404)
2.666***
(0.547)
0.325
(0.667)
-0.919
(1.002)
N 209 209 209 209
Log likelihood -594.340 -593.835 -321.927 -321.651
Note: Cell entries are negative binomial regression coefficients with robust standard errors, clustering on the individual senator (number
of clusters=124). The dependent variables are the number of correspondences concerning policy initiated by the senator to the department
each Congress (models 1 and 2) and the number of homeland security bills introduced by a senator (models 3 and 4). *** = p <.001; **
=p<.01; * = p <.05; # = p <.1
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Table B.3 Replication, Table 5.1: 110th Congress
Policy Contacts Bill Introductions
Variables Baseline
Model (1)
(S.E.)
Full
Model (2)
(S.E.)
Baseline
Model (3)
(S.E.)
Full
Model (4)
(S.E.)
Seniority 0.016*
(0.007)
0.016*
(0.006)
-.010
(0.012)
-0.009
(0.012)
Leader -0.088
(0.242)
-0.139
(0.239)
0.586#
(0.300)
0.605#
(0.333)
Labor Committee 0.418*
(0.206)
0.500**
(0.200)
0.277
(0.300)
0.320
(0.309)
Ideological Extremity -0.764
(0.538)
-0.082
(0.618)
0.643
(0.793)
0.786
(0.931)
Republican 0.122
(0.172)
-4.074#
(1.188)
0.155
(0.278)
-2.364
(3.875)
Proportion of Blue Collar Population in State 2.463
(3.073)
0.439
(3.764)
-0.889
(4.880)
-2.540
(5.758)
Republican*Blue Collar Prop. 5.965
(6.215)
5.399
(10.993)
Democratic Presidential Candidate’s Vote Share (%) 0.011
(0.010)
-0.007
(0.013)
0.043*
(0.017)
0.035#
(0.021)
Republican*Democratic Presidential Vote Share 0.056*
(0.023)
0.025
(0.040)
# of Labor Bill Introductions 0.094**
(0.038)
0.086**
(0.037)
# of Policy Contacts with Labor Dept. 0.032*
(0.014)
0.030*
(0.014)
Partial Term -0.235
(0.383)
-0.135
(0.380)
-1.526*
(0.861)
-1.516#
(0.865)
Constant 0.748
(1.081)
1.926
(1.312)
-2.207
(1.782)
-1.442
(2.093)
N 102 102 102 102
Log likelihood -308.772 -305.802 -164.542 -164.314
Note: Cell entries are negative binomial regression coefficients. The dependent variables are the number of
correspondences concerning policy initiated by the senator to the department each Congress (models 1 and 2) and
the number of labor bills introduced by a senator (models 3 and 4).  *** = p <.001; ** =p<.01; * = p <.05; # = p
<.1
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Table B.4 Replication, Table 5.1: 111th Congress
Policy Contacts Bill Introductions
Variables Baseline
Model (1)
(S.E.)
Full
Model (2)
(S.E.)
Baseline
Model (3)
(S.E.)
Full
Model (4)
(S.E.)
Seniority 0.018*
(0.007)
0.018*
(0.007)
-0.003
(0.011)
-0.002
(0.011)
Leader 0.196
(0.242)
0.233
(0.230)
0.514#
(0.284)
0.472
(0.287)
Labor Committee 0.578**
(0.202)
0.664**
(0.197)
0.083
(0.279)
0.058
(0.291)
Ideological Extremity -1.344*
(0.534)
-0.700
(0.676)
1.663*
(0.774)
2.173*
(0.975)
Republican -0.032
(0.192)
-7.247**
(2.748)
0.056
(0.294)
6.021
(4.372)
Proportion of Blue Collar Population in State 4.706
(3.831)
-2.489
(4.683)
0.703
(5.478)
6.150
(6.296)
Republican*Blue Collar Prop. 16.976*
(7.597)
-0.007
(0.047)
Democratic Presidential Candidate’s Vote Share (%) 0.021
(0.014)
-0.009
(0.019)
0.052**
(0.019)
0.052*
(0.026)
Republican*Democratic Presidential Vote Share 0.066*
(0.030)
-0.007
(0.047)
# of Labor Bill Introductions 0.101*
(0.042)
0.108**
(0.041)
# of Policy Contacts with Labor Dept. 0.042**
(0.013)
0.045**
(0.013)
Partial Term -1.139***
(0.312)
-1.105**
(0.341)
-1.586*
(0.633)
-1.984**
(0.686)
Constant 0.063
(1.364)
2.985#
(1.738)
-3.691#
(1.918)
-5.037*
(2.376)
N 107 107 107 107
Log likelihood -319.894 -316.550 -158.647 -156.373
Note: Cell entries are negative binomial regression coefficients. The dependent variables are the number of
correspondences concerning policy initiated by the senator to the department each Congress (models 1 and 2) and
the number of labor bills introduced by a senator (models 3 and 4).  *** = p <.001; ** =p<.01; * = p <.05; # = p
<.1
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Table B.5 Replication, Table 5.2: 110th Congress
Policy Contacts Bill Introductions
Variables Baseline
Model (1)
(S.E.)
Full
Model (2)
(S.E.)
Baseline
Model (3)
(S.E.)
Full
Model (4)
(S.E.)
Seniority 0.027***
(0.006)
0.023***
(0.006)
-0.014
(0.010)
-0.013
(0.010)
Leader 0.516**
(0.192)
0.543**
(0.204)
0.277
(0.323)
0.285
(0.335)
Homeland Security Committee 0.414
(0.255)
0.455#
(0.266)
0.335
(0.428)
0.242
(0.451)
Ideological Extremity -0.781#
(0.429)
-0.942#
(0.503)
0.944
(0.748)
1.241
(0.891)
Democrat -0.289#
(0.158)
0.258
(0.912)
0.285
(0.280)
-0.630
(1.634)
Southern Border State -0.196
(0.192)
-0.212
(0.233)
1.103***
(0.258)
1.052**
(0.351)
Democrat*Southern Border State 0.023
(0.399)
0.141
(0.553)
Republican Presidential Candidate’s Vote Share
(%)
-0.030***
(0.008)
-0.023
(0.014)
-0.019
(0.015)
-0.030
(0.026)
Democrat*Republican Presidential Vote Share -0.011
(0.018)
0.018
(0.033)
# of Homeland Security Bill Introductions 0.083**
(0.026)
0.083**
(0.028)
# of Policy Contacts with DHS 0.037**
(0.012)
0.037**
(0.012)
Partial Term -0.763*
(0.376)
-0.801*
(0.383)
-0.970
(0.630)
-0.881
(0.643)
Constant 3.653***
(0.450)
3.338***
(0.687)
0.545
(0.916)
1.053
(1.272)
N 102 102 102 102
Log likelihood -311.259 -311.071 -175.692 -175.498
Note: Cell entries are negative binomial regression coefficients. The dependent variables are the number of
correspondences concerning policy initiated by the senator to the department each Congress (models 1 and 2)
and the number of homeland security bills introduced by a senator (models 3 and 4). *** = p <.001; **
=p<.01; * = p <.05; # = p <.1
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Table B.6 Replication, Table 5.2: 111th Congress
Policy Contacts Bill Introductions
Variables Baseline
Model (1)
(S.E.)
Full
Model (2)
(S.E.)
Baseline
Model (3)
(S.E.)
Full
Model (4)
(S.E.)
Seniority 0.034***
(0.007)
0.034***
(0.006)
-0.007
(0.013)
-0.005
(0.013)
Leader 0.480*
(0.215)
0.515*
(0.218)
0.490
(0.358)
0.487
(0.365)
Homeland Security Committee 0.433*
(0.194)
0.424*
(0.193)
0.139
(0.370)
0.127
(0.371)
Ideological Extremity -0.141
(0.479)
-0.012
(0.600)
0.404
(0.924)
0.794
(1.155)
Democrat -0.158
(0.179)
-0.519
(1.226)
0.364
(0.333)
-1.372
(2.378)
Southern Border State -0.003
(0.215)
-0.131
(0.272)
1.008**
(0.333)
1.232**
(0.472)
Democrat*Southern Border State 0.314
(0.410)
0.399
(0.659)
Republican Presidential Candidate’s Vote Share
(%)
-0.011
(0.009)
-0.015
(0.018)
-0.015
(0.017)
-0.041
(0.037)
Democrat*Republican Presidential Vote Share 0.006
(0.025)
0.036
(0.037)
# of Homeland Security Bill Introductions 0.140**
(0.043)
0.134**
(0.043)
# of Policy Contacts with DHS 0.069**
(0.023)
0.068**
(0.023)
Partial Term -1.099***
(0.307)
-1.115**
(0.326)
-1.321*
(0.660)
-1.494*
(0.690)
Constant 1.740**
(0.558)
1.952*
(0.880)
0.274
(1.107)
0.881
(1.860)
N 107 107 107 107
Log likelihood -281.212 -280.871 -142.472 -142.020
Note: Cell entries are negative binomial regression coefficients. The dependent variables are the number of
correspondences concerning policy initiated by the senator to the department each Congress (models 1 and 2)
and the number of homeland security bills introduced by a senator (models 3 and 4). *** = p <.001; **
=p<.01; * = p <.05; # = p <.1
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Figure B.1 Replication of Figure 5.1, Predicted Number of Labor Bill Introductions across
Blue Collar Population, 110th (left) 111th (right)
Figure B.2 Marginal Effect of Party Affiliation across Blue Collar Population, 110th (left)
111th (right)
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Table B.7 Replication, Table 5.1 excluding Senators Serving a Partial Congress
Policy Contacts Bill Introductions
Variables Baseline
Model (1)
(Robust
S.E.)
Full
Model (2)
(Robust
S.E.)
Baseline
Model (3)
(Robust
S.E.)
Full
Model (4)
(Robust
S.E.)
Seniority 0.012#
(0.006)
0.012*
(0.006)
-.004
(0.009)
-0.004
(0.009)
Leader -0.039
(0.167)
0.007
(0.165)
0.549*
(0.249)
0.550*
(0.251)
Labor Committee 0.336*
(0.143)
0.436**
(0.150)
0.135
(0.219)
0.146
(0.228)
Ideological Extremity -0.955#
(0.503)
-0.411
(0.535)
1.306*
(0.642)
1.530*
(0.741)
Republican 0.084
(0.158)
-5.799**
(1.744)
0.030
(0.213)
-0.712
(3.152)
Proportion of Blue Collar Population in State 3.276
(2.660)
-1.297
(2.748)
1.523
(3.992)
1.405
(4.524)
Republican*Blue Collar Prop. 12.853*
(5.116)
-0.388
(8.431)
Democratic Presidential Candidate’s Vote Share (%) 0.015
(0.010)
-0.006
(0.010)
0.047**
(0.017)
0.041#
(0.023)
Republican*Democratic Presidential Vote Share 0.058**
(0.019)
0.016
(0.038)
# of Labor Bill Introductions 0.104***
(0.027)
0.096***
(0.026)
# of Policy Contacts with Labor Dept. 0.036***
(0.010)
0.035**
(0.010)
Congress 0.131
(0.083)
0.157*
(0.077)
-0.134
(0.134)
-0.126
(0.129)
Constant 0.482
(0.083)
2.411*
(1.025)
-3.252*
(1.608)
-2.982
(1.945)
N 193 193 193 193
Log likelihood -594.317 -588.148 -313.508 -313.318
Note: Cell entries are negative binomial regression coefficients with robust standard errors, clustering on the
individual senator (number of clusters=112). The dependent variables are the number of correspondences
concerning policy initiated by the senator to the department each Congress (models 1 and 2) and the number of
labor bills introduced by a senator (models 3 and 4).  *** = p <.001; ** =p<.01; * = p <.05; # = p <.1
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Table B.8 Replication, Table 5.2 excluding Senators Serving a Partial Congress
Policy Contacts Bill Introductions
Variables Baseline
Model (1)
(Robust
S.E.)
Full
Model (2)
(Robust
S.E.)
Baseline
Model (3)
(Robust
S.E.)
Full
Model (4)
(Robust
S.E.)
Seniority 0.024***
(0.005)
0.028***
(0.006)
-0.012
(0.010)
-0.011
(0.010)
Leader 0.421**
(0.144)
0.525**
(0.157)
0.087
(0.292)
0.082
(0.317)
Homeland Security Committee 0.378#
(0.204)
0.415*
(0.192)
0.260
(0.287)
0.226
(0.277)
Ideological Extremity -0.498
(0.445)
-0.591
(0.475)
0.855
(0.676)
1.111
(0.684)
Democrat -0.271*
(0.134)
0.067
(0.801)
0.352#
(0.206)
-0.517
(1.158)
Southern Border State -0.034
(0.127)
0.144
(0.163)
1.032***
(0.268)
1.027*
(0.430)
Democrat*Border or Coastal State 0.198
(0.230)
0.027
(0.579)
Republican Presidential Candidate’s Vote Share
(%)
-0.022**
(0.007)
-0.017
(0.011)
-0.017
(0.012)
-0.028
(0.021)
Democrat*Republican Presidential Vote Share -0.007
(0.016)
0.017
(0.023)
# of Homeland Security Bill Introductions 0.102***
(0.024)
0.104***
(0.026)
# of Policy Contacts with DHS 0.043***
(0.010)
0.043***
(0.011)
Congress 0.102***
(0.024)
-0.404***
(0.076)
-0.369*
(0.143)
-0.356*
(0.145)
Constant 3.097***
(0.416)
2.796***
(0.563)
0.315
(0.759)
0.833
(1.078)
N 193 209 193 193
Log likelihood -566.569 -596.942 -309.696 -309.494
Note: Cell entries are negative binomial regression coefficients with robust standard errors, clustering on the
individual senator (number of clusters=112). The dependent variables are the number of correspondences
concerning policy initiated by the senator to the department each Congress (models 1 and 2) and the number
of homeland security bills introduced by a senator (models 3 and 4). *** = p <.001; ** =p<.01; * = p <.05; # =
p <.1
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FIGURE B.3 Replication of Figure 5.1, Predicted Number of Labor Bill Introductions
across Blue Collar Population, excluding Senators serving a Partial Congress
FIGURE B.4 Marginal Effect of Party Affiliation across Blue Collar Population, excluding
Senators serving a Partial Congress
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Table B.9 Replication, Table 5.1 excluding Outliers
Policy Contacts Bill Introductions
Variables Baseline
Model (1)
(Robust
S.E.)
Full
Model (2)
(Robust
S.E.)
Baseline
Model (3)
(Robust
S.E.)
Full
Model (4)
(Robust
S.E.)
Seniority 0.014*
(0.007)
0.014*
(0.006)
-.005
(0.010)
-0.005
(0.010)
Leader 0.099
(0.168)
0.115
(0.167)
0.457#
(0.259)
0.446
(0.263)
Labor Committee 0.491***
(0.136)
0.557***
(0.138)
0.169
(0.216)
0.151
(0.226)
Ideological Extremity -0.810
(0.494)
-0.509
(0.530)
1.118
(0.681)
1.450#
(0.774)
Republican -0.067
(0.150)
-4.571*
(1.778)
0.127
(0.216)
0.872
(3.045)
Proportion of Blue Collar Population in State 3.087
(2.520)
-0.892
(2.778)
0.692
(4.320)
0.775
(4.757)
Republican*Blue Collar Prop. 11.000*
(4.865)
-5.928
(8.250)
Democratic Presidential Candidate’s Vote Share (%) 0.010
(0.010)
-0.004
(0.010)
0.046**
(0.017)
0.042#
(0.022)
Republican*Democratic Presidential Vote Share 0.039*
(0.019)
-5.928
(8.250)
# of Labor Bill Introductions 0.072*
(0.032)
0.072*
(0.032)
# of Policy Contacts with Labor Dept. 0.038**
(0.012)
0.037**
(0.013)
Partial Term -0.723*
(0.281)
-0.711*
(0.289)
-1.562**
(0.507)
-1.634***
(0.467)
Congress 0.051
(0.085)
0.072
(0.085)
-0.178
(0.142)
-0.181
(0.138)
Constant 0.757
(1.005)
2.235*
(1.049)
-2.644
(1.637)
-2.823
(1.951)
N 204 204 207 207
Log likelihood -603.589 -600.065 -317.423 -316.829
Note: Cell entries are negative binomial regression coefficients with robust standard errors, clustering on the
individual senator (number of clusters=123). The dependent variables are the number of correspondences
concerning policy initiated by the senator to the department each Congress (models 1 and 2) and the number of
labor bills introduced by a senator (models 3 and 4). *** = p <.001; ** =p<.01; * = p <.05; # = p <.1
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Table B.10 Replication, Table 5.2 excluding Outliers
Policy Contacts Bill Introductions
Variables Baseline
Model (1)
(Robust
S.E.)
Full
Model (2)
(Robust
S.E.)
Baseline
Model (3)
(Robust
S.E.)
Full
Model (4)
(Robust
S.E.)
Seniority 0.027***
(0.006)
0.027***
(0.006)
-0.006
(0.008)
-0.005
(0.008)
Leader 0.424**
(0.142)
0.458**
(0.148)
0.282
(0.249)
0.311
(0.265)
Homeland Security Committee 0.348#
(0.182)
0.356#
(0.189)
0.104
(0.273)
0.093
(0.259)
Ideological Extremity -0.353
(0.441)
-0.414
(0.484)
0.204
(0.565)
0.488
(0.568)
Democrat -0.201
(0.136)
0.063
(0.820)
0.264
(0.193)
-0.656
(1.084)
Southern Border State -0.008
(0.125)
-0.097
(0.159)
0.673**
(0.222)
0.561#
(0.288)
Democrat*Southern Border State 0.231
(0.238)
0.257
(0.482)
Republican Presidential Candidate’s Vote Share
(%)
-0.019**
(0.007)
-0.015
(0.011)
-0.024*
(0.012)
-0.036#
(0.019)
Democrat*Republican Presidential Vote Share -0.006
(0.016)
0.018
(0.022)
# of Homeland Security Bill Introductions 0.093***
(0.022)
0.089***
(0.023)
# of Policy Contacts with DHS 0.037***
(0.009)
0.036***
(0.010)
Partial Term -0.950**
(0.297)
-0.929**
(0.297)
-0.997**
(0.326)
-0.983**
(0.336)
Congress -0.345***
(0.080)
-0.352***
(0.080)
-0.339*
(0.146)
-0.346*
(0.146)
Constant 2.763***
(0.419)
2.616***
(0.562)
0.900
(0.677)
-1.458
(0.981)
N 205 205 205 205
Log likelihood -576.366 -575.961 -298.541 -298.085
Note: Cell entries are negative binomial regression coefficients with robust standard errors, clustering on the
individual senator (number of clusters=124). The dependent variables are the number of correspondences
concerning policy initiated by the senator to the department each Congress (models 1 and 2) and the number
of homeland security bills introduced by a senator (models 3 and 4). *** = p <.001; ** =p<.01; * = p <.05; # =
p <.1
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FIGURE B.5 Replication of Figure 5.1, Predicted Number of Labor Bill Introductions
across Blue Collar Population, excluding Outliers
FIGURE B.6 Marginal Effect of Party Affiliation across Blue Collar Population, excluding
Outliers
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Table B.11 Replication of Table  5.3 including Committee Chair and Ranking Member as Leaders
Difference Ratio
Variables Baseline
Model
(Robust
S.E.)
Full
Model
(Robust
S.E.)
Baseline
Model
(Robust
S.E.)
Full
Model
(Robust
S.E.)
Seniority 0.147#
(0.084)
0.161*
(0.080)
0.002
(0.002)
0.002
(0.002)
Leader 1.617
(1.716)
1.530
(1.667)
-0.024
(0.042)
-0.025
(0.042)
Labor Committee 4.493**
(1.524)
5.326**
(1.528)
0.028
(0.028)
0.039
(0.028)
Ideological Extremity -9.271#
(4.941)
-5.147
(4.723)
-0.193*
(0.077)
-0.157#
(0.090)
Republican 0.668
(1.742)
-53.694**
(15.063)
0.003
(0.029)
-0.707*
(0.301)
Proportion of Blue Collar Population in State 39.041
(27.426)
-9.420
(31.444)
0.546
(0.497)
-0.152
(0.655)
Republican*Blue Collar Prop. 117.502*
(45.425)
1.727#
(0.950)
Democratic Presidential Candidate’s Vote Share (%) 0.144
(0.095)
-0.074
(0.089)
-0.002
(0.002)
-0.005*
(0.002)
Republican*Democratic Presidential Vote Share 0.055**
(0.165)
0.006#
(0.003)
Partial Term -2.006
(1.780)
-2.032
(1.757)
0.045
(0.038)
0.046
(0.035)
Congress 1.154
(0.889)
1.356
(0.848)
0.026
(0.017)
0.029
(0.018)
Constant -9.134
(9.643)
11.434
(9.852)
1.046***
(0.164)
1.318***
(0.216)
N 209 209 209 209
R-squared 0.165 0.216 0.108 0.149
Note: Cell entries are OLS coefficients with robust standard errors, clustering on the individual senator (number of
clusters=124). The unit of analysis is the senator-Congress.  The dependent variables are the difference between
the number of correspondences concerning policy initiated by the senator to the department and the number of
labor bills introduced by a senator (models 1 and 2) and a ratio comprised of the number policy contacts in the
numerator and bill introductions in the denominator (models 3 and 4).  *** = p <.001; ** =p<.01; * = p <.05; # = p
<.1
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Table B.12 Replication of Table  5.3 including Committee Chair and Ranking Member as
Leaders
Difference Ratio
Variables Baseline
Model
(Robust
S.E.)
Full
Model
(Robust
S.E.)
Baseline
Model
(Robust
S.E.)
Full
Model
(Robust
S.E.)
Seniority 0.214**
(0.066)
0.215**
(0.066)
0.004**
(0.001)
0.004**
(0.001)
Leader 3.682*
(1.649)
3.845*
(1.672)
0.049#
(0.027)
0.048#
(0.028)
Homeland Security Committee 2.767
(1.838)
2.722
(1.904)
0.033
(0.034)
0.033
(0.034)
Ideological Extremity -5.754
(4.022)
-5.268
(4.191)
-0.098
(0.066)
-0.097
(0.070)
Democrat -2.068
(1.404)
-3.834
(8.310)
-0.045*
(0.022)
-0.048
(0.124)
Southern Border State -1.060
(1.105)
-1.971
(1.330)
-0.073**
(0.024)
-0.067*
(0.032)
Democrat*Southern Border State 2.471
(2.245)
-0.015
(0.048)
Republican Presidential Candidate’s Vote Share
(%)
-0.180*
(0.070)
-0.197#
(0.109)
-0.002
(0.001)
-0.002
(0.002)
Democrat*Republican Presidential Vote Share 0.028
(0.158)
0.000
(0.002)
Partial Term -2.765*
(1.314)
-2.571*
(1.272)
-0.012
(0.022)
-0.013
(0.022)
Congress -3.188***
(0.757)
-3.183***
(0.766)
-0.033*
(0.015)
-0.033*
(0.015)
Constant 17.504**
(5.319)
18.391**
(6.683)
1.202***
(0.079)
1.204***
(0.088)
N 209 209 209 209
R-squared 0.281 0.285 0.235 0.235
Note: Cell entries are OLS coefficients with robust standard errors, clustering on the individual senator
(number of clusters=124). The unit of analysis is the senator-Congress.  The dependent variables are the
difference between the number of correspondences concerning policy initiated by the senator to the
department and the number of labor bills introduced by a senator (models 1 and 2) and a ratio comprised of
the number policy contacts in the numerator and bill introductions in the denominator (models 3 and 4).  *** =
p <.001; ** =p<.01; * = p <.05; # = p <.1
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Table B.13 Replication of Table  5.3, 110th
Difference Ratio
Variables Baseline
Model
(S.E.)
Full
Model
(S.E.)
Baseline
Model
(S.E.)
Full
Model
(S.E.)
Seniority 0.194**
(0.068)
0.207**
(0.067)
0.002#
(0.001)
0.003#
(0.001)
Leader -0.836
(2.270)
-1.381
(2.253)
-0.060
(0.047)
-0.068
(0.048)
Labor Committee 4.066*
(1.932)
4.712*
(1.915)
0.000
(0.040)
0.005
(0.041)
Ideological Extremity -6.066
(5.309)
-1.704
(5.913)
-0.119
(0.110)
-0.058
(0.126)
Republican 0.956
(1.710)
-44.878*
(21.788)
0.006
(0.035)
-0.320
(0.463)
Proportion of Blue Collar Population in State 15.055
(31.483)
-19.112
(38.651)
0.569
(0.653)
0.427
(0.822)
Republican*Blue Collar Prop. 82.376
(63.479)
0.259
(1.350)
Democratic Presidential Candidate’s Vote Share
(%)
0.095
(0.100)
-0.111
(0.129)
-0.002
(0.002)
-0.004
(0.003)
Republican*Democratic Presidential Vote Share 82.376
(63.479)
0.005
(0.005)
Partial Term 0.286
(3.589)
-0.771
(3.699)
0.039
(0.074)
0.054
(0.079)
Constant -2.686
(11.184)
14.326
(13.753)
1.006***
(0.232)
1.123***
(0.292)
N 102 102 102 102
R-squared 0.153 0.205 0.106 0.119
Note: Cell entries are OLS coefficients. The dependent variables are the difference between the number
of correspondences concerning policy initiated by the senator to the department and the number of labor
bills introduced by a senator (models 1 and 2) and a ratio comprised of the number policy contacts in the
numerator and bill introductions in the denominator (models 3 and 4).  *** = p <.001; ** =p<.01; * = p
<.05; # = p <.1
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Table B.14 Replication of Table  5.3, 111th
Difference Ratio
Variables Baseline
Model
(S.E.)
Full
Model
(S.E.)
Baseline
Model
(S.E.)
Full
Model
(S.E.)
Seniority 0.104
(0.072)
0.123#
(0.070)
0.002
(0.001)
0.002#
(0.001)
Leader 0.520
(2.192)
0.926
(2.149)
-0.035
(0.044)
-0.026
(0.043)
Labor Committee 4.713*
(1.915)
5.691**
(1.921)
0.044
(0.039)
0.066#
(0.039)
Ideological Extremity -11.323*
(4.833)
-6.169
(5.782)
-0.236*
(0.097)
-0.211#
(0.117)
Republican 0.332
(1.798)
-62.415*
(24.671)
-0.002
(0.036)
-1.167*
(0.499)
Proportion of Blue Collar Population in State 67.311*
(33.499)
-7.639
(42.671)
0.517
(0.675)
-0.809
(0.854)
Republican*Blue Collar Prop. 141.982*
(70.252)
3.429*
(1.421)
Democratic Presidential Candidate’s Vote Share
(%)
0.214
(0.112)
-0.034
(0.152)
-0.002
(0.002)
-0.006#
(0.003)
Republican*Democratic Presidential Vote Share 0.613*
(0.261)
0.008
(0.005)
Partial Term -3.215
(2.496)
-2.861
(2.654)
0.046
(0.050)
0.076
(0.054)
Constant -16.111
(11.598)
7.895
(14.697)
1.097***
(0.234)
1.536***
(0.297)
N 107 107 107 107
R-squared 0.188 0.241 0.130 0.181
Note: Cell entries are OLS coefficients. The dependent variables are the difference between the number
of correspondences concerning policy initiated by the senator to the department and the number of labor
bills introduced by a senator (models 1 and 2) and a ratio comprised of the number policy contacts in the
numerator and bill introductions in the denominator (models 3 and 4).  *** = p <.001; ** =p<.01; * = p
<.05; # = p <.1
169
FIGURE B.7 Replication of Figure 5.3, Predicted Difference between Policy Contact with
the Labor Department and Bill Introductions (left) and Ratio of Policy Contact to Bill
Introductions (right) across Blue Collar Population, Labor Model, 110th
FIGURE B.8 Replication of Figure 5.2, Marginal Effects of Party on the Difference
between Policy Contact with the Labor Department and Bill Introductions (left) and Ratio
of Policy Contact to Bill Introductions (right) across Blue Collar Population, Labor Model,
110th
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FIGURE B.9 Replication of Figure 5.5, Predicted Difference between Policy Contact with
the Labor Department and Bill Introductions (left) and Ratio of Policy Contact to Bill
Introductions (right) across Democratic Presidential Vote Share, Labor Model, 110th
FIGURE B.10: Replication of Figure 5.4, Marginal Effects of Party on the Difference
between Policy Contact with the Labor Department and Bill Introductions (left) and Ratio
of Policy Contact to Bill Introductions (right) across Democratic Presidential Vote Share,
Labor Model, 110th
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FIGURE B.11 Replication of Figure 5.3, Predicted Difference between Policy Contact with
the Labor Department and Bill Introductions (left) and Ratio of Policy Contact to Bill
Introductions (right) across Blue Collar Population, Labor Model, 111th
FIGURE B.12 Replication of Figure 5.2, Marginal Effects of Party on the Difference
between Policy Contact with the Labor Department and Bill Introductions (left) and Ratio
of Policy Contact to Bill Introductions (right) across Blue Collar Population, Labor Model,
111th
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FIGURE B.13 Replication of Figure 5.5, Predicted Difference between Policy Contact with
the Labor Department and Bill Introductions (left) and Ratio of Policy Contact to Bill
Introductions (right) across Democratic Presidential Vote Share, Labor Model, 111th
FIGURE B.14 Replication of Figure 5.4, Marginal Effects of Party on the Difference
between Policy Contact with the Labor Department and Bill Introductions (left) and Ratio
of Policy Contact to Bill Introductions (right) across Democratic Presidential Vote Share,
Labor Model, 111th
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Table B.15 Replication of Table  5.3: 110th Congress
Difference Ratio
Variables Baseline
Model
(S.E.)
Full
Model
(S.E.)
Baseline
Model
(S.E.)
Full
Model
(S.E.)
Seniority 0.252**
(0.071)
0.250**
(0.071)
0.005***
(0.001)
0.005***
(0.001)
Leader 5.788*
(2.361)
6.320*
(2.487)
0.099*
(0.043)
0.099*
(0.046)
Homeland Security Committee 3.866
(3.016)
4.195
(3.121)
0.046
(0.055)
0.051
(0.057)
Ideological Extremity -9.193#
(5.298)
-10.417#
(6.074)
-0.169#
(0.097)
-0.190#
(0.111)
Democrat -3.500#
(1.919)
1.014
(11.078)
-0.066#
(0.035)
-0.015
(0.203)
Southern Border State -3.548#
(2.108)
-4.529#
(2.668)
-0.122**
(0.039)
-0.110*
(0.049)
Democrat*Southern Border State 2.714
(4.576)
-0.034
(0.084)
Republican Presidential Candidate’s Vote
Share (%)
-0.305**
(0.092)
-0.243
(0.166)
-0.003*
(0.002)
-0.002
(0.003)
Democrat*Republican Presidential Vote
Share
-0.100
(0.221)
0.002
(0.004)
Partial Term -2.049
(3.668)
-2.218
(3.819)
-0.000
(0.067)
-0.009
(0.070)
Constant 25.391***
(5.466)
22.735**
(8.287)
1.309***
(0.100)
1.264***
(0.152)
N 102 102 102 102
R-squared 0.311 0.315 0.305 0.308
Note: Cell entries are OLS coefficients with standard errors in parentheses. The dependent variables
are the difference between the number of correspondences concerning policy initiated by the senator
to the department and the number of labor bills introduced by a senator (models 1 and 2) and a ratio
comprised of the number policy contacts in the numerator and bill introductions in the denominator
(models 3 and 4).  *** = p <.001; ** =p<.01; * = p <.05; # = p <.1
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Table B.16 Replication of Table  5.3: 111th Congress
Difference Ratio
Variables Baseline
Model
(S.E.)
Full
Model
(S.E.)
Baseline
Model
(S.E.)
Full
Model
(S.E.)
Seniority 0.195***
(0.046)
0.198***
(0.046)
0.003***
(0.001)
0.003***
(0.001)
Leader 2.778#
(1.443)
2.935*
(1.454)
0.019
(0.029)
0.020
(0.029)
Homeland Security Committee 3.007*
(1.274)
2.992*
(1.279)
0.036
(0.025)
0.036
(0.026)
Ideological Extremity -1.507
(3.109)
0.133
(3.814)
-0.023
(0.062)
-0.015
(0.076)
Democrat -0.626
(1.175)
-6.264
(7.780)
-0.026
(0.023)
-0.053
(0.156)
Southern Border State -0.745
(1.339)
-0.291
(1.750)
-0.037
(0.027)
-0.041
(0.035)
Democrat*Southern Border State 2.680
(2.782)
0.010
(0.056)
Republican Presidential Candidate’s Vote
Share (%)
-0.039
(0.061)
-0.104
(0.116)
-0.000
(0.001)
-0.000
(0.002)
Democrat*Republican Presidential Vote
Share
0.106
(0.155)
0.001
(0.003)
Partial Term -2.235
(1.632)
-2.331
(1.735)
-0.007
(0.032)
-0.008
(0.035)
Constant 4.970
(3.806)
8.009
(5.809)
1.047***
(0.076)
1.062***
(0.116)
N 107 107 107 107
R-squared 0.264 0.264 0.178 0.178
Note: Cell entries are OLS coefficients with standard errors in parentheses. The dependent variables
are the difference between the number of correspondences concerning policy initiated by the senator
to the department and the number of labor bills introduced by a senator (models 1 and 2) and a ratio
comprised of the number policy contacts in the numerator and bill introductions in the denominator
(models 3 and 4).  *** = p <.001; ** =p<.01; * = p <.05; # = p <.1
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Table B.17 Replication of Table  5.3 excluding Senators serving a Partial Congress
Difference Ratio
Variables Baseline
Model
(Robust
S.E.)
Full
Model
(Robust
S.E.)
Baseline
Model
(Robust
S.E.)
Full
Model
(Robust
S.E.)
Seniority 0.121
(0.087)
0.142#
(0.083)
0.001
(0.001)
0.002
(0.002)
Leader -0.597
(1.502)
-0.420
(1.454)
-0.058
(0.043)
-0.055
(0.042)
Labor Committee 3.642*
(1.622)
4.538**
(1.656)
0.007
(0.028)
0.017
(0.029)
Ideological Extremity -9.306#
(5.428)
-4.619
(5.172)
-0.209*
(0.084)
-0.167#
(0.096)
Republican 1.296
(1.919)
-56.232**
(15.804)
0.020
(0.031)
-0.639*
(0.319)
Proportion of Blue Collar Population in State 33.416
(29.387)
-13.463
(32.823)
0.383
(0.544)
-0.193
(0.666)
Republican*Blue Collar Prop. 122.692*
(50.632)
1.549
(1.056)
Democratic Presidential Candidate’s Vote
Share (%)
0.159
(0.099)
-0.071
(0.090)
-0.002
(0.002)
-0.004*
(0.002)
Republican*Democratic Presidential Vote Share 0.583**
(0.173)
0.006#
(0.003)
Congress 1.287
(0.926)
1.511#
(0.886)
0.025
(0.018)
0.027
(0.018)
Constant -8.147
(9.9.44)
12.407
(10.101)
1.090***
(0.171)
1.325***
(0.215)
N 193 193 193 193
R-squared 0.120 0.180 0.108 0.126
Note: Cell entries are OLS coefficients with robust standard errors, clustering on the individual senator
(number of clusters=112). The unit of analysis is the senator-Congress.  The dependent variables are the
difference between the number of correspondences concerning policy initiated by the senator to the
department and the number of labor bills introduced by a senator (models 1 and 2) and a ratio comprised
of the number policy contacts in the numerator and bill introductions in the denominator (models 3 and
4).  *** = p <.001; ** =p<.01; * = p <.05; # = p <.1
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FIGURE B.15 Replication of Figure 5.3, Predicted Difference between Policy Contact with
the Labor Department and Bill Introductions (left) and Ratio of Policy Contact to Bill
Introductions (right) across Blue Collar Population (excluding Senators’ serving a Partial
Congress)
FIGURE B.16 Replication of Figure 5.2, Marginal Effects of Party on the Difference
between Policy Contact with the Labor Department and Bill Introductions (left) and Ratio
of Policy Contact to Bill Introductions (right) across Blue Collar Population (excluding
Senators’ serving a Partial Congress)
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FIGURE B.17 Replication of Figure 5.5, Predicted Difference between Policy Contact with
the Labor Department and Bill Introductions (left) and Ratio of Policy Contact to Bill
Introductions (right) across Democratic Presidential Vote Share (excluding Senators’
serving a Partial Congress)
FIGURE B.18 Replication of Figure 5.4, Marginal Effects of Party on the Difference
between Policy Contact with the Labor Department and Bill Introductions (left) and Ratio
of Policy Contact to Bill Introductions (right) across Democratic Presidential Vote Share
(excluding Senators’ serving a Partial Congress)
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Table B.18 Replication of Table  5.3 excluding Senators serving a Partial Congress
Difference Ratio
Variables Baseline
Model
(Robust
S.E.)
Full
Model
(Robust
S.E.)
Baseline
Model
(Robust
S.E.)
Full
Model
(Robust
S.E.)
Seniority 0.205**
(0.064)
0.206**
(0.065)
0.004**
(0.001)
0.004**
(0.001)
Leader 3.899*
(1.787)
4.133*
(1.834)
0.052
(0.031)
0.051
(0.032)
Homeland Security Committee 3.165
(2.169)
3.182
(2.279)
0.037
(0.039)
0.037
(0.040)
Ideological Extremity -5.912
(4.418)
-5.996
(4.490)
-0.103
(0.072)
-0.111
(0.074)
Democrat -2.598#
(1.520)
-2.063
(9.600)
-0.053*
(0.024)
-0.026
(0.140)
Southern Border State -0.957
(1.170)
-2.026
(1.439)
-0.073**
(0.026)
-0.068#
(0.037)
Democrat*Southern Border State 2.619
(2.276)
-0.012
(0.051)
Republican Presidential Candidate’s Vote
Share (%)
-0.202*
(0.078)
-0.189
(0.128)
-0.002
(0.001)
-0.002
(0.002)
Democrat*Republican Presidential Vote
Share
-0.018
(0.181)
0.000
(0.003)
Congress -3.271***
(0.810)
-3.287***
(0.382)
-0.034*
(0.016)
-0.034*
(0.016)
Constant 19.077**
(5.846)
18.580*
(7.773)
1.221***
(0.086)
1.207***
(0.101)
N 193 193 193 193
R-squared 0.253 0.257 0.215 0.215
Note: Cell entries are OLS coefficients with robust standard errors, clustering on the individual
senator (number of clusters=112). The unit of analysis is the senator-Congress.  The dependent
variables are the difference between the number of correspondences concerning policy initiated by
the senator to the department and the number of labor bills introduced by a senator (models 1 and 2)
and a ratio comprised of the number policy contacts in the numerator and bill introductions in the
denominator (models 3 and 4).  *** = p <.001; ** =p<.01; * = p <.05; # = p <.1
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Table B.19 Replication of Table  5.3 excluding Outliers
Difference Ratio
Variables Baseline
Model
(Robust
S.E.)
Full
Model
(Robust
S.E.)
Baseline
Model
(Robust
S.E.)
Full
Model
(Robust
S.E.)
Seniority 0.109
(0.077)
0.119
(0.077)
0.002
(0.002)
0.002
(0.002)
Leader 0.743
(1.682)
0.710
(1.630)
-0.030
(0.044)
-0.030
(0.043)
Labor Committee 3.537**
(1.212)
4.090**
(1.195)
0.027
(0.029)
0.035
(0.029)
Ideological Extremity -6.394#
(3.504)
-4.496
(3.774)
-0.155*
(0.075)
-0.138
(0.089)
Republican -0.586
(1.395)
-34.983*
(13.868)
-0.014
(0.030)
-0.539#
(0.304)
Proportion of Blue Collar Population in State 32.500
(22.878)
-1.921
(25.753)
0.449
(0.499)
-0.093
(0.650)
Republican*Blue Collar Prop. 80.683#
(43.537)
1.355
(0.939)
Democratic Presidential Candidate’s Vote Share
(%)
0.066
(0.076)
-0.059
(0.086)
-0.003#
(0.002)
-0.005*
(0.002)
Republican*Democratic Presidential Vote Share 0.318*
(0.137)
0.004
(0.003)
Partial Term -1.637
(1.835)
-1.616
(1.757)
0.047
(0.038)
0.048
(0.035)
Congress 0,944
(0.665)
1.088
(0.652)
0.026
(0.017)
0.028
(0.017)
Constant -4.412
(8.094)
8.469
(8.597)
1.089***
(0.161)
1.288***
(0.208)
N 203 203 203 203
R-squared 0.129 0.159 0.104 0.116
Note: Cell entries are OLS coefficients with robust standard errors, clustering on the individual senator (number of
clusters=123). The dependent variables are the difference between the number of correspondences concerning
policy initiated by the senator to the department and the number of labor bills introduced by a senator (models 1
and 2) and a ratio comprised of the number policy contacts in the numerator and bill introductions in the
denominator (models 3 and 4).  *** = p <.001; ** =p<.01; * = p <.05; # = p <.1
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FIGURE B.19 Replication of Figure 5.3, Predicted Difference between Policy Contact with
the Labor Department and Bill Introductions (left) and Ratio of Policy Contact to Bill
Introductions (right) across Blue Collar Population (excluding Outliers)
FIGURE B.20 Replication of Figure 5.2, Marginal Effects of Party on the Difference
between Policy Contact with the Labor Department and Bill Introductions (left) and Ratio
of Policy Contact to Bill Introductions (right) across Blue Collar Population (excluding
Outliers)
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FIGURE B.21 Replication of Figure 5.5, Predicted Difference between Policy Contact with
the Labor Department and Bill Introductions (left) and Ratio of Policy Contact to Bill
Introductions (right) across Democratic Presidential Vote Share (excluding Outliers)
FIGURE B.22 Replication of Figure 5.4, Marginal Effects of Party on the Difference
between Policy Contact with the Labor Department and Bill Introductions (left) and Ratio
of Policy Contact to Bill Introductions (right) across Democratic Presidential Vote Share
(excluding Outliers)
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Table B.20 Replication of Table  5.3 excluding Outliers
Difference Ratio
Variables Baseline
Model
(Robust
S.E.)
Full
Model
(Robust
S.E.)
Baseline
Model
(Robust
S.E.)
Full
Model
(Robust
S.E.)
Seniority 0.196***
(0.051)
0.198***
(0.052)
0.003***
(0.001)
0.003***
(0.001)
Leader 3.231#
(1.171)
2.440*
(1.204)
0.019
(0.020)
0.019
(0.021)
Homeland Security Committee 2.170
(1.384)
2.164
(1.388)
0.030
(0.026)
0.030
(0.026)
Ideological Extremity -2.310
(2.925)
-1.938
(3.381)
-0.051
(0.058)
-0.052
(0.060)
Democrat -1.587
(1.111)
-3.132
(6.515)
-0.038#
(0.020)
-0.003
(0.001)
Southern Border State -0.382
(1.067)
-0.998
(1.208)
-0.034#
(0.019)
-0.032
(0.022)
Democrat*Southern Border State 1.778
(2.348)
-0.005
(0.042)
Republican Presidential Candidate’s Vote
Share (%)
-0.117*
(0.052)
-0.132
(0.088)
-0.001
(0.001)
-0.001
(0.001)
Democrat*Republican Presidential Vote
Share
0.027
(0.124)
0.000
(0.002)
Partial Term -2.683*
(1.169)
-2.554*
(1.153)
-0.021
(0.021)
-0.022
(0.021)
Congress -2.088**
(0.590)
-2.109***
(0.584)
-0.021#
(0.012)
-0.021#
(0.012)
Constant 12.169***
(3.397)
12.963**
(4.644)
1.141***
(0.062)
1.137***
(0.078)
N 201 201 201 201
R-squared 0.253 0.256 0.173 0.173
Note: Cell entries are OLS coefficients with robust standard errors, clustering on the individual
senator (number of clusters=123). The unit of analysis is the senator-Congress.  The dependent
variables are the difference between the number of correspondences concerning policy initiated by
the senator to the department and the number of labor bills introduced by a senator (models 1 and 2)
and a ratio comprised of the number policy contacts in the numerator and bill introductions in the
denominator (models 3 and 4).  *** = p <.001; ** =p<.01; * = p <.05; # = p <.1
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FIGURE B.23 Marginal Effects of Party on Number of Labor Bill Introductions across
Blue Collar Population
FIGURE B.24 Marginal Effects of Party on Number of Labor Bill Introductions across
Democratic Presidential Vote Share
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FIGURE B.25 Number of Labor Bill Introductions across Democratic Presidential Vote
Share
FIGURE B.26 Marginal Effects of Party on Number of Homeland Security Bill
Introductions by Southern Border State
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FIGURE B.27 Predicted Number of Homeland Security Bill Introductions by Southern
Border State
FIGURE B.28 Marginal Effects of Party on Number of Homeland Security Bill
Introductions by Republican Presidential Vote Share
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FIGURE B.29 Predicted Number of Homeland Security Bill Introductions by Republican
Presidential Vote Share
FIGURES B.30 Marginal Effects of Party on the Difference between Policy Contact with
the Department and Bill Introductions (left) and Ratio of Policy Contact to Bill
Introductions (right) by Southern Border State
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FIGURE B.31 Predicted Difference between Policy Contact with the Department of
Homeland Security and Bill Introductions (left) and Ratio of Policy Contact to Bill
Introductions (right) by Southern Border State
FIGURES B.32 Marginal Effects of Party on the Difference between Policy Contact with
the Department and Bill Introductions (left) and Ratio of Policy Contact to Bill
Introductions (right) across Republican Presidential Vote Share
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FIGURE B.33 Predicted Difference between Policy Contact with the Department of
Homeland Security and Bill Introductions (left) and Ratio of Policy Contact to Bill
Introductions (right) across Republican Presidential Vote Share
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FIGURE B.34 Comparison of Predicted Number of Policy Contacts (left) and Bill
Introductions (right) by Seniority, Homeland Security
FIGURE B.35 Comparison of Predicted Number of Policy Contacts (left) and Bill
Introductions (right) by Seniority, Homeland Security
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FIGURE B.36 Comparison of Predicted Number of Policy Contacts (left) and Bill
Introductions (right) by Committee Membership, Labor
FIGURE B.37 Comparison of Predicted Number of Policy Contacts (left) and Bill
Introductions (right) by Committee Membership, Homeland Security
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FIGURE B.38 Comparison of Predicted Number of Policy Contacts (left) and Bill
Introductions (right) by Leadership, Labor
FIGURE B.39 Comparison of Predicted Number of Policy Contacts (left) and Bill
Introductions (right) by Leadership, Homeland Security
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APPENDIX C (Codebook)
Codebook
Correspondence Type
 All correspondence is coded as either grant related, policy, or non-policy (i.e., casework).
 A contact should be coded as non-policy if it concerns casework, non-policy related event
invitations, or similarly ceremonial correspondence (e.g., thank you notes and birthday
greetings).
 I operationalize casework as involving (1) a matter particular to just one constituent or a
family or (2) routine assistance often carried out by a congressional office’s caseworker
on a regular basis (e.g., VISA renewal, delayed social security checks, etc.). Most
correspondence labeled as non-policy satisfies both criteria. However, some of this
correspondence only applies to the first or the second criterion (such as a request for
expedited processing of a local business’ routine application).
 If there is doubt or uncertainty about whether a contact is about casework or policy, it
should be coded as casework (i.e. “non-policy”).
 Code contacts as grant requests if it involves a request for funds for a particular project or
organization within the state.
 Contacts coded as a grant request may describe support for a “proposal” or “application”
rather than explicitly state it is for a grant.
Examples of each category from the Department of Homeland Security’s congressional
correspondence logs:
Grant requests
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 “Writes to support the grant request by the Syracuse Fire Department for funding under
the Firefighters Grant Program.”
Policy
 Contact about “seeking information on DHS's use of reverse auctioning to procure goods
and services.”
 Contact requesting “an assessment of the vulnerability of offshore oil rigs to terrorist
attacks or sabotage in light of the Deepwater Horizon oil spill.”
 “Writes in support of stronger U.S. trade remedy laws regarding Chinese furniture.”
 “Requests an investigation into Hallmark Industrial, LLC who may have employed
undocumented workers and to hold those who are responsible accountable.”
 “Writes regarding how DHS implements air travel restrictions on passengers with
communicable diseases that pose a significant threat to public health.”
 “Writes regarding concerns with drugs and violence at the U.S.-Mexico border and the
need to take greater action.”
 “Shares concerns regarding need for multi-layered cargo screening process.”
Non-Policy/Casework
 “Customer is requesting the status of her husband's I-485 application.”
 “Customer is requesting assistance with an asylum petition.”
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Example of Congressional Correspondence Log (Department of Homeland Security)
The image below is a screenshot of a page of the log I received which records contact
from members of Congress. Each row contains information about a contact. The page includes
the date the contact was received by the department (third column), the name of the legislator
(sixth column), and a short description of the subject of the contact (ninth column). The “(b)(6)”
indicates the information was redacted due to the 6th FOIA exemption (see Chapter 3, p. 46). The
highlighted cell is the description of the subject of the letter from Senator Kirsten Gillibrand on
the following page (coded as “policy contact”).
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Letter from Senator Kirsten Gillibrand to Secretary Janet Napolitano (Department of
Homeland Security)45
45 This letter was obtained from Senator Kirsten Gillibrand’s website and was last accessed from
http://www.gillibrand.senate.gov/issues/immigration on July 21, 2015.
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